

THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
TUNISIA AND EGYPT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

AZİZE SERDE CAFEROĞLU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MARCH 2023

Approval of the thesis:

**THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
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ABSTRACT

THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN TUNISIA AND EGYPT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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March 2023, 137 pages

Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power in the 1980s and served as the “authoritarian” leaders of Egypt and Tunisia until 2011. For almost three decades, Tunisia and Egypt have gone through similar processes of repression and socio-economic strains. In 2010, the Arab Uprisings began as a response to oppressive and violent regimes of the Middle East within a form of anti-government protests. The Arab Uprisings was initially perceived as a revolutionary wave that would overthrow the authoritarian regimes and bring democracy. However, for most of the region, authoritarianism remained still. Following the uprisings, Egypt faced with a military takeover. Although it was followed by an election that brought Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated politician Mohamed Morsi in charge, in 2013, another military coup d’état overthrew Morsi. Tunisia, on the other hand, posited an exception in the region as the country embarked on a democratic transition through a process of non-violent dialogues and negotiations while struggling throughout the process. However, in July 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saeid dismissed the government and froze the parliament. For some, this action of the president was

interpreted as a civilian coup d'état. This thesis focuses on the different trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt following the Uprisings and the reasons for the failure of democratization process in two countries.

Keywords: The Arab Uprisings, the Middle East, authoritarianism, democratization, transition

ÖZ

ARAP AYAKLANMALARI VE TUNUS VE MISIR ARASINDAKİ FARKLILIK: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZ

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Mart 2023, 137 sayfa

Hüsnü Mübarek ve Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali 1980lerde iktidara geldi ve 2011 yılına kadar Mısır ve Tunus'un otoriter liderleri olarak görev yaptı. Neredeyse otuz yıl boyunca Tunus ve Mısır benzer baskı süreçlerinden ve sosyoekonomik baskılardan geçti. 2010 yılında Arap Ayaklanmaları, Orta Doğu'nun baskıcı ve şiddet içeren rejimlerine yanıt veren hükümet karşıtı protestolar olarak başladı. Arap Ayaklanmaları başlangıçta otoriter rejimleri devirecek ve demokrasi getirecek devrimci bir dalga olarak algılandı. Bununla birlikte, bölgenin çoğu için otoriter rejimler var olmaya devam etti. Ayaklanmaların ardından Mısır, askeri bir darbe ile karşı karşıya kaldı. Ayaklanmaları, Müslüman Kardeşler'e bağlı siyasetçi Muhammed Mursi'yi göreve getiren bir seçim izlese de 2013'te bir başka askeri darbe Mursi'yi devirdi. Tunus ise, şiddet içermeyen bir diyalog ve müzakere süreciyle demokratik bir geçiş süreciyle girmesiyle bölgede bir istisna olarak öne çıktı. Ancak Temmuz 2021'de Tunus Cumhurbaşkanı Kays Said Tunus hükümetini görevden aldı ve parlamentoyu dondurdu. Bazıları için cumhurbaşkanının bu eylemi bir sivil darbe olarak yorumlandı. Bu tez, Tunus ve Mısır'ın ayaklanmalar

sonrasındaki süreçlerinin farklılıklarına ve iki ülkede demokratikleşme sürecinin başarısız olmasının nedenlerine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Ayaklanmaları, Orta Doğu, otoriterizm, demokratikleşme, dönüşüm

Anneme

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has been a product of a two and a half year challenging process. However, to have an amazing thesis supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zerrin TORUN, made this process easier and bearable. Therefore, first of all, I would express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor for all the support, time, feedbacks and encouragements that she gave me throughout the research.

I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŐIK and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayőe mür ATMACA for their suggestions and comments.

On the other hand, there are few people that I would like to thank for being by my side. First and foremost, I would like to thank my family for all that I have and all that I am. This thesis is for them. In addition, I would like to thank my friends, Betül, Deniz, Ekin, Esra, Seda, Sırma, Yaren and Yusuf. It would have been impossible for me to complete this thesis without their support. I would lastly like to thank my cat. Love you, Hugo.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- CPR: Congrès pour la République
CGTT: Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens
ERSAP: Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme
ETUF: Egyptian Trade Union Federation
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FJP: Freedom and Justice Party
IMF: International Money Fund
LTDH: Ligue tunisienne des droits de l'homme
MDS: Mouvement des démocrates socialistes
MENA: Middle East and North Africa
MTS: Mouvement de la tendance islamiste
MUP: Mouvement d'Unité Populaire
NDP: National Democratic Party
NGO: Non-governmental Organization
NSC: National Security Council
PCT: Parti communiste tunisien
PSD: Parti Socialiste Destourien
PCOT: Parti communiste des ouvriers de Tunisie
RCD: Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
SCAF: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SUM: Sweden's Young Muslims
UGTT: Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens
UNAT: Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens
UTIC: Union Tunisienne des Industriels et Commerçants
UTICA: Union tunisienne de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the last month of 2010, Mohammad Bouazizi's self-immolation sparked a wave of protests in Tunisia. Following the popular protests, Tunisian president, Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali, was deposed. A month later, Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak was removed from the office. What was later called the literature as "The Arab Uprisings" or "The Arab Spring"¹, these protests swept across the region. "By the end of February 2011, virtually every country in the Arab world was beset by tumultuous demonstrations demanding fundamental political change" (Lynch, 2014, 1).

Following Tunisia and Egypt, protests took place in Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen (Robinson & Mellow, 2020). Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen became the only countries that the leadership changed. Since 2011, many scholarly works had focused on the reasons of the Arab Uprisings. According to Robinson and Mellow, although there were many factors that motivated the protests such as the low standard of living, youth unemployment and corruption, the common theme was the demand for dignity and human rights (Robinson & Mellow, 2020). For the common features of

¹ Within the context of this thesis, I choose to use the phrase "Arab Uprisings" rather than the "Arab Spring". In order to refer to the events in Tunisia, the term "Arab Spring" first used by Marc Lynch in 2011 one week before the deposal of Ben Ali (Whitehead, 2015, 17). According to Gelvin (2015, 37), the term "spring" has been associated with renewal; therefore, it seemed to be inevitable to use the phrase. In addition, it was not the first time that the commentators used the phrase "spring". For example, the phrase was used for the American invasion of Iraq and President George W. Bush's "freedom agenda" (Gelvin, 2015, 37). Some commentators used the phrase to refer to the events following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Cedar Revolution in Lebanon as well (Gelvin, 2015, 37). Within the context of the 2011, the phrase "spring" refers to the Revolutions of 1848, in accordance with the movements that advocates democracy (Arab Spring, 2018). Neither in Iraq nor Lebanon, the promise of a spring has been fulfilled (Gelvin, 2015, 37). In case of the Arab Uprisings, with the exception of Tunisia, protests have not met democratization expectations; therefore, to use the phrase "spring" might be misleading (Gelvin, 2015, 37). Thus, I find it appropriate to use the phrase "uprising" rather than "spring" in this thesis.

the countries that protests took place, Al-Sayyid (2015, 52-54) lays belonging in the category of a poor country, economic difficulties that “were aggravated by the economic policies” and “adopted neo-liberal economic packages” (Al-Sayyid, 2015, 52), legitimacy crisis, youth unemployment and absence of free and fair elections as common characteristics.

Tunisia and Egypt shared the common characteristics with the rest of the region. The poverty level in Tunisia was 32.4 percent in 2000 while in 2008, 44 percent of the Egyptian population was counted as poor (Beinin, 2016, 57 & Gelvin, 2015, 40). The gap between the rich and poor, the youth unemployment and corruption were all common in Tunisia and Egypt similar to the MENA region. According to Sofi (2019, 48), many factors that led to the protests were similar in the region. However, what differed Tunisia and Egypt from the rest of the countries was “an utter lack of political space, an unaccountable authority, a corrupt regime, lack of dignity, fewer job avenues, and less development” (Sofi, 2019, 48) which created a hatred towards the leaders of both countries. These characteristics helps us to understand why the Uprisings took place first in Tunisia and later in Egypt (Sofi, 2019, 48). Following the Uprisings, Tunisia and Egypt became the two countries where their leaders were ousted, and the first steps of a democratic transition process took place. On the other hand, in Syria, Libya and Yemen, ethnic and sectarian divisions were unveiled with the protests and resulted in a civil war (Erdoğan, 2018, 1-2).

Prior to the Arab Uprisings period, Tunisia and Egypt shares similarities in their sociopolitical histories, economic agendas, civil-society relations and the emergence of the political Islam. As the reasons behind the Uprisings were similar in both countries and the result was the overthrow of both leaders, many people expected democratic transition processes in Tunisia and Egypt. However, following the Uprisings, Tunisia and Egypt witnessed two different trajectories. In Tunisia, the country held its first democratic elections, suspended its assembly following the assassination of two politicians and violence between the military and salafi militants, completed the constitution and electoral law, initiated a national dialogue (Mullin, 2015, 98-99). Ten years after the Uprisings, in 2021, Tunisian government was dismissed and the parliament was suspended by the President. In Egypt, the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections took place and Egypt chose

Mohammad Morsi as the first freely elected president of the country (El Fadl, 2015, 259). However, the conflict between the seculars, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, in addition to the Brotherhood's advocacy of religion with politics (Moussa, 2015, 247) resulted in a coup by the armed forces in 2013 which ousted Morsi and placed General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as the president.

Tunisia's democratic transition process made the country a unique case within the context of the consequences of the Arab Uprisings for the first three years after the Uprisings. However, after ten years, Tunisian democracy has seemed to be failing. What causes authoritarianism and what leads to the failure of a democratization process? Why and how Tunisia and Egypt differed from each other ten years following the Uprisings? In the literature, many scholars searched for the answer of these questions.

For the causes of authoritarianism, Bölme (2015) separates the past and the recent history of the Middle East and lays the reasons for the authoritarian nature of the regional countries. Accordingly, institutional inheritance of the regional countries, Islamic history and neopatriarchy are the reasons that came from the past for authoritarianism. In "The Roots of Muslim Rage", Lewis (1993) argues that Islam is authoritarian in essence; therefore, it is opposite to democracy and secularism. In his work "The Clash of Civilizations", Huntington (1993, 40) also argues that Islam and the West differs from each other on democracy and secularism since values such as "individualism, equality and liberalism" do not fit in Islamic cultures. For the case of Arab culture and neopatriarchy, Hinnebusch (2020, 24), for example, refers to patriarchal family relations, tribal structure and patrimonial rule as the reasons for weak political institutions; therefore, tendency for an authoritarian rule. For the reasons in the recent history, Western democracy promotion, inefficiency of electoral systems, the modernization theory and the rentier state theory appear as the explanations for authoritarianism in the Middle East. The argument for the Western democracy promotion claimed that the authoritarian nature of the Middle East is a result of Western countries' democracy promotion that did not put any pressure on the authoritarian rulers. For the inefficiency of electoral systems, Levitsky and Way (2002, 54) categorize authoritarian regimes as competitive, electoral and closed authoritarian and show that the presence of electoral systems might be misleading

since elections may not yield any meaningful result. While the modernization theory, on the other hand, puts an importance on the economic development, Mahdavy's (2014, 428) rentier state theory argues that the wealth that was generated through rents breaks the work-reward relationship between the state and the public and the state becomes autonomous, which results in the persistence of authoritarianism.

For the failure of democratization, two important theories, the theory of authoritarian upgrading and the robust coercive apparatus are presented by the scholars. For the authoritarian upgrading, Heydemann (2007, 5) argues that authoritarian regimes have learnt to survive by introducing political and economic reforms. By managing political contestation and containing civil society, in addition to the absence of political institutionalism, authoritarian regimes learnt to hinder the democratic transition processes. On the other hand, Eva Bellin (2004) claims that scholarly explanations are not adequate to understand the failure of the democratization. Accordingly, the coercive apparatus' capacity and will are the determinants for a successful or a failed democratization process.

Focusing more on Tunisia and Egypt, in her doctoral dissertation "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative Analysis Between Egypt and Tunisia in Post-Arab Spring", Erdoğan (2018) compares Tunisia and Egypt's post-Arab Uprisings period and lays reasons for the divergence between the two countries. In her work, Erdoğan (2018, 5) focuses on the transitional period and the role of political elite in the transition process. Accordingly, reasons why Tunisia differed from Egypt are related to "the strategic decisions by the political agents" (Erdoğan, 2018, 347) and the elite consensus on the future of the countries. Designing of the transition process, more specifically, timing of the elections and drafting of the constitution differed in Egypt compared to Tunisia. While in Egypt, "the new system was built based on the old set of rules" (Erdoğan, 2018, 347), in Tunisia, the constitutional and electoral process was more transparent and participatory (Erdoğan, 2018, 348). Karakoç (2015, 172), on the other hand, focuses on the distrust among actors in the transitional period as the reason for the failure of the democratization processes and explores the effects of the changes in political freedoms and women/minority issues on the human security conditions. According to Karakoç, distrust among secular and Islamist actors and these actors' exclusion of the others in order to ensure their

interests creates an environment that “the people who do not hold political power” (Karakoç, 2015, 196), confronts with violence, which also leads authoritarianism to gain space. Gelvin (2015) also offers a comparison between Tunisia and Egypt and explains the reasons for the different paths taken by two countries following first years after the Uprisings. According to Gelvin, “the path taken by an uprising depends upon four factors: state institutions and capabilities, the ability of the opposition to maintain a broad and unified coalition, the cohesiveness of the military and the side it takes, and the intervention (or lack of intervention) of outside powers” (Gelvin, 2015, 185). As these four factors differed in Tunisia and Egypt, their transition process led to different outcomes. For example, in Tunisia, the military decided to hand the power to the national government while in Egypt, the Supreme Court of the Armed Forces used its force to hold on to the power (Gelvin, 2015, 71). On the other hand, in terms of the state institutions and capabilities, two countries have failed to manage the economic hardships while the opposition failed to maintain a unified coalition. Other scholarly works mainly focused on either one specific explanation for the divergence between Tunisia and Egypt, or one country to broadly explain the outcome of the Arab Uprisings. For example, Beinin, Haddad and Seikaly (2021) focus on political economy of the regional countries through a historical perspective. On the other hand, Beinin (2016) compares the two countries on the basis of collective actions and social struggles before and after the Uprisings.

The literature in explaining authoritarianism and the failure of democratization shares a general view for the countries in the region; therefore, fall short for the specific comparison of Tunisia and Egypt following the Arab Uprisings. Although these theories explain specific features for the authoritarian natures of the Middle Eastern and North African countries, they cannot fully capture the picture in comparing the past and the present of Tunisia and Egypt. The literature focusing more on Tunisia and Egypt, on the other hand, does not offer a comprehensive work in comparing Tunisia and Egypt’s past. Erdoğan’s doctoral dissertation (2018), successfully lays the similarities and differences in Tunisia and Egypt prior and after the Arab Uprisings. However, Erdoğan’s (2018) explanations focuses more on the transitional period and the political agents. Factors such as the military, civil society and the political Islam are presented in explaining the structure of the transitional period while Tunisia and Egypt’s political and economic history prior to Ben Ali and

Mubarak periods were not examined in detail. In addition, Tunisia's current political and economic situation was not examined. Karakoç's (2015) work, on the other hand, lays the future of human security in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya and underlines the importance of the trust between political actors in shaping the future of the countries following the Uprisings. For Karakoç (2015), the distrust among secular and Islamist actors hinders the post-Uprisings process. However, Karakoç's (2015) work does not focus on Tunisia and Egypt's similarities and differences in shaping the post-Uprisings period and does not give a clear answer to why the two countries differed. As mentioned before, other works in the literature, for example Beinin, Haddad and Seikaly's "A Critical Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa" (2021) and Beinin's "Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt" (2016) focuses on either a specific subject or a specific country, not offering a comprehensive and comparative analysis for the different trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt. However, for the future studies of authoritarianism and democratization processes, it is important to understand how two similar countries that went through similar period of protests ended up in two different paths and two different coup d'états. Therefore, comparing Tunisia and Egypt's historical backgrounds, political economies, class structures, civil societies, civil-military relations and societies offers a new understanding for the authoritarianism and democratic transition studies.

This thesis aims to present a comprehensive work in comparing Tunisia and Egypt's similarities and differences prior and after the Arab Uprisings and yield the reasons for the different trajectories of the two countries. The hypothesis of this thesis rests with the conclusion that Tunisia and Egypt seem to share a similar background in terms of an authoritarian political structure from 1980 until 2010. However, the two countries differ from each other in state formation, military, class and societal structure, and civil society. These differences led these countries to different paths after the Arab Uprisings. Dependent variables for this thesis, therefore, are authoritarianism and democratic transition process. Independent variables, as explained, include the history of state formation, military, class and societal structure, and civil society.

For this thesis, the methodology consists of the qualitative analysis of authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the Middle East, and Tunisia and Egypt's political and economic history from 1980 until 2010. For this analysis, descriptive and explanatory methods are used in order to examine and give insight into authoritarianism and democracy, first in the Middle East and then in Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, to build a bridge between economic and political reforms and authoritarianism, correlation and causation are used. The relevance of Tunisia and Egypt's historical background to their present political nature are presented.

The first chapter of the thesis offers a theoretical framework for authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the Middle East. For this purpose, the first part of the first chapter lays the explanations for authoritarianism in the region. In order to conduct an analysis for the explanations, Böhme's categorization on the impact of the past and the present of the Middle East in her work "The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East" is used. For the impact of the past, institutional inheritance of the regional countries, Islamic history and neopatriarchy are examined. For the institutional inheritance, Ottoman Empire's bureaucratic formation process and France and Britain's control over the region are analyzed. Islamic history and neopatriarchy, on the other hand, attributed as a reason for authoritarianism in the region by some scholars. These theories were also countered by several scholars. For the impact of the present, Western democracy promotion, introduction of the elections in the region, impact of the military, the modernization theory and the rentier state theory are analyzed. Arguments suggest that Western democracy promotion and introduction of the elections in the region exacerbated the scale of authoritarianism in the region since democratic reforms and introduction of elections did not affect the authoritarian leaders but helped them to use the reforms for their own survival. In addition, democracy promotion was a secondary goal for the Western countries, but it was the Western interests that was important the most. Therefore, as long as a regional leader would not pose a threat to the interests of the Western countries, he can survive. For the impact of the military, Bellin (2004), suggests that linkages between the coercive apparatus of the country and the state defines the future of the country; therefore, the position of the military becomes an important indicator for the survival of the regimes. The military's willingness and capacity define its relationship with the regime. The modernization theory, on the

other hand, attributes a state's authoritarian nature to the development level of a country. Accordingly, the country's level of wealth, industrialization and urbanization affect authoritarianism of the state. As the theory fails to explain the oil-rich countries' level of wealth and authoritarian nature, the rentier state theory tries to explain this nature. The theory suggests that the reason why oil-rich countries are authoritarian is that the work-reward relationship between the citizen and the state is broken due to the wealth generated through rents in the country. As the state does not owe anything to its citizens, the state gains an autonomy from the people and becomes unaccountable which helps the state to be more authoritarian.

The second part of the first chapter consists of the explanations for the failure of democratization. In his work "The Middle East and North Africa" published as a chapter in Routledge Handbook of Democratization in 2012, Cavatorta differentiates the reasons for the democratization in the region as "structure-led" and "agency-led" arguments. This thesis uses Cavatorta's categorization for the failure of democratization and analyzes other scholars' arguments on the subject. In addition to this categorization, domestic politics and actors of the regional countries are examined and inefficiency of political parties, civil society and elections are added to the argument as possible reasons for the failure of democratization. Lastly for this part, Bellin's 2004 study on the "Middle East exceptionalism" and the role of the coercive apparatuses in the region in the democratization processes are analyzed. Structure-led explanations for the failure of democratization are international factors and political culture in the region. Arguments suggest that the international support for the regional regimes and the relationship between Islam and democracy hinders the democratization process in the region. International actors' support for the authoritarian regimes for their interests, in addition to the state-tribal relations on contrary to citizen-state relationship and undemocratic nature of Islam are the reasons for the failure of democratization process. The agency-led explanations explain the failure of democratization in terms of the position of the ruling elites and the distrust between the regional actors. The first argument suggests that the ruling elites in the region have no intention for a democratic transition process, but the applied reforms are for the consolidation of power of the ruling elites. Therefore, as the reforms do not have any meaning, democratization process is invalid in essence. The other argument in the agency-led explanations, on the other hand, suggests that

the distrust between the Islamist and secular actors in the region hinders the democratic transition process. Since their intention for the future of the countries differ from each other, their distrust creates a conflict between these actors and creates a lack of unity which ends up with the failure of democratization process. The third explanation for the failure of democratization focuses on the domestic politics of the regional countries. Arguments suggest that inefficiency of political parties, elections and civil society causes the failure of democratization since the inefficiency of political parties creates a depoliticized public and distrust towards these parties, in addition to inefficient elections that give legitimacy to the regimes and oppressed civil society organizations by the regimes. The last argument on the failure of democratization is Bellin (2004)'s "Middle East exceptionalism". As mentioned in the explanations for the authoritarianism in the region. Bellin (2004) suggests that the robustness of the coercive apparatus in the region is the reason for democratization process to fail.

The second chapter of the thesis focuses on the pre-Arab Uprisings period of Tunisia and Egypt. The first part of the second chapter analyzes the socio-political history of Tunisia and Egypt until the 1980s in order to express the similarities and the differences between the two countries. The part underlines that the socio-political histories of Tunisia and Egypt resemble each other. The second part of the second chapter focuses on the political economy, class structure and civil society of Tunisia and Egypt after 1980 until the Uprisings. This part of the second chapter shows the similar political economies that Tunisia and Egypt experienced after the 1980s and the increasing authoritarian nature of both of the states. The third part of the second chapter examines the civil-military relations and the role of the military in shaping one country's future. The role of the military in the region has been a subject for discussions in scholarly debates. In Tunisia and Egypt's case, it is one of the characteristics that differs two countries from each other. While the military has been an important feature in Egypt's political history, the Tunisian military was sidelined for most of the time. Until the Uprisings, both countries had professionalized and institutionalized armies. However, Egyptian military's linkages with the regime and its privileged position differed from Tunisia. Two armies' relationship with the public is also became important indicator for the construction of the post-Uprisings period of Tunisia and Egypt.

Lastly, the last part of the second chapter focuses on the political Islam, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt. The distrust between secular and Islamist actors in two countries, as well as contradicting trajectories of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood are important factors that defined the different ends for both countries following the Uprisings. The last part of the second chapter examines the relationship between the secular actors and Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt and how this relationship affected the democratic transition process following the Uprisings, in addition to the differences in political actions taken by Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The last chapter of the thesis focuses on the post-Arab Uprisings period in Tunisia and Egypt. The chapter consists of four parts. The first part analyzes the factors that led to the Arab Uprisings. The part shows the commonalities in Tunisia and Egypt prior to 2011. The common factors are explained as economic crisis, corruption and the lack of legitimacy. The following parts of the last chapter focuses on how the two countries followed different paths following the Uprisings. The second part explains the election process, political parties, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood following the Uprisings. The part lays down political and electoral differences in Tunisia and Egypt.

While the third part focuses on the political economies and civil societies of Tunisia and Egypt after 2011, the last part of the last chapter of this thesis covers the civil-military relations and the position of the military. The third part shows the differences in Tunisia and Egypt's civil society participation and unionized action and how these factors affected the outcome of the Uprisings. Similar to the second chapter, the last part of the last chapter compares the civil-military relations of Tunisia and Egypt. Being one of the important factors that affected the transitional period, the military's relationship with the society and the state and how the civil-military relationship affected the post Arab Uprisings period.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.Explanations for authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa

The ongoing nature of authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the Middle East have been analyzed by several scholars. Since then, some authors have explained the reasons behind it on sociocultural terms, such as institutional inheritance, including Islam and neopatriarchy. Others, focusing on economic explanations, based their analyses on socioeconomic development and the rentier state theory. In the meantime, democracy promotion, civil society and the “Middle East exceptionalism” were added to the argument.

For this section, the explanations for authoritarianism and the explanations for the failure of democratization will be analyzed in two different parts. The first part will explain authoritarianism in the Middle East. This analysis will be based on Bölme’s differentiation on the impact of the past and the present. For the second part, the failure of the democratization will be explained first with “structure-led” and “agency-led” democratization attempts based on Cavatorta’s differentiation. Then, domestic politics of the countries in the region will be explained with inefficient presence of political parties, civil society and elections. At the end of this part, Bellin’s study (2004) on “Middle East exceptionalism” and coercive apparatus in the region will also be analyzed.

2.1.1. Explanations for Authoritarianism in the Middle East

In this section, explanations for authoritarianism in the Middle East will be separated into two parts. This differentiation will be based on Bölme’s work on “The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”, which was published in Karakoç’s “Authoritarianism in the Middle East Before and After the Arab Uprisings” in 2015.

First part will be focusing on the history of the Middle East as the reason for authoritarian nature of the Middle East. In this part, institutional inheritance of the Middle Eastern countries, as well as with Islamic history and neopatriarchy in the region will be analyzed as reasons for the authoritarianism in the Middle East which were debated by several scholars. The second part will be focusing on the recent history of the Middle East as a reason for authoritarianism. Recent history will be covering from the end of the 20th century onwards. For this part, Western democracy promotion, introduction of the elections in the region, impact of the military, modernization theory and rentier state theory will be analyzed.

Starting with the first section of the argument, historical background of the Middle East has been a subject of discussions. The state formation process as an institutional inheritance covers the first part of these discussions. Anderson (1987, 3) points out that almost all the region was once ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the state formation began under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for most of the countries in the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire structuralized the legitimate power under one person, which was the Sultan. On the other hand, as Hinnebusch underlines (2020, 22), the Empire also had a strong bureaucratic structure with the senior officials that were able to fill the power vacuum in the absence of the Sultan. These bureaucrats and senior officials were also responsible of collecting taxes, through the *sipahis* or knights, that were paid for their services with temporary *tumars* or fiefs. However, by the eighteenth century, the Empire began to weaken for several reasons. On the economic aspect, the fall of *tumar* system and becoming “over-dependent on extracting surplus from vulnerable trade routes” (Hinnebusch, 2020, 22) could be counted. On the political aspect, ineffectiveness of the ruling elite and the bureaucratic class that could not fill any power vacuum which once could be established due to the strong bureaucratic structure could be exemplified. In addition to those, in the nineteenth century, Anderson argues, the Ottoman state formation, threatened by the European economic and military power, created a “defensive modernization” (Anderson, 1987, 5), which was the reconstruction of the military and provincial administrations, the reorganization of the tax collection system and the modernization of the educational system. This modernization process, however, was not enough for the Empire after the First World War. Therefore, the Empire did not survive, and the Middle East went from an uncompleted bureaucratic

development process to another. With the end of the First World War, regional countries under the Ottoman Empire, together with Egypt and Tunisia, were already all occupied by the European powers. This caused a discontinuity in the state formation process.

Once the region began to be ruled by either France or Britain, this bureaucratic development was disrupted, and each country went under different processes for the state formation. These two processes, of course, differed from each other. Each rule destroyed the predecessor's bureaucratic formation. Unlike the other countries in the Middle East, Egypt and Tunisia enjoyed relative freedom under the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century – with local reforms. However, this discontinuity in the state formation process resulted in weak states and weak institutions in the Middle Eastern countries. Although national bureaucracies came with independence after the Second World War in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, these bureaucratic institutions, along with the civil society, did not have a solid background (Anderson, 1987, 5).

Independent countries established after the Second World War created new political regimes that accumulated the monopoly of power under a single party or a ruler. As political elites were united against the European powers for independence, these elites also formed a single dominant party after the independence – in the name of an effort to build a strong statehood. Disrupted statehood formation as an inheritance, overall, caused dominant single party regimes which led to an authoritarian structure in the Middle East.

Another argument on authoritarianism in the Middle East is the Islamic history of the region. According to the argument, Islamic countries are more prone to the authoritarian state structure, since Islam is authoritarian in essence, as the legitimate rule comes from God, and this use of power is adapted by one ruler, by a king, or a sultan, who claims to rule in the name of God, which posits an opposition for democracy and secularism. Lewis (1993), one of the advocates of this argument, differentiates Christianity from Islam on their historical background with secularism. Accordingly, Christianity experienced a period of struggle between Protestants and Catholics, which eventually led to the separation of the Church from the state in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. However, Islam did not experience such

separation, nor did it need one, but continued to be used as a form of legitimacy to rule the state. Moreover, as the Islamic state itself is a theocracy, therefore, the legitimate use of the power only comes from God – not from democracy.

Huntington, on the other hand, with his well-known article “The Clash of Civilizations”, argues that values of Islam and the West differ from each other since Western concepts such as “individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state” (Huntington, 1993, 40) do not fit in Islamic cultures. On the other side of the debate, some scholars argue that Islam and the democratic deficit in the region do not correlate. Voll (2006, 173) underlines that, other scholars held opposing views on the incompatibility of Islam with democracy. According to Voll, Galwash argues that the political system of Islam is mainly democratic since Islamic principles recognized “individual and public liberty, secured the person and property of the subjects, and fostered the growth of all civic virtues” (Galwash, 1958, as cited in Voll, 2006, 173).

Besides the Islamic influence on the authoritarian nature of the Middle East countries, there is another argument, which is the neopatriarchy and Arab culture. Accordingly, it is the Arab culture that causes authoritarianism in the region. Although today this cultural explanation of authoritarianism might not be prevalent, there are still some arguments. For the proponents, the neopatriarchal nature of the Arab societies, obedience and “unquestioned dominance of the patriarchal figures” (Bölme, 2015, 21) also comply with the state-citizen relationship. Thus, societies with a neopatriarchal nature fall on the authoritarian point of the political spectrum. The unquestioned obedience to the patriarchal figures can also be linked to the Islamic nature of the personal practices in the regional countries. In the Islamic political theory, the ruler would uphold the *sharia*, therefore would receive his power from the God. According to Kedourie (1992), “the duty to obey the ruler, who was the Prophet’s apostolic successor, was a religious duty” (Kedourie, 1992, 7) This neopatriarchal nature was further transmitted to societal relations after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the region. Practices of patriarchal family, tribal institutional structure, and patrimonial rule, which Hinnebusch defines as “the personal rule of the leader via clientele networks” (Hinnebusch, 2020, 24) caused weak political

institutions and bureaucratic structure according to the argument. Therefore, although the regional countries gained their independence after the Second World War, tendency for an autocratic rule remained. For this argument, therefore, the obedience to the patriarchal figures creates a tendency for autocratic rule.

Crystal (1994), however, argues that Islam or Arab culture does not explain the authoritarianism in the region. However, there is a more “complex dynamic involving economic growth and stagnation, social-structural transformation, state formation and institutional inertia, and ideological transformation” (Crystal, 1994, 263). Another counterpoint on the effect of Arab culture on authoritarianism is made by Ghalioun and Costopoulos, who argue that it is an old standby to claim that “Arab culture is incompatible with democratic values and that violence forms a natural part of this culture” (Ghalioun & Costopoulos, 2004, 130). For Ghalioun and Costopoulos (2004, 130), feudalization of the Arab regimes is the result of two processes, the first is a top-down introduction of modernization which led to a sudden interruption from tradition and older societal structures, while the latter is the relationship between the regional powerholders and Western states with their interests in the region. To sum up, rather than focusing on the Arab culture, one should take the economic and societal level of developments into account so that it would be easier to understand the failure of the societal and political movements for democracy in the region.

The second part of the explanations for authoritarianism in the Middle East will be based on the events and notions that have taken place in recent history, approximately starting at the end of the 20th century. On the top of these list of events that were considered as the reason for authoritarianism in the Middle East, “Western democracy promotion” takes place. Other explanations consist of multiparty system and elections, the position of the military, economic development, and the rentier state theory.

To begin with the top of the list, the argument about Western democracy promotion claims that actions of the Western countries in favour of the democratic reforms in the Middle East did not help the region to become more democratic but exacerbated the scale of the authoritarianism since they did not pose any pressure on authoritarian rulers. Dalacoura argues that supporters of democracy promotion have “a universalist understanding of democracy” (Dalacoura, 2010, 63), meaning that democratic

principles can be applied worldwide, irrespective of cultural, religious, or political norms. Therefore, in essence, while they do not advocate the argument that Islam and Arab culture are inconsistent with democracy, they also do not advocate that each region or each country should adopt democracy on their terms. However, as not everyone shares that point of view, but perceives Western democracy promotion as a tool for “political, economic, military, and cultural domination” (Dalacoura, 2010, 64) in the region through the “imposition of neo-liberal economic reforms” (Dalacoura, 2010, 64). In terms of its perception in the region, it can be argued that the United States does not have a credible historical record primarily due to the United States’ involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relationships with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Western democracy promotion that did not hinder the authoritarian persistence but exacerbated its impact, therefore, did not change that perception for the United States. The relationship between the United States and democracy promotion was largely linked to the “war on terror”. It was claimed by George W. Bush that the democracy promotion was necessary in order to stop terrorism (Carothers, 2008, 131). However, most of the people in the world, particularly in the Middle East, perceived the war on terror as a security cooperation between the United States and non-democratic regimes.

For the most part, democracy promotion in the region was a secondary goal; it was the security concerns and vital interests of the Western countries that came first. Therefore, authoritarian leaders that did not pose a severe threat to the vital interests of the Western countries were mostly ignored. Carothers (2008, 132), for this part gives the example of relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Accordingly, the United States changed its position with its relationship with Pakistan by becoming “a major aid donor and warm friend” to Pakistani dictatorship in 2002. The other examples, Carothers (2008, 132) underlines, include Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the United States, Carothers argues, “Europe maintained warm, sometimes very cosy relationships with non-democratic governments for all kinds of reasons: trade, access to oil, security cooperation, or other things” (Carothers, 2008, 128). Therefore, it can be concluded that when a leader served well for the interests of the Western countries, it became “a friend” so that the authoritarian regime did not impose any threat.

At the end of the process of Western democracy promotion, multiparty elections were expanded in the Middle East since it was prioritized within the liberal democratic norms promoted by the Western countries while mostly neglecting human rights and civil liberties. However, multiparty elections did not bring democracy to the region but helped the authoritarian regimes to maintain their status quo, which brings us to the second argument for the existence of authoritarianism in the Middle East, which is inefficient electoral system.

Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East introduced elections in order to satisfy the demands for democracy in domestic and international politics. Therefore, these regimes found a way to weaken and suppress the opposition, but also, election results gave the regimes the “legitimacy” to rule the country. However, although the regimes claim legitimacy with the introduction of electoral system, citizens of the region do not think that democratization and introduction of electoral process have affected the institutional bureaucracy in their countries. Lust, for this part, gives an example from Lindsay Benstead’s and Ellen Lust’s survey, conducted in 2006. Accordingly,

“...In Algeria found that only 59 percent of respondents would, if they wanted to resolve a dispute with the government, first take the issue to the agency in question, and only 24 percent believed that this approach would be the most effective. Even more strikingly, only 39 percent said that if they were seeking employment in the public sector, they would first approach the agency; less than 20 percent believed that this was the most effective approach” (Lust, 2009, 125).

In addition to that, Lust (2009, 125) underlines that this phenomenon is widespread in other parts of the region, including Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Morocco. Therefore, it becomes clear that introduction of electoral systems in fact does not challenge authoritarianism but presents a ground for other types of authoritarianisms. Although types of authoritarian regimes will not be explained in detail here, it is essential to point out Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way’s differentiation on authoritarian regimes. Levitsky and Way (2002, 54) categorize authoritarian regimes as competitive authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, and closed authoritarian. This categorization helps to explain the regimes in the Middle East for our case. Accordingly, in electoral authoritarianism, while elections do exist, they do not produce any meaningful result since the media and the judiciary are mainly controlled or suppressed by the regime. What differentiates electoral authoritarian

regimes from competitive authoritarian regimes is that in competitive authoritarian regimes, there is still an independent media and judiciary, although might not be fully. What brings us to our point is that, although several regimes in the Middle East introduced multiparty elections, these regimes did not bring any meaningful result since elections were already not free and fair. In addition, elections helped the authoritarian regimes to divide the opposition by offering them a part in the government or granting only some of them compromise. Elections, as a result, become not a step for the democratization process but help the authoritarian regime consolidate its power (Levitsky & Way, 2002, 53-54).

For this section, military is the third factor to be discussed for the existence of authoritarianism in the region since it is an essential factor to be discussed within the context of both the history of the Middle East and the 21st-century political scene. Throughout the political history of the Middle East, the military had an impact on almost every sphere of the region. Either controlling the state or having a direct connection with the regime, the military became an inseparable apparatus for the region. Therefore, for both the past and the present, the position of the military within the country, either for or against the regime, is an important indicator for the future of the regimes. Although it will be later analyzed in detail in the section “Explanations for the failure of democratization and the Middle East ‘exceptionalism’”, it is crucial to analyze the effects of the military within the context of authoritarianism.

Bellin argues that the robustness of authoritarianism does not lie within the absence of conditions that should be accomplished but lies in the present conditions namely, a “robust coercive apparatus in these states” (Bellin, 2004, 143). Linkages between the regime and the coercive apparatus, therefore, define the country’s future. In any case of an uprising, the question arises as to whether the military would side with the regime or with the public. During the Arab Uprisings, for example, in Egypt and Tunisia’s cases, the military did not side with the regime. For Bellin, this was what led the regime leaders to depart. Regime’s survival, thus, depends on the military’s “willingness and capacity” to repress the uprisings. What does have an impact on the willingness is based on the degree of the institutionalization and the prestige of the military. If the military has a degree of institutionalization, it has a mission and an

identity separate from the regime, and if it decides that shooting on the crowds would affect its prestige and contrasts with its interests, the military would not side with the regime – therefore the military decides on the future of the regime. At this point, it can be said that the military and the regime become co-dependent. For Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt and Pilster (2020, 561) the nature of this co-dependent relationship can vary according to the nature of an authoritarian regime. Personalist dictatorships, accordingly, are associated with the weakness of political institutions, therefore become increasingly dependent on coercive apparatus, since any case of a challenge to the regime could only be suppressed by this apparatus. In that case, the military becomes essential for the survival of the regime. In conclusion, the relationship between the regime and the military constitutes an important factor for the existence of an authoritarian regime.

The last two approaches for explaining authoritarianism in this section are the modernization theory and the rentier state theory. The modernization theory argues that less developed countries can be brought to the same level as more developed countries, as long as they follow the same path. Therefore, if less developed countries practice the modern processes, such as industrialization and urbanization, they would become more developed in the end. This would suggest that the level of economic development is important to prevent the rise of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, if a country's level of industrialization, wealth and urbanization is low, authoritarian rule is inevitable. However, economically developed countries have a greater chance to sustain democracy. Although the origins of the modernization theory go back to Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, its development continued throughout the second half of the 20th century. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 83), a political sociologist, puts democracy as a direct result of economic growth. However, years later, the modernization theory became more and more flawed since it fell short to explain the endurance and the existence of authoritarian regimes despite economic growth. For Hazbun (2016, 192), it is because the modernization theory does not take the process of the change of “political forces, ideologies, societal forces” (Hazbun, 2016, 192) into account. According to Hazbun (2016, 192), “It [Modernization Theory] offers a map predicated on the refusal to recognize the autonomous agency of modernizing subjects”. Therefore, other political forces or ideologies become irrelevant. In addition, the theory also fails to

explain the existence of authoritarian oil-rich states that are wealthy and have a high level of income, such as the oil-rich states in the Middle East. The rentier state theory, for this part, tries to explain the existence of oil-rich states that seem resilient to democratic transition process.

The rentier state theory, first argued by Hussein Mahdavy in 1970 (Mahdavy, 2014, 428) in “Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East”, edited by M. A. Cook, states that oil-rich countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar generate their revenue through the sale of oil and suggests that if a state increases its wealth not with taxes or production but with rent, then this causes the autonomy of the state from society. Since the society does not contribute to the wealth of the country with taxes, therefore, the regime does not owe to the society. The public does not obtain wealth or jobs from a causation relationship, that is, by paying taxes and receiving services in return, but the state makes the wealth from the rent revenues and distributes wealth and benefits. Since the work-reward relationship broke between the state and the public and there is no apparatus for the public to bargain with the state, the state becomes autonomous from the society, which helps it sustain its power more quickly. On the other hand, the public becomes more and more dependent on the state to receive services and benefits. The state becomes unaccountable, and this causes authoritarianism to persist.

For the latter section, the failure of democratization will be analyzed in four subsections. Initially, Francesco Cavatorta’s structure-led and agency-led explanations for the failure of democratization in the Middle East will be presented. In addition, the effectiveness of political parties, civil society and elections in the region will be analyzed as the third section. Lastly, the “Middle East exceptionalism”, which Bellin (2004) explains with the coercive apparatus will be studied in detail.

2.1.2. Explanations for the Failure of Democratization

In 1974, a process of democratization began in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, where the authoritarian governments were replaced with democratically elected ones.

Following these Southern European countries, several authoritarian regimes in “Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa” (Haynes, 2011, 1) shifted into a process of democratization. This process was named as “the third wave of democracy” by Samuel Huntington. The process continued in the 1980s, in which some scholars included the Middle East in this third wave of democratization since many countries in the region adopted several reforms. According to Cavatorta (2011), these included reformations in electoral processes, expansion of individual freedoms and modernization of political institutions. However, although these reforms created an expectation for regional democratization, authoritarian rules persisted. For the question “Why?”, “structure-led” and “agency-led” explanations will be studied first.

Before exploring structure-led and agency-led explanations for the failure of democratization, we should first look at the debate between structure and agency in order to better conceptualize the position of arguments behind explanations. Structuralists argue that actors, or agents, became highly constrained by the structures in any political environment. Therefore, it is the dominant structural factors that determine the outcome. For Wendt, neorealism, and world-system theory both offer a structuralist approach. Accordingly, neorealism focuses on an “individualist ontology” (Wendt, 1987, 336) and refers to structure as what constrains the individuals, while world-system theory posits a holistic ontology in which defines the structure with “the underlying organizing principles of the world economy” (Wendt, 1987, 346). On the other side of the debate, scholars argued that it is rather the individuals that are important in determining any possible outcome, while underlining that structuralists undermine the importance of the agents. As Imbroscio (1999, 46) underlines, although the two approaches might seem like opposite to each other, the approaches both acknowledge one another, but it is the level of importance that they attribute to each factor that causes the difference. Therefore, in the case of the failure of democratization, structure-led and agency-led explanations do not automatically eliminate each other, but rather they put importance to different concepts. In many ways, they complement each other.

For the structure-led explanations, international factors and political culture in the region are regarded as relatively important. In the case of international factors, the Democratic Peace Theory should be explained first. The conceptualization of the

theory goes back to Kant's book "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" which was published in 1795 (Kant, 1795/1903). To shortly describe, Kant argued that republics that have separate legislature and executive bodies would be in peace with each other (Kant, 1795/1903). The "perpetual peace" concept of Kant evolved over the years with the contribution of several political scientists and scholars. Democratic Peace Theory, much of like its ancestor, advocates that, democratic countries would not go into war with each other and would behave differently toward non-democratic countries. According to Layne (1994, 6), there are two positions for the logic of the theory. One of them attributes the peace to the democratic institutions, which prevents any case of war due to the checks and balances system. For the other position, it is the democratic norms and culture that prevent war since democratic values would promote a stabilized system. However, when we came to the Middle East, democratization of the region would "destabilize" the "stable international system" (Cavatorta, 2021, 83). Therefore, it would be beneficial for democratic countries to have an undemocratic Middle East, since it would serve their interests and an undemocratic Middle East would give them the right to intervene in any case of a regime change in the region that would challenge the Western states. Thus, it would be beneficial for the Western states to support authoritarian regimes and provide material resources so that they would suppress the opposition, Islamists in particular. The international support for the regional regimes, therefore, hinders the process of democratization.

International support for the authoritarian regimes might be a cause for the failure of democratization in the region but cannot explain the failure of democratization all by itself. Since it has also been witnessed that countries such as Syria or Iraq could not be referred pro-Western but still had not been democratized. In addition to this, domestic and regional politics are also important elements of democratization; thus, international politics cannot be the only cause.

Another structure-led argument for the failure of democratization is political culture. Political culture can be divided into tribalism and the relationship between Islam and democracy. To begin with the first, one characteristic attributed to the political culture in the region is tribalism. Although there is no strict definition of a tribe, one can understand a tribe as "a local group of people distinguished from other groups by

notions of shared descent, whether real or imagined” (Alon, 2021, 477). In addition to the definition, tribes should not be considered as an ancient concept, but rather, the concept evolves throughout the time and adapts itself to the ongoing structure. This adaptation makes a tribe a modern concept which also makes it applicable to today’s arguments. As Alon (2021, 478) underlines, tribes filled the void in the absence of states or central control mechanisms and provided security and resources for its members. With the formation of new state system following the First World War, tribes began to weaken. However, their shaykhs have also played important roles in the state formation, acted as mediators between the state and their community. As the national state formation process heated up, so as the tribes that were committed to their group began to be seen as obstacles and separatists. In time, members of the tribes were tried to be turned into citizens under a nation state. However, today, tribal culture still exists in the region.

Today, according to the one side of the argument, the leader of a country in the Arab countries surrounds itself with a clan or a tribe and provides resources to them so that it ensures the security of the regime. It is possible since as tribes evolved in time, so as the ruling elites. They have learnt how to deal with the tribal culture and how to use them for their own advantage. Alon (2021, 479) again gives an example from Iraq for this point. Accordingly, Saddam Hussein learnt how to exploit tribalism effectively. Being a tribesman, Saddam Hussein surrounded himself with his family and tribal linkages, while “appointed shaykhs and provided them with money and weapons in order to form local militias” (Alon, 2021, 479). Today, several regimes in the region still practice manipulating tribal identities while tribes also try to ensure their communal security. Gambill (2003) observes that today, tribalism is more of a reaction to the Arab state that cannot provide resources to the population rather than a creation of the Arab culture. For example, government suppression of civil society, including unions, voluntary associations, and popular movements, has forced people to “seek refuge in their traditional institutions to express their discontent” (Barakat, 1993, as cited in Gambill, 2003). In addition, inefficiency in economic development caused deficient social services for the population. Bassam (1990), for this point, argues that because of the failure in economic development processes, “society has resorted to its prenatal ties as a solution” (Bassam, 1990, as cited in Gambill, 2003). Today, state-tribal relations persisting in the region underline the relevance of

tribalism. For some scholars, tribalism is the reason why democratization fails in the region since there is no citizen-state relationship. However, to solely focus on the tribalism rather than to focus on the inter-state and state-society relations would be undermining in explaining the failure of democratization.

The second characteristic of the political culture in the region is Islam and its relationship with democracy. For the advocates of the argument, Islam is not compatible with democracy since, in essence, Islam is an undemocratic religion. Therefore, the democratization process in the region is doomed to fail. As it was explained in the former parts of this thesis, scholars such as Bernard Lewis argues (1993) that the belief system of Islam goes unquestioned and the religion did not go through a reformation process, such as Enlightenment, therefore obedience to a neopatriarchal figure became a feature of the political culture. In addition, as there is no challenge to the political leadership, it is inevitable to be ruled under authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the nature of “undemocratic” Islam fails the democratization process. On the other hand, the “obedient” nature makes the religion eligible for authoritarian regimes.

However, contrary to Lewis’s argument, we can witness Muslims participating in democratic processes in many countries. Research conducted by Fatima Zibouh asserts that “the number of Muslim MP’s in the Parliament of the Brussel-Capital-Region rose from 0% in 1989 to 22.5% in 2009” (Zibouh, 2013, 23). In another research based on a survey conducted in Sweden’s Young Muslims (SUM) conference, Bäckelie and Larsson (2013, 68) questioned the general interest in politics and found that 119 individuals (44.2%) said they were somewhat interested in politics while 59 individuals (21.9%) said they were very interested. The other 32.9 percent of individuals on the other hand either were not particularly interested or not interested in politics at all. In addition to the research conducted in Belgium and Sweden, Salima Bouyarden’s research on Muslim political participation in France and the United Kingdom introduces a typology of French and British Muslim women engaged in politics. Bouyarden (2013, 115) assets that there are three distinct types of European Muslim women that engaged in politics. The first group of women define their movement within traditional political parties. The second group also define their movement within traditional parties while advocate the acceptance of

their Muslim and ethnic identity. The third group, similar to the second, advocate the acceptance of their Muslim and ethnic identity but within independent political parties. However, these three groups all fight for equality, rights, and recognition. Therefore, it is important to underline that, as Bouyarden argues, “these women all have their particularities and their main converging point is not Islam, as one would expect, but the expression of modern society’s pluralism and need for change and variety” (Bouyarden, 2013, 115). It is also interesting that in Bäckelie and Larsson’s research (2013, 70), majority of the individuals participating in elections expressed their voting choice on the side of the left-wing parties, rather than the right-wing political parties as would be expected. Therefore, the nature of political culture attributed to Islam and its relationship with democracy, including electoral choices at the individual level fails to find a solid ground since several examples show that individuals defining themselves as Muslims participate in electoral processes in democratic countries while showing interest in politics.

The last argument for the structure-led explanations for the failure of democratization is the rentier state theory. Altunışık defines a rentier state with three characteristics:

“First, oil revenues are paid to governments in the form of rent; this means that the relationship between production price and market price is very weak due to the fact that oil is a ‘strategic commodity.’ Second, oil revenues are externally generated through marketing in the global economy. Third, oil revenues are directly accrued by the state” (Altunışık, 2014, 77).

Rentierism, on the other hand, is measured “through the percentage of total government revenue made up by oil rent” (Altunışık, 2014, 17). Rentier State Theory asserts that these externally generated rent revenues are able to lift the pressure from oil-rich rentier states, since oil revenues are being directly paid to the state, therefore, the state becomes the distributor of the revenues. This way, regimes became autonomous from the public since the public have no bargaining power over the regime as the regime does not generate revenue from the taxes. Since the public has no bargaining power, the regime can withdraw essential services in any case of upheaval and repress the public. In addition, some scholars argue that the “work-reward” dilemma creates a “rentier mentality”. Hertog (2020, 1) explains the concept as a collapse of the link between effort and reward; therefore, citizens became passive politically and dependent on the state respectively. This unequal relationship

between the regime and the public prevents any democratic transition process possible since citizens become dependent on the state and politically passive, while the state becomes autonomous from the public.

The second explanation for the failure of democratization in the Middle East consists of the agency-led explanations. Agency-led arguments are mainly around the ruling elites, Islamic movements, and political Islam. Rather than the structure, these arguments suggest that the failure of democratization in the region is mostly because of the political actors.

The first agency-led explanation for the failure of democratization to be covered is the position of ruling elites. According to the scholarly debate, the ruling elites have no intention for a democratic transition in the region. The aim of the political reforms that were implemented throughout the late 1980s and 1990s was about gaining domestic and international legitimacy. Cavatorta (2012, 86), mentions that when the reforms caused any change in the political scene, for example, by political or social groups starting to increase power over the regime, then the regime would make sure that reforms would eventually become unmeaningful, by either repressing the opposition or introducing excessive powers to itself. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2000) argue that the ruling elite can counter an unrest in a country in three ways; “by repression, by full-scale democratization, or by making a lesser concession (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2000, 685)”. By a lesser concession, regimes can introduce voting rights or political reforms to certain classes of the public in order to acquire domestic legitimacy. However, introducing political reforms might lead to a higher degree of concessions. Acemoğlu and Robinson, argue that, for this reason, the ruling elite tends to choose between repression or democratization. But a process of democratization costs the ruling elite more. Thus, repression is more likely to be chosen by the elite. It can be concluded that it is infrequent for the regimes to begin a process of democratization that is intended to build a democratic state. Instead, the regimes “have no other option but to liberalize in the presence of a serious crisis of legitimacy” (Cavatorta, 2012, 86). The process of democratization, therefore, fails, as the aim of the process was not democratization.

However, as the political or social actors, such as political parties, unions, or civil society organizations, gain power with newly liberal reforms, this shift in power

relations that the regime cannot repress brings unintended consequences for the regime. The Arab Uprisings, in this case, proves an unexpected consequence of this democratization process for the regimes.

Distrust between the regional actors, particularly between the Islamist parties and secular opposition, constitute the second part of the agency-led explanations for the failure of democratization in the Middle East. For the one side of the argument, the aim of the Islamist movements was the creation of an Islamic state, therefore the absence of any democratic forms of politics, which constitutes a threat to women and minorities (Karakoç, 2015, 174). However, from the 1990s onwards, Islamic movements moderated their discourse and began to announce their support for democratic institutions and advocated that Islam, in essence, is democratic (Karakoç, 2015, 176). As the liberal reforms had taken place in those years, Islamist movements were foremost the primary beneficiaries of the reforms since they have started to take place in the political scene (Cavatorta, 2012, 87). However, Islamic movements' different discourses on democracy and Islam intensified secularists' distrust.

For the secularist opposition, Islamists' discourse on democracy was not genuine, as their goal was always to build an Islamic state which would undermine the other's existence in their country. Consequently, according to the secularists as soon as the Islamists gain power through democratic means, they would abolish democratic institutions and build another authoritarian but theocratic regime. Their distrust towards Islamist movements was exacerbated in some cases, for example, when the Muslim Brotherhood announced its support for an Islamic state. In 2004, the Muslim Brotherhood issued "a political platform which was in fact a proposal for an Islamist state" (Khalid, 2006, 46) which stated that their "mission is to build a Muslim individual, a Muslim family and an Islamic rule to lead other Islamic states" (Khalid, 2006, 46). However, for Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the founder of the Islamic party Ennahda in Tunisia (founded as the Movement of Islamic Tendency in 1981), their vision of Islam is a moderate one since their foundation, while they accept "the notion of citizenship as the basis of rights" (Lewis, 2011, as cited in Alvi, 2019, 17) denounce any discrimination between an Islamist or non-Islamist (Lewis, 2011, as cited in Alvi, 2019, 17). This distrust between both sides of the opposition also

continued after the Arab Uprisings, as Islamists became more moderate and received the West's support, while secularists perceived Islamists as "threats to their existence" (Karakoç, 2015, 176). From the Islamic opposition's point of view, on the other hand, secular parties would eventually suppress the Islamic movements and exclude them, as they have experienced it before (Karakoç, 2015, 174-176). Hence, the distrust between actors hinders the process of democratic transition (Cavatorta, 2012, 87).

The third part of the explanations for the failure of the democratization in the Middle East focuses on domestic politics of the countries in the region. Explanations based on domestic politics focus on arguments for the inefficiency of political parties and elections, and civil society.

To begin with the political parties, before the 1980s, elections in the region were held with one or a few political parties eligible to run. However, as the need for domestic and, most importantly, international legitimacy increased since the "third democratization wave" began to occur in many countries around the globe, regimes allowed the emergence of political parties and civil society activists. The introduction of a multiparty system in the regional countries allowed regimes the necessary legitimacy, while political parties have been given permission to hold party conferences and participate in elections. In addition, the introduction of the multiparty system prevented "the international community from being too critical of Arab allies because, after all, the rulers do indeed allow for a degree of pluralism" (Cavatorta, 2012, 88). What is more important for the failure of democratic transition here is that most opposition parties did become a part of the multiparty system for the development of democracy. However, it became clear that the regimes had no intention to carry out a democratization process, since the regimes gave the opposition parties minimal opportunities to operate. While most of the political parties participated in this multiparty system, from the public eye, parties became ineffective and were seen as the instruments of the regime by the public. The result was the depoliticization of the public, which disrupted a possible turn for democratization. Maghraoui (2002, 30-31) gives Morocco as an example of this process of depoliticization. Accordingly, although political control and repression were relaxed for a while during the democratization process, in fact, the newly

introduced reforms did nothing for the process itself. In addition, opposition political parties had little or no impact on the policies or laws. Depoliticization of the public also helped the regime to consolidate this façade of the multiparty system, in return, created a superficial process of democratization.

While focusing on elections, as mentioned earlier, it can be observed that elections gave the authoritarian regimes legitimacy in the public eye. However, most importantly, with authoritarian regimes winning the elections, the international community had to accept the legitimacy of the regimes. If it is the case, how did the inefficiency of elections cause the failure of democratic transition? Indeed, the inefficiency of elections is mainly due to regimes themselves. However, elections themselves should be investigated since inefficient elections give legitimacy to the regimes. Therefore, it is important to examine the nature of the elections in the newly built multiparty systems in the region. Competitive authoritarian regimes –for Levitsky and Way (2002, 59), introduced multiparty elections to acquire legitimacy. However, these elections were not free or fair and helped the regimes to divide the opposition parties. Because the opposition agreed to be a part of this multiparty system, while some were promised to take part in the government or promised to be granted compromises. Levitsky and Way consider elections non-competitive when:

“(1) major candidates are formally barred or effectively excluded on a regular basis; (2) repression or legal controls effectively prevent opposition parties from running public campaigns; or (3) fraud is so massive that there is virtually no observable relationship between voter preferences and official electoral results” (Levitsky&Way, 2010, 7).

In this regard, authoritarian regimes in the region become “competitive authoritarian” since elections are indeed competitive and political parties are allowed to participate or able to campaign. However, elections, under competitive authoritarian regimes are non-competitive, unfree, and unfair. How elections can be unfree or unfair is a relatively easy question to answer. Although the opposition parties participate in the electoral process, they can be suppressed or given not none but less opportunity to campaign thanks to the regime’s network, or fraud could easily be the case in the elections.

Heydemann argues that through introducing political and economic reforms, authoritarian regimes have learnt how to survive in a globalized world in which the conditions are constantly changing. For this adaptation process, Heydemann uses the

term “authoritarian upgrading” (Heydemann, 2007, 5). One of the critical features of the authoritarian upgrading for the regimes, according to Heydemann, is to manage political contestation. For Heydemann, electoral reforms in Arab countries are about “making the elections safe for authoritarianism” (Heydemann, 2007, 11). Therefore, the regimes control elections tightly while offering an uneven electoral process for other parties that any electoral outcome would benefit the regimes. Opposition parties and leaders, on the other hand, become a subject of repression. Electoral results, in that case, do not serve as a result of political reforms but only prove that elections indeed reinforce the status quo.

Another feature of the authoritarian upgrading for Heydemann (2007, 5) is to appropriate and contain civil societies, which brings us to the argument on the inefficiency of civil society as a reason for the failure of democratization in the region. From the 1990s onwards, civil society organizations in the Middle East proliferated – which led to an overall increase in social activism - due to political and social reforms taken by the regimes (Heydemann, 2007, 5-6). This development was received as an important step for the process of democratization since an autonomous space for social activism could advance the level of political chance. However, an increase in the number of civil society organizations did not necessarily mean an overall development in the process of democratization. First of all, the regimes oppressed these organizations, which were focusing on human rights, women’s rights, transparency, electoral reform, by harassing and intimidating them on a regular basis (Heydemann, 2007, 7). This oppression and disruption of organizations’ work, on the other hand, had been taken on a legal framework.

For example, in 1992, Tunisia reformed its association law, which imposed new conditions on NGOs “that essentially forced the Tunisian Human Rights League to suspend its activities” (Heydemann, 2007, 7) . Although Tunisian Human Rights League reopened a year later, it had to ease its relations with the regime. In 2000, the League had to suspend its activities again due to the increased pressure from the regime (Heydemann, 2007, 7). Another example is Egypt’s Law of Association in 2002, which was a revised version of the 1999 Law. The law disrupted activities of NGOs and imposed several restrictions, which resulted in limiting their activities (Heydemann, 2007, 7). Therefore, although the regimes had given permission to civil

society organizations to function without criminalizing them, regimes also ensured that they could not function properly, thus, led them to become ineffective.

In addition to the regime-driven ineffectiveness of civil society organizations, there is another cause for the organizations to be ineffective, which is about the absence of political institutionalism and unpreparedness of the organizations. Wiktorowicz (2000, 44) points out how many scholars put importance on civil society in terms of checking political power and expanding civil liberties and political freedom. It is true that civil society creates a “collective empowerment”, that is, civil society can be “used to empower individuals and social groups vis-à-vis public policy, authoritarian rulers, and the welfare state” (Wiktorowicz, 2000, 44). In the case of the Middle East, the growth of civil society was well-received since, due to limited political participation, groups that were excluded from politics could find themselves a place within these social organizations. However, this might not be the case for some instances. An increase in the number of civil society organizations was used by the regimes for their own means in the region. To quote Weber, “the quantitative spread of organizational life does not always go hand in hand with its qualitative significance” (Weber, 1924, as cited in Wiktorowicz, 2000, 45-46). For the question “How?”, Wiktorowicz refers to Berman’s study on the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany. According to Berman, civil society actually “helped scuttle” (Berman, 1997, 402) a democratic experiment in the 20th century, which was Weimar Germany. What caused this scuttle, according to Berman (1997, 402) was that civil society can accurately function if political institutions are sufficiently strong to provide political order. However, even civil society organization may be great in numbers, the lack of political institutionalism makes them inefficient, and thus civil society can serve the interests of authoritarian regimes. Berman (1997, 408) refers to the Nazi Party, which used the linkage between individuals under civil society organizations to mobilize for political participation. In that case, civil society paved the way for the weakening of democracy. In addition, Berman points out that Nazi Party did not rise to power by attracting excluded individuals of the society, “rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting their skills and associational affiliations to expand the party's appeal and consolidate its position as the largest political force in Germany” (Berman, 1997, 408). Civil society, therefore,

can become strictly attached to the regime so that it cannot function as an independent entity and can help the regime to control society.

This is why it is important to conceptualize civil society within the context of the regional or country-based political structure. Civil society, in the end, may not be an improvement for the process of democratization and as it was in the case of the Middle East, it could decelerate a possible democratization process. The Arab Uprisings prove that point, since the uprisings indicate “how traditional, official and vertically-organised civil society movements were unprepared for the uprisings and did not commit to them until they were well on the way” (Cavatorta, 2012, 89).

The last explanation for the failure of the democratization process in the region is Eva Bellin’s (2004) analysis on the robustness of the coercive apparatus in the Middle East. In the article “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”, Bellin underlines that authoritarianism has been robust in the Middle East and North Africa, “because the coercive apparatus in many states has been exceptionally able and willing to crush reform initiatives from below” (Bellin, 2004, 144) which makes the region an exception, compared to other parts of the world. Therefore, the democratization process in the region is doomed to fail.

Bellin (2004) lays out scholarly explanations for the failure of democratization, which are the weakness of civil society, state-driven economic planning, poverty of the people and low literacy rates, and regional culture with Islam. However, these explanations are not adequate to explain the failure of democratization. Because the failure is not about fulfilling the prerequested conditions for democratic transition, but it is about conditions that nourish the robust authoritarianism. In this case, it is the robust coercive apparatus that leads to the failure of democratic transition. The question here is, how the coercive apparatus makes democratic transition fail? Four criteria are introduced by Bellin (2004, 144-146) as important indicators for shaping the robustness of the coercive apparatus:

1. Maintenance of fiscal health
2. Maintenance of international support networks
3. Level of institutionalization
4. Popular mobilization

The first two, maintenance of fiscal health and international support networks, determine the coercive apparatus' capacity, whereas the level of institutionalization and popular mobilization determine the coercive apparatus' will to repress (Bellin, 2012, 129).

The maintenance of fiscal health of the coercive apparatus is undoubtedly an important point for the material capability of the apparatus to repress any possible revolt or hinder the democratic transition. Bellin (2004) gives an example from sub-Saharan Africa's democratic transition. Accordingly, the financial crisis affected many African countries and "soldiers went unpaid, and materiel deteriorated. The democratic transition was possible because decomposition of the military and security establishments opened up the political space in which demands for democracy could be pressed" (Luckham, 1995, as cited in Bellin, 2004, 144). In addition, in Tunisia, for example, fiscal health of the Defense Ministry was intentionally deteriorated by Ben Ali. According to Grewal, by 2011, "the budget of the Defense Ministry was barely half that of the Interior Ministry" (Grewal, 2016). The World Bank data (The World Bank, n.d.) also shows that from 1988 to 2011, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Tunisia has fallen from 2.1% to 1.2% over the years. However, overall, in the Middle East fiscal health of the military was put a great importance. Posusney underlines that "the Middle East is distinguished by the comparatively high proportion of government expenditures devoted to security forces" (Posusney, 2004, 131). A materially capable military institution, therefore, becomes sufficient to repress any possible unrest that could result in a democratic transition process.

The maintenance of the international support networks is also an important factor for the robustness of the coercive apparatus. The lack of international support for the apparatus diminishes the will or the capacity of the security establishment. Lacking the essential support eventually affects the fiscal health of the apparatus as well. Therefore, fiscal health and international support become highly interlinked for the coercive apparatus' will and capacity to carry on repression (Bellin, 2004, 148).

In the case of the level of institutionalization, Bellin (2004, 145) refers to institutionalized coercive apparatus as an entity that has an identity and a path of its own, therefore independent from the regime and more open to reform. In any case of

separation from the state forces, due to their independence from the regime, the separation does not affect the apparatus' interests and existence, although a separation would affect the coercive apparatus that is linked to the regime. In contrast to that definition, a coercive apparatus that is organized with patrimonial lines, abuse of power, cronyism and corruption is directly linked to the regime. Any possibility of reform, revolution or democratic transition constitute an existential threat for the coercive apparatus as well. Adding to Bellin's argument, Lutterbeck suggests that a low degree of institutionalism in the armed forces might lead to "a splintering of the military" (Lutterbeck, 2018, 15) in any case of a pro-reform uprising, since the low degree of institutionalism cause a fragmentation in the military that could not form a united entity to crash the upheavals. In Libya, for example, a high degree of fragmentation and patrimonialism, combined with a low level of institutionalisation caused the fracturing of the military. Lutterbeck defines the high degree of fragmentation in Libya under Qaddafi as "a multiple military regime" since there were several security agencies in Libya that served to protect the Qaddafi regime, including "Revolutionary Committees, the Revolutionary Guards, and the People's Guards" (Lutterbeck, 2018, 32). These features of Libya's security forces led to the fracturing of the armed forces during the Arab Uprisings, forming pro and anti-regime forces and resulted in a civil war. Therefore, while the level of institutionalism lays a groundwork for the coercive apparatus' will on repression, fragmentation in the military should also be considered.

Lastly, the high level of popular mobilization affects the coercive apparatus' will to hinder the democratic transition or to repress an upheaval. If the level of mobilization is high, it is more costly, in any way, to suppress an upheaval, and if it is low, it does not pose a critical threat to the apparatus. The level of mobilization, therefore, defines which side the security establishment would take. For example, in Egypt, the public was revived with the overthrow of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. On January 25, several civil society and opposition organizations gathered for the overthrow of Mubarak and the protests spread throughout the country. As the demonstrations grew, "The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—previously convened only wartime in 1967 and 1973—issued its first communiqué, 'endorsing the people's legitimate demands'" (Dalacoura, 2012, 64), and a few days later, on February 11, Mubarak resigned. Although the level of popular mobilization cannot

be a single indicator for the decision-making of the security forces, Egypt sets an example on the effect of popular mobilization on military's will to suppress.

How could these variables be adapted to the Arab Uprisings overall? According to Bellin (2012), the coercive apparatus' will and capacity determine the fall or rebirth of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, therefore, directly affecting the democratic transition process. If the apparatus decides to intervene on the regime side, then there is a high probability for the fall of the regime. If the coercive apparatus decides to take a side on the reformists, then the opposite outcome can be expected. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the military chose not to take side with the regime, which resulted in the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak. In the case of the democratic transition, however, another question arose. Although in Tunisia and Egypt, the military had sided with the public, which led to the fall of the authoritarian regimes, in the case of the democratic transition, the result was not the same. For the answer to this question, therefore, the pre-Arab Uprisings period of both Tunisia and Egypt will be analyzed in the latter chapter.

To conclude, explanations for the endurance of the authoritarian regimes and the failure of democratization vary. Each approach is not solely sufficient to explain the political condition of the region since each approach fits into the context of a particular country on a different level. Therefore, it is also essential to analyze the countries within their own contexts of political and economic history, their culture, and their religion.

2.2. Pre-Arab Uprisings Authoritarianism in Tunisia and Egypt

The first section of the thesis focused on the factors leading to authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the Middle East. The first part consisted of the factors leading to authoritarianism in which the elements from the past and the present were discussed. The second part consisted of the explanations for the failure of democratization in the region. In that part, structure-led and agency-led explanations were discussed. In addition, the efficiency of political parties, civil

society and elections were added to the argument. Lastly, for that section, Eva Bellin's analysis of the "Middle East exceptionalism" was discussed.

The second section of this thesis will focus on the pre-Arab Uprisings period of Tunisia and Egypt. First, Tunisia and Egypt's brief socio-political history until the 1980s will be analyzed. After the first part, Tunisia and Egypt's military, political economy and class structure, society and culture and civil society after the 1980s until the Arab Uprisings will be discussed.

Until the Arab Uprisings, both Tunisia and Egypt were considered authoritarian countries. After the uprisings, Tunisia embarked on a democratic transition process and faced with a civilian coup in 2021 while Egypt faced a military take-over after a three-year period. For this thesis, I argue that although Tunisia and Egypt share a similar background as being authoritarian countries, they bear different factors in their socio-political history. These factors include the history of the state formation; military and the administration; political economy, class structure and civil society; and society and culture. According to my argument, although these factors rallied under authoritarian regimes, they are the reasons for different paths taken by Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Uprisings. The third section will also focus on these factors and how these factors were shaped in the post-Arab Uprisings period, which eventually led to two different paths for these countries.

2.2.1. A Brief Socio-political History of Tunisia and Egypt until the 1980s

The first section of the thesis focused on the factors leading to authoritarianism and Long-served leaders of Tunisia and Egypt came to power in the 1980s. In Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power by overthrowing Habib Bourguiba with a coup d'état in October 1987. Coming from a military background, Ben Ali stayed in power for two and a half decades. Hosni Mubarak, on the other hand, came to power in 1980 following Anwar Sadat's assassination. Mubarak also had a military background and had been serving as the Prime Minister of Egypt from 1975 to 1980. His rule lasted for thirty years. Autocratic leaders of Tunisia and Egypt came to power with promises of democratic rule with neoliberal economic policies. However, both of them were ousted in 2011. Before Ben Ali and Mubarak, Tunisia and Egypt

had been ruled by different actors. Habib Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia, had ruled the country from 1957 to 1987. In Egypt, Mohamed Naguib became the first president of the country in 1953, followed by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat until 1981. Naguib, Nasser and Sadat had been a part of the Free Officers Movement and been a member of the Egyptian Armed Forces, while Bourguiba graduated from a law school before participating in the Tunisian national movement, the Destour.

Coming to the power of these actors was affected by the socio-political history of Tunisia and Egypt. This period shaped the structure of the military, political economy and class structure, society and culture, and civil society. For this part, a brief summary of Tunisia and Egypt's socio-political history will be made in order to present a broad picture of the countries' backgrounds. After this section, a specific focus on the factors discussed, which are political economy, class structure, civil society, military, society and culture will be presented.

To start with Tunisia, the country was ruled by the Ottoman Empire from 1574 to 1881. However, from 1705 until 1881, it was an autonomous governate and ruled by the Beys of the Husainid Dynasty (Moalla, 2004, 3-4). Largueche, Clancy-Smith and Audet define the beylical power as "a Tunisian expression of monarchy in the modern period" (Largueche, Clancy-Smith & Audet, 2001, 106). According to Hédi Chérif, the beylical system in Tunisia "constituted a 'total phenomenon', one which played a primordial role in modern state formation" (Hédi Chérif, 1984, as cited in Largueche et al., 2001, 106) while shaping the political and social structure of the country for the future. Accordingly, the system of *mahalla* functioned as "a mobile military camp under the direct command of the ruler" (Largueche et al., 2001, 109), which is the bey. The system allowed permanent mobility of the masses and became "an institution of power adapted to a nomadic society" (Largueche et al., 2001, 109), whereas it became a responsive apparatus for aggressive tribalism. *Mahalla* became a monarchical structure in Tunisia where beys became the rulers and the power to rule would be transferred through heirship.

The French rule in Tunisia brought the reconstruction of the society and the state structure. It should be underlined that "Tunisian society was even then peculiarly homogeneous" (Murphy, 1999, 43), and unlike Algeria, Tunisia was not accepted as

a part of France. However, the French political and administrative structure was introduced while old-structural features of the country were reformed. According to Murphy (1999, 43), France also continued to recognize the role of the grand families of Tunisia by giving them statues in the Grand Council that was established in 1907. Therefore, it can be considered that French rule in Tunisia was both direct and indirect. On the other hand, Larif-Béatrix (1988, as cited in Murphy, 1999, 43) argues that because of the administrative efficiency that the French brought, the tribal structure of the country eroded and helped the foundation of national associations in the form of political parties and unions. Economic policies, on the other hand, focused on the commercialization of agriculture and integration into the international economy. During the colonial period, the Tunisian economy began to develop as the French rule developed agriculture, transport, trade, and infrastructure. However, most of the wealth was accumulated in the hands of French colonists. This accumulation of wealth led to the creation of “an agricultural proletariat” (Anderson, 1986, 137) and landless workers that depended on the landlords. Once welcomed by Tunisians, colonial economic and political changes in the country led to the disenchantment from French policies. At every level of the Tunisian society, protests began to arise at the beginning of the twentieth century. Anderson (1986, 138) points out that the early stages of protests came from the old elites of the former governments as Tunisian people became poorer under the French protectorate. Subsequently, the Tunisian bourgeoisie protested the unemployment level between Tunisians and the refusal of the establishment of a Tunisian constitution. Protests by the middle class that underlined the discrimination against Tunisians demanded a fully Tunisian-controlled state structure. According to Anderson (1986, 138), it was the Neo-Destour Party that led to this final effort as a nationalist movement. Neo-Destour was founded in 1934 by young men educated in France and returned to Tunisia “to oppose French domination more effectively than the Destour Party” (Moore, 1962, 461). Unlike its predecessor Destour, Neo-Destour aspired to build a new modern nation embedding itself into the international society while “appealing to the masses as well as to the educated Tunisian elite” (Moore, 1962, 462). Although they had nationalism in common, Neo-Destour did not accept religion as a base for management. In addition, Destour did not support the *Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT)*, which was founded in 1924 as the first

Tunisian trade union, while it was shut down by French authorities in 1925; however, later on, it was Neo-Destour that supported an organized union, *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT)* that was established in 1946 (Anderson, 1986, 47), in addition to the *Union Tunisienne des Industriels et Commerçants (UTIC)* and the *Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens (UNAT)* (Moore, 1962, 462). Later on, it was UGTT that supported Neo-Destour in national consensus over the independence. “Together with the two other main trade unions and the employers’ federation, the UGTT joined the Neo-Destour to form the National Front in the 1956 and 1959 National Assembly elections” (Murphy, 1999, 53). In the following years, national organizations and unions became fundamental for Bourguiba’s administrative process. These associations were strongly linked to the ruling party, in a way that this affiliation was essential for their existence. Although throughout the end of the 1970s, the UGTT became more and more critical of the existing regime due to political repression and economic hardships and called for a strike in 1978, the government response was repression through military with arrests and sentences. As a result, the UGTT again was forced to cooperate with the regime (Murphy, 1999, 60) in order to survive.

How Neo-Destour mobilized the public during the independence struggle is another question to be asked. The clientele networks of the party, in addition to the financial support from business people, through teachers, doctors, lawyers and professionals, encouraged nationwide support for independence, convincing the public that the protectorate had not been serving the Tunisian interests (Murphy, 1999, 46) by effectively mobilizing and educated the “most backward sectors of the society” (Moore, 1962, 464). Having been a homogenous society sharing a Sunni-Arab identity, Tunisia had its independence with a relatively moderate process of negotiations. First accepted by France as internal independence, a delegation led by Bourguiba negotiated independence, and it was formally accepted in 1956, followed by an election forming a new Constituent Assembly and appointing Bourguiba as the elected president.

During the Bourguiba period in Tunisia, the state building was represented as a process that “required collective effort and that the new state would serve the common need rather than that of any single socio-economic group” (Murphy, 1999,

13) by the nationalist groups. The new constitution that was proclaimed in June 1959 declared that “it is the will of the people ‘to consolidate national unity’ and ‘to institute a democracy founded on the sovereignty of the people and characterised by a stable political regime based on the separation of powers’” (Callard, 1960, 21). In the post-independence state building process, the old colonial structures had been swept away by “nationalist movements with populist agendas” (Murphy, 1999, 14), while Bourguiba became the leader in the creation of a corporatist state and put Tunisia on the path of economic liberalization. The national independence party “was considered all-encompassing. Alternative parties were considered as having nothing to offer and having no place in the new political system. The single, or dominant, party became the intermediary between the state and the people, as represented by interest groups” (Murphy, 1999, 14). Therefore, there was no room for class mobilization. In place of this class mobilization, functional groups divided by their interests, such as “agricultural producers, industrial producers, civil servants, women, and the military” (Murphy, 1999, 14) were constructed. Whenever an interest group submitted its demand to the state, it would have only been able to do so through the representatives within the national party. Murphy defines the early independence period of Tunisia and Egypt as a corporatist model, meaning the system “considers society to be organic, rather like a body with many parts functioning harmoniously together but having their separate tasks” (Murphy, 1999, 15), therefore considers the existence of a class-based organized labor a threat to the functioning of the society. Bourguiba, as the leader of the party, created an administrative system that functions as a pro-Western, Tunisificated state. As the relationship between the party and the state became ambiguous, “the party was used to service his own political agenda, while the state apparatus serviced that of the nation” (Murphy, 1999, 51). Therefore, once began as a nationalist movement, Neo-Destour, under the leadership of Bourguiba, built an authoritarian regime in the following decades of Tunisian independence.

On the other hand, the military constituted a functional group that would provide the regime with a nationalist statute while ensuring order. Murphy (1999, 16), for this point, underlines that the military is one of the continuous characteristics of the region, and most of the regimes in the region have a military background. Although this was not the case with Habib Bourguiba, it was the case for Gamal Abdel Nasser,

Hosni Mubarak, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The corporatist state, therefore, requires the monopoly over the military in order to consolidate the power of the regime. As it was mentioned before, throughout the end of the nineteenth century, patron-client relations became more and more visible in society, in both military and politics. This patron-client relationship continued to exist in the newly built vertical structure after the independence at the institutional level, and became evident “in personalist leadership patterns, the relations between political leaders and the military forces” (Murphy, 1999, 19).

The populist regimes of the post-independence period were obliged to provide economic welfare and development. Therefore, the state itself became more involved in industrialization and economic planning. In the first decade of the new regime, Bourguiba and Neo-Destour became committed to a form of Tunisian Socialism. While the party changed its name to the “*Parti Socialiste Destourien*, or PSD” (Murphy, 1999, 55), in order to ensure economic welfare, the regime embarked upon “import substitution industrialization and agricultural collectivization” (Murphy, 1999, 55). Callard (1960, 30), at this point, underlines that in a doctrinal sense, Neo-Destour has never been a socialist party. Since “no activity can claim to be outside the control and supervision of the state” (Callard, 1960, 31), it can be considered as “a statist party” (Callard, 1960, 31) in Tunisia. In the early 1970s, it has been witnessed that the state support for economic liberalization increased, mostly due to as a response to the existing economic strategies and the internal party conflicts. As the economic liberalization required political liberalization as well, the corporatist nature of the regime began to take a path on an authoritarian one in order to ensure the survival of the regime (Murphy, 1999, 57-58).

Since the existing industrial bourgeoisie in the region was not strong, the regime created its own “bourgeois-bureaucratic state apparatus” (Murphy, 1999, 21). This apparatus did not own the means of production but had the control over them, so that could “facilitate access to profit-making opportunities: trade licenses, credit lines, information, public sector contracts and employment opportunities” (Murphy, 1999, 22). In the 1970s, as the economic reforms fell short of the fiscal prosperity, the bourgeois state allied itself with “the industrial bourgeoisie and a growing commercial bourgeoisie” (Murphy, 1999, 23) and began representing its interest

rather than the nation. As the alliance between the nation and the regime began to break down, strikes, demonstrations and protests took place, which were met with authoritarian measures. It was at that particular point that corporatism was “overtaken by authoritarianism” (Murphy, 1999, 23), while the regime became more reliant on the support of the military.

Egypt has shared similarities and differences with Tunisia in socio-political history. The country had also been ruled by the Ottoman Empire beginning from 1517 as an eyalet until 1867. Although invaded by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798, three years later, joint forces of Britain and the Ottoman Empire expelled the French forces from Egypt. On the other hand, France’s defeat left a power vacuum in Egypt, since until the invasion, Mamluks were the ruling class. However, after the withdrawal of France, a conflict to fill the vacuum took place, which resulted in the triumph of Muhammad Ali’s seizure of power in Egypt. Muhammad Ali claimed himself as the khedive of the country; however, it was not recognized until 1867 that Egypt became a khedivate. Following the Urabi revolt, Britain invaded Egypt in 1882 and formally declared a protectorate over the country in 1914.

Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the economy of Egypt remained strong while enduring its position as “the richest and most important Ottoman province” (Crececius, 1998, 59) since “it distributed to various regions of the Ottoman empire ... agricultural bounty of such crops as rice, sugar, and wheat as well as a broad range of products, chiefly Yemeni coffee, from Africa, Asia, and the Red Sea region” (Crececius, 1998, 59). However, in the second half of the century, Egypt’s economy began to decline by the European expansion to the Middle Eastern markets, that goods such as coffee and rice would be bought directly (Crececius, 1998, 60) and such goods would be grown in the New World. According to Crececius, this decline was exacerbated

“by the unrestrained tyranny of the ruling beys, whose short-sighted policies destroyed the prosperity created by their predecessors, ruined the merchant community, both foreign and domestic, left the countryside in chaos, and provoked two military expeditions (in 1786 and again in 1798) that undermined the very foundations of the system that had provided the political and military leadership of the province for centuries” (Crececius, 1998, 60).

The end of the eighteenth century was marked by the French invasion of Egypt, which lasted until 1801. One of the most important effects of the invasion for Egypt

was the increase in Egypt's economic crisis. According to Dykstra, "merchants involved in the Mediterranean coastal trade certainly suffered heavily from the blockades and embargoes of commerce; certainly, those involved in the transit of goods between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea also suffered" (Dykstra, 1998, 135). In addition, the Mamluk regime in Egypt began to lose its legitimacy mostly due to economic crisis, "the growing gap between the rich and poor" (Dykstra, 1998, 136) and its inability to prevent French penetration. The French invasion of Egypt, with the general discontent over the Mamluk ruling elite, therefore, resulted in a four-year power vacuum in Egypt. During the period, while Ottoman authorities tried to consolidate their power in the province, Britain "came to the assistance of the Mamluks" (Fahmy, 1998, 141). However, after three years of struggle, the power vacuum ended with the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha, as the commander of "the most powerful military force in Egypt" (Fahmy, 1998, 143), the Albanian forces. Muhammad Ali Pasha would end the Mamluk regime in 1805 and would be appointed as the *wali* of Egypt by the Ottoman Empire. Fahmy (1998, 178) underlines that the Pasha's policies emphasized the importance of Egypt strategically, which also contributed to the British military intervention in 1882. Through the end of Pasha's reign, Egypt became an important economy in the world market, especially with the cultivation of cotton. However, Egypt mostly traded with the Western economies, such as Britain and France, accompanied by an undermined urban merchantry "whose trade in coffee and spices had been primarily conducted within the Ottoman empire or with lands farther to the east" (Fahmy, 1998, 178). In terms of societal structure, Fahmy points out that, with many students that Muhammad Ali Pasha had sent to Europe, a new cultural elite had been created. This new elite reoriented its culture from Ottoman Empire to a European one and "was to decide Egypt's future orientation and lay the groundwork for a later cultural movement that would insist that Egypt had a Mediterranean identity, rather than an Oriental, Ottoman one" (Fahmy, 1998, 179). However, the most important aspect of Muhammad Ali Pasha's reign was the creation of a state that monopolized the coercive power and used that monopolized coercive power to extend the influence of central power all over Egypt for permanent (Fahmy, 1998, 179).

After Muhammad Ali Pasha, Egypt was ruled by his descendants for almost a hundred years until the abolishment of the monarchy with the 1952 Egyptian

Revolution. According to Hunter, by the time of British invasion of Egypt in 1882, European penetration in the Ottoman province increased with “the self-assertion and intervention of foreign consulates, lending by European bankers, and the build-up of a huge debt owed entirely to foreigners” (Hunter, 1998, 180). These events were followed by the control of Egypt’s finances by Britain and France. The increasing control over Egypt stimulated a riot in Alexandria in June 1882. Although it has been named after Colonel Ahmad Urabi, according to Reid (1998, 231), there has been no credible evidence that supports this argument. Nevertheless, this violent revolt became a ground for British troops to land in Egypt, disbanding the Egyptian army and jailing Urabists. Muhammad Ali Dynasty, on the other hand, survived for another century, while Egypt remained as an Ottoman province until 1914.

During British control, Egypt was in a financial crisis. Therefore, in order to create financial stability, “emergency measures were adopted” (Daly, 1998, 240) while “an Egyptian council of ministers remained responsible in theory to the khedive; in practice British advisors were appointed to the principal ministries, and British advice was expected to be followed” (Daly, 1998, 241). The British control over Egypt integrated the country “into the capitalist world economy dominated by Europe” (Ajl, Haddad, & Abul-Magd, 2021, 48) while colonial administration cooperated with local landowners, resulting with the indebtedment of peasantry to European creditors (Ajl et al., 2021, 48).

During wartime, Egyptian labor became a source for Britain. “An Egyptian labour corps and camel transport corps were established; when voluntary labour and animal sales dried up, the British resorted to conscription and confiscation, which were moreover enforced harshly and with inadequate compensation” (Daly, 1998, 246). In addition, because of the British demand for cotton, food production in Egypt declined, which resulted in inflation in food prices. Under such circumstances, due to their wartime efforts, Egyptians proclaimed their right to independence, or least, self-government. During the second half of the nineteenth century, due to the introduction of a market economy, an increase in the demand for labor power and bad working conditions, Egypt witnessed the rise of the labor movement (Abbas, 1973, 62). According to Abbas (1973, 62), landless peasants, craftsmen, and unemployed skilled migrant workers constituted the Egyptian working class at the end of the

nineteenth century. Throughout the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, there were several labor strikes and protests in Egypt, mostly to improve the working conditions (Abbas, 1973, 63). During this period, Egypt witnessed the birth of a long-lasting nationalist party, the Wafd, led by Saad Zaghlul. The party supported the labor movement in order to “recruit the working class, peasants, and intellectuals to the nationalist struggle against British occupation” (Abbas, 1973, 63). For this purpose, one of the first unions in Egypt, the Trade Union of Craftsmen, was established in 1910 under the leadership of the party. The beginning of the First World War marked the suppression of political parties and disbandment of trade unions (Abbas, 1973, 63). However, the 1919 Egyptian Revolution were supported by the workers while it provided the opportunity for the reestablishment of the unions. As Egypt was recognized as an independent country in 1922, it was not until 1952 that Egypt became completely free from British forces on their soil. The independence was not what the unions had hoped for. Abbas underlines that after the independence, the national bourgeoisie’s attempt “to dominate trade unions obstructed the workers’ struggle for the improvement of labor conditions and class consciousness” (Abbas, 1973, 74). It was not until the beginning of the 1950s that the communist movement was Egyptianized (Abbas, 1973, 74) and not until 1942 that trade unions were legalized (Ajl et al., 2021, 49). According to Beinin, the “workers’ movement was an important component of the social upheaval that undermined the monarchy and ended the era of British colonialism” (Beinin, 1989, 71). Although the workers’ movement embraced the 1952 Revolution, problems of the workers’ movement, such as “the conflict between labor and capital, workplace struggles, refusal to accept the officially sanctioned limits on independent workers’ political action” (Beinin, 1989, 71) had not been resolved. According to Ajl et al., the nationalist movement of Egypt “mostly ignored peasants’ interests” while “small farmers and agricultural seasonal laborers engaged in daily acts of resistance” (Ajl et al., 2021, 49). Therefore, it can be concluded that, although workers actively demonstrated resistance against the conditions endured, Egypt’s workers’ movement could not infiltrate to the party politics and be an active part of it compared to Tunisia, since the national bourgeoisie continuously attempted to dominate the movement and ignored the interests of the laborers.

The socialisms enforced in Tunisia and Egypt differed from each other. Ajl et al. define Egypt's state planning as an "Arab Socialism" while defining Tunisia's as a limited "socialist experiment" (Ajl et al., 2021, 52). After the 1952 Revolution, Egypt adopted state import substitution industrialization while, unlike Tunisia, the military regime gave an emphasis on urban and rural standards and "carried out an agrarian reform aimed at undermining the large landholders who had dominated Egyptian politics since the mid-nineteenth century" (Ajl et al., 2021, 53), while establishing rural cooperatives under the party control. What differed Egypt from Tunisia in the first decade of independence was the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Bank Nisr and all private enterprises under the leadership of Nasser (Ajl et al., 2021, 53). Although both countries began to take more authoritarian measures in the second half of the 1960s, Tunisia still represented itself as a pro-Western, liberal, and anti-Arab nationalist country, while Nasser became an anti-Western hero of the region and defined the regime's ideology as Arab Socialism. However, Anwar Sadat's coming to power changed Egypt's economic and social policies. The *infitah*, or open door, policy reversed Nasserist policies and "inaugurated an era of new consumer goods, crony capitalism, and corruption, as ascendant capitalists deepened business and familial ties with the regime" (Ajl et al., 2021, 59) and exacerbated the existing patron-client relations. While Hosni Mubarak's coming to power in 1981 did not change the economic policies pursued by Sadat, in the early periods of his rule, Mubarak resisted the US-IMF pressure on liberalization of the economy while representing Egypt as a pro-US country (Ajl et al., 2021, 62). On the other hand, during the same period, "Tunisia moved to a carefully modulated neoliberalization. Due to the social power of the UGTT and entrenched familial-business networks, breaking direct state control of the economy was more complex and contested than in than Egypt" (Ajl et al., 2021, 64-65). Therefore, in the early 1980s, what differed Egypt from Tunisia was that the latter experienced a smoother transition. In social and political policies, however, both countries experienced an increasing number of authoritarian measures.

The following parts of this section will cover the post-1980s period, beginning with the rule of Ben Ali and Mubarak until the Arab Uprisings. Following the first years of the two leaders, both Tunisia and Egypt experienced increasing authoritarian policies accompanied by limited liberal economic reforms. In order to underline the

different factors in both countries' experiences, in the first part, political economy, class structure and civil society will be analyzed. Later, the structure of the military and its relationship with the administration will be explained. Lastly, for this section, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood in reference to the effect of political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt will be explained.

2.2.2. Political Economy, Class Structure and Civil Society

The first part of pre-Arab Uprisings authoritarianism in Tunisia and Egypt covered the socio-political history of the two countries until the 1980s. The socio-political histories have shaped the countries' political economy, class structure and civil society, as well as the military and the societal structure. Although Tunisia and Egypt share similar historical backgrounds, different elements drove them into different paths after the Arab Uprisings. Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, these factors were vague. However, the beginning of French and British rule marked the separate paths for Tunisia and Egypt.

The second part of the second chapter will focus on the political economy, class structure and civil society of the post-1980 periods in Tunisia and Egypt – the era of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak until the Arab Uprisings. Previously mentioned in the first part, until Ben Ali and Mubarak, the two countries have already started to experience authoritarian repression, corruption, and increasing clientel relations within the regimes.

The last decade of Bourguiba's rule was marked by a transition from corporatism to authoritarianism. According to Murphy, "in the early years of statehood, national organizations, under the tutelage of the single party, were able to articulate and negotiate interests within the National Assembly" (Murphy, 1999, 78). Trying to eliminate any challenge to his personal rule, Bourguiba increased the level of control over the state and the party. While the balance between the state and the party disappeared, and economic policies of the state fell short of alleviating the economic crisis of the late 1980s and the degree of repressive authoritarian measures increased (Murphy, 1999, 79).

In 1987, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power with a coup d'état and became the head of state and the party (Perkins, 2014, 188). According to Murphy, when Ben Ali came to power, “the state was an inflated, bureaucratic but paralysed entity. It was wholly integrated with the PSD, a single party which had ceased to be interested in mobilizing public support for its objectives” (Murphy, 1999, 221). Therefore, Tunisia was already on the path to becoming an authoritarian-ruled country under an economic crisis. Thus, when Ben Ali came to power, people were already expecting political and economic reforms, and Ben Ali, indeed, promised those reforms (Sadiki, 2002, 58). Under the economic liberalization process, “a rising working class championed democracy and applied pressure on the single-party system, leading some elites and other social groups to become advocates of democratic reform” and pressured the state (King, 2003, 4). Therefore, “the challenges from below led Tunisian authorities to experiment with political democratization” (Anderson 1986, 246, as cited in King, 2003, 4).

In the first year of coming to power, Ben Ali implemented the 1986 Stand-by agreement, which included two development plans for the next ten years. The first development plan, which covered the years between 1987 and 1991, was to “achieve macro-economic stability and to introduce the initial measures of structural liberalization, particularly in terms of sectoral (including public sector), financial and trade reform” (Murphy, 1999, 103). The second plan, which covered the years between 1992 and 1996, was designed to “consolidate these measures, with legislative arrangements to encourage foreign investment, accelerate privatization, develop the stock market, and deepen integration with overseas” (Murphy, 1999, 103). Within the scope of the development plans, “the World Bank provided support, initially in 1986 in the form of an agricultural sector adjustment loan, followed by an industrial and trade policy adjustment loan in 1987, two structural adjustment loans (in 1988 and 1991), a second agricultural sector adjustment loan in 1989, and a public enterprise reform loan in 1989” (Ghali, 2004, 9-10). However, these economic and political reforms were “more a case of restoring the credibility of the existing system than of replacing it with another. His reforms were not democratic – they were imposed from above albeit in sympathy with demands from below” (Murphy, 1999, 223). In addition, the promise of a functioning multi-party system was to revive a mobilization for public support behind the state. Although multi-party

elections were held in 1981, “the democratic reforms of that year never took hold. Elements of the hegemonic state party apparently had second thoughts and interfered with the elections to ensure that not a single opposition candidate was elected” (Anderson 1986, 248, as cited in King, 2003, 4). Therefore, according to Murphy (1999, 224), distribution of powers would not be a challenge to the regime but rather would support it.

Despite economic and political reforms under the Ben Ali regime, the issue of patronage remained in place. In order to achieve economic stability, the regime had to have a functioning private sector. This private sector, on the other hand, was controlled by the state and adapted to the market structure, while the private sector was deprived of political autonomy. Under the structural reform process, “patronage for economically vulnerable groups came in the direct form of social transfers while the middle classes were left to compete for more indirect forms of support” (Murphy, 1999, 225). For the rural poor, the regime became the direct provider of goods and services with directly targeted transfers (Murphy, 1999, 225). Murphy explains the effects of the economic policies on the middle class as follows:

“If the withdrawal of subsidized food, fuel, and welfare provision was the major cost element of liberalization for the middle classes, the benefits were portrayed as the creation of wealth-generation opportunities, the structural modernization and de-bureaucratization of the economy, and most importantly the stabilization of a system which had been characterized by crisis for a prolonged period” (Murphy, 1999, 225).

Throughout the ten-year structural programme, in general terms, economic planning had been a success. According to Murphy, in the first ten-year of Ben Ali’s rule, “Tunisia’s international credit standing has been restored, public finances have been stabilized and budget deficits greatly reduced. Inflation has been kept under control, production and exports have been diversified, imports have been liberalized and trade balances have been improved” (Murphy, 1997, 115). However, although targeted payments to the rural poor favoured them for a while, according to King, the agricultural policy during the structural reform process made it clear that the rural masses were abandoned by the state since the “dual strategy of favoring large commercial enterprises and also making a much smaller effort to stabilize family farms through state policy has ended” (King, 1998, 79).

In the first year of his presidency, Ben Ali's promises of political liberalization were shown in action. For example, "as an indication of the seriousness of his intentions, the president ordered the release from prison of a number of prominent figures, including UGTT leader Habib Achour, MDS leader Ahmad Mestiri and former minister Driss Guiga" (Murphy, 1999, 168). In addition to providing amnesties for political prisoners and reforming the constitution, in the early stages of his presidency, Ben Ali reformed his party, PSD. "The party was renamed, dropping the reference to its Destourian (and socialist) past and establishing instead the commitment to peaceful democratic change" (Murphy, 1997, 117).

"In May 1988 a new law legalized a number of political parties, although notably not the most virile challenger, the Mouvement de la tendance islamiste (MTI). The following September the National Pact was launched, an effort to reconcile political adversaries through dialogue and to commit all parties to a national programme of action designed to revive the political, social and economic life of the country" (Murphy, 1997, 118).

However, after the first year of his presidency, the Ben Ali regime has shown "a growing intolerance for dissent, criticism, or opposition of any kind. Rather than giving rise to a democratizing or liberalizing trend, the period of accelerated marketization in Tunisia has been associated with the hardening of authoritarianism" (King, 2003, 5).

Murphy underlines that Tunisian society was reshaped "under the pressures of economic reform" (Murphy, 1999, 226). As the regime formulated and implemented economic policies based on economic hierarchies, strict lines between horizontal interest groups became evident. In the case of class politics, a working-class consciousness has been present in Tunisia since the 1970s, and UGTT has been a vital part of class politics (Murphy, 1999, 227). While the Ben Ali regime implemented policies that benefited the employer rather than the worker and reduced the rights of the workers, UGTT "resisted the implementation of those [the principles of economics] of its aspects which impact negatively on workers' rights and economic security (Murphy, 1999, 228)". Civil society in Tunisia, particularly the UGTT, has been a channel to challenge the regime since "education, urbanization and association have deepened the population's consciousness of the state, and how it confines them" (Murphy 1999, 229). The sense of political community, according

to Bellin, “is essential to the development of a ‘civic culture’ but so rare in the Arab world” (Bellin, 1995, 124), which makes Tunisia a unique case.

Bellin (1995, 124) defines five characteristics that create the sense of political community in Tunisia. First, compared to other countries in the region, the society is ethnically and religiously unfragmented. Second, civilian rule in the country has a long history, mostly due to Bourguiba’s contraction of the military in order to subordinate it to civilian rule. Third, the promotion of education for many years and the distribution of economic benefits created a well-educated middle class that could advance civil society. Fourth, Tunisia was one of the first Arab countries that embarked on a “quasi-liberal strategy of development” (Bellin, 1995, 124), and abandoned Arab socialism, therefore could create “autonomous sources of economic power” (Bellin, 1995, 124). The last and the most important point for Bellin is that the state “has publicly committed itself to the development of civil society in Tunisia” (Bellin, 1995, 124), although it tried to control it most of the time. Since the Bourguiba regime, Tunisian elites “has recognized the political value of nourishing *civisme* and civility in one’s citizenry” (Bellin, 1995, 126) and encouraged the development of civil society, however, “in an extremely controlled way” (Bellin, 1995, 126), so that elites’ privileges would not be contested. According to Beinin, workers constituted “a valuable political asset for nationalist parties and their leaders” (Beinin, 2016, 6) for the postcolonial states, especially for Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. For political parties, workplaces were an important part of the national struggle for independence since the mobilization of people for anticolonial campaigns (Beinin, 2016, 5). However, after the independence, workers’ demands for better working conditions and social securities were mostly undermined by the regimes (Beinin, 2016, 6).

For Tunisia, a national trade organization was provided by the UGTT, and throughout its history, the union “has paired social initiatives with political and national aims”, and unlike “its counterparts in other Arab countries, the UGTT has always enjoyed a certain amount of independence” (Yousfi, 2018, 1-2). According to Beinin (2016, 6), although the UGTT had been forced to have good relations with the regime, either Bourguiba or Ben Ali could never fully control the UGTT. On the other hand, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) “was created by the Nasser

regime as an instrument of the state and continued to be so under his successors” (Beinin, 2016, 6). Since the ETUF was created by the regime, the union did not actually represent the workers, and most of the workers were suspicious of the opposition figures “who sought to intervene in their [workers’] economic struggles and offer what they understood to be the ‘correct’ political orientation” (Beinin, 2016, 6) since “the Nasser regime markedly improved the lives of working people even though ETUF did not actually represent them or offer them a political forum” (Beinin, 2016, 6). Another factor that differed Tunisia’s working-class movement from other countries in the region is that “teachers, office workers and public-sector officials rapidly became central to the union” (Yousfi, 2018, 6), therefore “comprised communities of workers with multiple allegiances – to workers’ groups that share the same interests and to tribal, regional and national groups” (Yousfi, 2018, 6). In the case of Egypt, for example, white-collar workers are also unionized and affiliated with workers, “but they have never engaged in public contestation with the regime; indeed, they have comprised one of its principal bases of support” (Beinin, 2016, 4).

Differences in Tunisia and Egypt’s workers’ movements were brought by “their organizational capacities, their relationships with the intelligentsia, political parties, and NGOs” (Beinin, 2016, 7), although they share a similar historical development of the political economy. According to Roccu (2013, 40), Egypt’s political economy for the period between the 1952 Revolution and 1990 was a dependent one, and neither Nasser’s nationalisations nor Sadat’s *infitah* policies changed this dependency. This dependency was due to the control of the Egyptian economy by “the army officials, public sector managers or members of the *infitah* bourgeoisie” (Wahba, 1994, as cited in Roccu, 2013, 41). In addition, although the economy was opened to the international market by Sadat’s policies, the Egyptian economy was not a liberalised one since the state held major control over the economic activities (Roccu, 2013, 41). The drop in oil prices worsened the already indebted Egyptian economy; therefore, the Mubarak government entered negotiations with the IMF, which resulted in a stabilization package and further involvement of international financial institutions in the Egyptian economy. This involvement found its peak with the implementation of the “neo-liberal agenda symbolized by the 1991 Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) agreements with the IMF and World Bank” (Beinin, 2012, 21) under Washington Consensus policies.

Transition to the neoliberal agenda proposed by the adjustment programme did not happen smoothly in Egypt; however, “in the second half of the 1990s, due to massive relief and restructuring of its external debts, Egypt’s macro-economic stability seemed to have been restored, and the country possessed substantial foreign currency reserves” (Wurzel, 2012, 98). On the other hand, according to Roccu (2013, 47), Egypt’s social contract was a populist one, with the agriculture and manufacturing at the heart of this contract. The structural adjustment programme affected the populist social contract with the agricultural class in favour of the landlords. For example, according to the new tenancy law, adopted in 1992 and fully implemented in 1997, landowners acquired the right “to evict the tenant if the land was to be sold and there was no agreement between the two” (Roccu, 2013, 47). By the end of the 1990s, a million peasants were evicted from their land while more than 700.000 jobs were lost (Roccu, 2013, 47).

Following the 1990s, rural inequality increased in the next decade. In addition to the rural working class, the industrial working class also suffered from inequalities and worsening working conditions. Newly established private companies began to control the local market and were exempted from taxes while major layoffs took place in these companies. Therefore, a new private privileged class was established while the working class bore the downsides of the structural adjustments under the Mubarak regime. Throughout the 2000s, the neoliberal policies of the Mubarak regime strengthened the private entrepreneurial elite, and the new business class benefited the most from it (Roccu, 2013, 59). The new business class received direct access to politics and transformed into a “capitalist oligarchy” while directly participating in policymaking (Roccu, 2013, 59). Due to the strong links with the regime, the new business class “could guarantee a privileged path to the acquisition of profitable state-owned companies” (Roccu, 2013, 62). The Egyptian state, according to Wurzel, “has for decades granted import licences to certain businessmen in order to distribute privilege so that many import activities have been controlled by a small number of powerful and well-connected tycoons” (Wurzel, 2012, 101). Therefore, neoliberal policy implementation did not necessarily mean competition but the creation of a new privileged oligarch class that has the capacity to affect both economy and politics.

The implementation of the structural development programme in Egypt bore different results than in Tunisia in terms of the coordination of the working class. In Egypt, Mubarak was concerned that Washington Consensus policies would result in another food riot; therefore, he “did not fully implement the conditions of the agreements” (Beinin, 2016, 42). On the other hand, in Tunisia, IMF’s policy on state subsidies was fully implemented; therefore, the regime abandoned “the economic populism and faux political liberalization” (Beinin, 2016, 43). Tunisia’s full implementation of the programme squeezed the middle class in favour of the poor, which in return, integrated the middle class into a coordinated working-class movement. In addition, structural adjustment in Tunisia was not rapid since “the UGTT successfully lobbied to slow the pace of privatizing the public sector and liberalizing trade to reduce the loss of jobs” (Beinin, 2016, 55). Beinin refers to the UGTT’s response to Washington Consensus as a limited resistance. However,

“The UGTT’s resistance to Washington Consensus policies was rooted in its origins as an organization distinct from the Neo-Destour and the history of its struggles to retain some degree of autonomy from the party and the state. Its opposition to wage austerity was defeated by repression. But the UGTT’s resistance, albeit limited and subordinated to its ‘responsibility to the nation,’ enhanced its legitimacy and political influence in the post–Ben Ali era” (Beinin, 2016, 49).

In Egypt, on the other hand, the partially applied development programme still affected the power relations between classes, which resulted in “a rough annual average of thirty-three strikes from 1986 to 1993” (Beinin, 2016, 44) that took place in Egypt due to social security plans and working conditions. However, unlike in Tunisia, these strikes were not planned by political forces or unions. “Unlike Tunisian workers, who could compel the national UGTT leadership to support their demands at least in part” (Beinin, 2016, 45), Egyptian workers could not rely on ETUF; therefore, they “increasingly resorted to local organizations or informal networks” (Beinin, 2016, 45). Different attitudes of unions in Egypt and Tunisia “explain why the UGTT decisively influenced Tunisia’s post–Ben Ali trajectory toward procedural democracy. In contrast, ETUF remained loyal to Mubarak until the end, and beyond” (Beinin, 2016, 7).

The UGTT’s ability to resist the regime was due to the preservation of “an internal life that the regime could not fully control, a space where the political left could survive, and a forum for democratic debate in an institution with profound national

legitimacy” (Beinin, 2016, 73). In Egypt, on the other hand, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation did not enjoy autonomy from the regime. After all, it was established by Nasser, and its role was “to implement government policy regarding workers and their wages and benefits” (El-Shazli, 2019, 52); therefore, the union was “not an independent advocacy trade union organization committed to defending worker rights” (El-Shazli, 2019, 52). According to Beinin, the Egyptian workers’ movement developed “through tactical agreements on actions to achieve specific demands and a conception of workers’ ‘rights’ rooted in the authoritarian bargain of the Nasser regime—higher wages, job security, and social benefits, but no political participation” (Beinin, 2016, 93). Although throughout the 2000s, activities of the independent workers’ movement increased against the regime, ETUF primarily remained attached to the regime (El-Shazli, 2019, 60; Hartshorn, 2016, 352). Prior to the Arab Uprisings, “Egyptian workers entered the revolutionary process primarily as individuals. Despite representing more than four million workers, many of whom supported change, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) sided with the Mubarak regime” (Hartshorn, 2016, 352).

In the case of the expected political reforms from the Mubarak regime, the implementation of the structural adjustment programme brought political repression. According to Sherbiny and Hatem, Mubarak dealt with the political opposition as “a security issue” (Sherbiny & Hatem, 2015, 87) in order to ensure political stability. Therefore, Mubarak “expanded domestic security forces” (Sherbiny & Hatem, 2015, 87) in order to control the political opposition. Before coming to power, Mubarak inherited a high rate of inflation, substantial foreign debt and a high rate of unemployment, in addition to “a population containing large sections of angry people” (Amin, 2011, 3). Similar to Ben Ali, during the first year of his presidency, Mubarak promised political reforms and took a promising step of “releasing all prominent political prisoners” (Amin, 2011, 4). In addition, reforms were accompanied by the return of the free press. Therefore, Amin argues that “Egyptian intellectuals witnessed a golden age of freedom of expression and criticism” (Amin, 2011, 4). In his speech to the People’s Assembly in 1981, “Mubarak asserted that ‘Egypt is for all society - not for a privileged few or the chosen elite or the sectarian dictatorship’ and that accordingly, opposition parties would be allowed to participate in the national government” (Davidson, 2000, 79). However, over the years,

Mubarak and the National Democratic Party increased their control over the People's Assembly; therefore, the executive branch began to dominate the legislative branch (Davidson, 2000, 82). Political reforms performed by the regime were only to stabilize the political environment so that economic transition could be implemented. This stabilization of the political arena brought an increasing amount of political repression. Although Mubarak permitted the proliferation of opposition groups and civil society organizations, in any case of exercising too autonomously from the regime, any organization would be subjected to the restriction (Davidson, 2000, 84). Therefore, Davidson underlines that Egyptian civil society "exists in many respects solely at the sufferance of the government, and thus remains incapable of acting as any sort of social intermediary against the hegemonic, intrusive tendencies of the central government" (Davidson, 2000, 85). Similar to Tunisian experience, political reforms that have been made under Mubarak regime "have been largely cosmetic and have not brought about any significant reform of the inert political structures that have long needed regeneration" (Davidson, 2000, 93) and the president and the NDP continued to control the political arena "allowing or disallowing other contenders at their sufferance" (Davidson, 2000, 93). Civil society organizations, on the other hand, were largely regulated; therefore, they failed to resist state domination in political expression. According to Davidson, Mubarak repeatedly indicated that the first priority of the country must be economic reform. However, as economic success does not necessarily bring political content, "successful economic reform in Egypt has been hampered, not surprisingly, by the failings of the political system" (Davidson, 2000, 93).

In the last decade prior to the Arab Uprisings, the Mubarak regime initiated a limited political opening (Beinin, 2016, 61). However, "public expressions of opposition still risked administrative detention, prosecution on spurious charges, jail, beatings, and torture" (Beinin, 2016, 61). On the other hand, a non-governmental press began to flourish, "beginning with *al-Misri al-Yawm* (The Egyptian today) in 2004 and the reopening of *al-Dustur* (The constitution) the next year" (Beinin, 2016, 61). In contrast to Egypt's political opening, the proliferation of civil society activities and the non-governmental press, the Ben Ali regime flattened the civil society in Tunisia under overly repressive measures (Beinin, 2016, 63). "Tunisia harassed, beat, jailed, and tortured opposition figures, especially Islamists, and journalists more extensively

than Egypt” (Beinin, 2016, 63). According to Beinin, revolts throughout the 2000s created a “culture of protest” (Beinin, 2016, 97) in Egypt. On the other hand, the excessive repression in Tunisia “blocked the emergence of a culture of protest” (Beinin, 2016, 97). However, although a culture of protest was blocked by the regime, “unemployed graduates and youth of the interior regions repeatedly protested their marginalization, poverty, and high unemployment rates” (Beinin, 2016, 97). In addition, Beinin provides the International Labour Organization’s figures on strikes in Tunisia, which show that between 1996 and 2007, approximately 3000 strikes took place in Tunisia every year, mostly in the manufacturing sector (Beinin, 2016, 72). “In both Egypt and Tunisia, most of the oppositional intelligentsia failed to appreciate that in an authoritarian regime, recurring mobilizations of large numbers of people seizing control of public space—workers, the unemployed devotees of the ‘apolitical’ preacher ‘Amr Khalid, or soccer fans—are inherently political” (Beinin, 2016, 98).

In terms of the political economy, both Tunisia and Egypt went through similar processes of structural reforms during the Ben Ali and Mubarak periods. Both countries adopted the Washington Consensus reforms, although on a different scale. In addition, while both presidents neglected the middle class and rewarded the lower classes, that did not inherently mean that the working class did not suffer from the downsides of economic reforms. On the contrary, in both countries, the gap between the rich and the poor widened. What differed in Tunisia compared to Egypt was the presence of a “civic culture”. Therefore, although Tunisian civil society was exposed to harsher repression in the last decade before the Arab Uprisings and was blocked from creating a culture of protest by the Ben Ali regime, challenging the regime under a coordinated civil society, mostly by the UGTT, was possible. In addition to the political economy, class structure and civil society of the two countries, the military and its relationship with the administration played an important role in the post-Arab Uprisings period. Therefore, the third part of the second chapter will focus on the military, its structure and the relationship between the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes and Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood with reference to the political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt.

2.2.3. Civil-Military Relations

The role of the military during the Arab Uprisings has been subjected to several discussions due to the following processes in the region. The relationship of the military with the civil structure was discussed in defining the success of the post-Arab Uprisings period. For example, Bellin (2004, 143) underlines that in any case of an uprising, the relationship between the coercive apparatus and the regime defines the country's future. This relationship, on the other hand, is defined by the military's institutionalization and relationship with society. Barany (2011, 28) also points out that one of the important points that a revolutionary success depends on is the support from the armed forces. Therefore, the third part of the second chapter will focus on the civil-military relations in Tunisia and Egypt prior to the Arab Uprisings.

The role of the military in the Arab Uprisings has brought attention to civil-military relations in the Middle East. While throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the focus was on military coups and military intervention into politics, the institutional structure of the military and civil-military relations became crucial in terms of the study of the Arab Uprisings. Before comparing Tunisia and Egypt's civil-military relations, it is important to conceptualize the position of the army in the Middle East. For this conceptualization, Mehran Kamrava's (2000, 67-68) work on military professionalization sets an example. According to Kamrava, civil-military relations in the region posits a dilemma for Middle Eastern leaders. While the leaders have tried to professionalize the military so that they could check the military's political aspirations, leaders could not reduce their reliance on the military establishment. Therefore, in order to deal with this paradox, each state developed "a specific pattern of interaction with their armed forces" (Kamrava, 2000, 68). For these patterns of interactions, Kamrava presents four categories. In the first category, the state dominates domestic politics while allowing the military to play an important role. For this category, Turkey and Israel are positioned as examples. In the second category, the state is inclusionary, meaning that "a highly ideological, largely volunteer militia" (Kamrava, 2000, 68) neutralizes the regular military establishment and its political aspirations in the countries such as Iran, Iraq and Libya. In the third category, in which Tunisia and Egypt were given as examples, the state excludes the

military from civilian administration. Once-ideological military officers are in power; however, they “now civilianized themselves and much of the machinery of the state, having in the process become largely nonideological, civilian autocrats” (Kamrava, 2000, 68). Lastly, in monarchies, the leaders either rely on foreign mercenaries, as in Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, or as is presented as a case in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the leader counterbalances the military establishment with loyal tribal units.

In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, both countries can be regarded as an “autocratic officer-politician regime” (Lutterbeck, 2013, 34). However, what makes Tunisia a unique case for the Arab world is that the identity of the military establishment is “clearly distinct from the regime in power” (Lutterbeck, 2013, 34). Ware defines the Tunisian military as “a non-praetorian, highly professional body of officers and men” (Ware, 1985, 37) that did not form a coup against the state or “has never been the instrument of national emancipation except as the adjunctive arm of civilian policy” (Ware, 1985, 37). Therefore, it can be regarded as an establishment that is dedicated to national integrity. The disenfranchisement of the military from politics, on the other hand, was due to Habib Bourguiba’s policy of distinctly separating officers and corps from political associations and decision-making processes (Ware, 1985, 37). Instead, the military assumed the role of an instrument linking the public with the government as the “defenders of national sovereignty” (Ware, 1985, 37).

The post-independence regime in most of the countries in the region came from the military, whereas Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, did not come from the military and prevented the military from assuming a prominent role in politics. Bourguiba’s successor, Ben Ali, was also not from a military background but came from intelligence services (Lutterbeck, 2013, 34). According to Lutterbeck (2013, 34), Ben Ali’s coming to power further evolved the military as a depoliticized and professionalized establishment and increased its technical and professional expertise. Therefore, in contrast to Ben Ali regime, the Tunisian army is perceived as a highly professionalized and apolitical force while it “has been relatively free of corruption and cronyism” (Lutterbeck, 2013, 34). On the other hand, Ben Ali’s policy of keeping the military away from politics was not valid for all the security units. While the Tunisian military is the smallest in North Africa (Lutterbeck, 2013, 35), Ben Ali

mostly relied on internal security forces and intelligence agencies to suppress any case of dissent.

During the Arab Uprisings, as a highly institutionalized and depoliticized entity, the Tunisian military supported the pre-reform movements. According to Barany, the military was “undistracted by politics and despite its meager budget and equipment, the Tunisian military in time came to rank among the Arab world’s most professional forces” (Barany, 2011, 31). Therefore, in addition to the disdain for the corruption of the regime, “the military had no special stake in the regime’s survival and no strong reason to shoot fellow Tunisians on the regime’s behalf” (Barany, 2011, 31). Moreover, according to Bellin (2012, 134), the Tunisian army and the public were not segregated along ethnic and sectarian lines. Therefore, it was no surprise that the Tunisian military was not interested in the survival of the Ben Ali regime but rather sided with the public.

The case of the Egyptian military and its relationship with the state is different from Tunisia. During the Arab Uprisings, the Egyptian military did not support the Mubarak regime either and backed the uprising (Barany, 2011, 31). However, unlike in Tunisia, it was not a straightforward decision that had been made by the armed forces (Barany, 2011, 31). The Egyptian military was also professional and was not linked to the Mubarak regime through ethnicity or bloodline, but it was linked to the regime through the crony capitalist links (Bellin, 2012, 134). Unlike the Tunisian military, the economy of the Egyptian military was directly supported by the regime (Bellin, 2012, 134). Thus, in the first week of the uprising, the military stood by the regime and did not prevent the police from suppressing the protesters; on the other hand, the armed forces did not fire on the protesters (Arafat, 2017, 52). It was when Mubarak’s security agents unleashed violence on protesters on February 2, 2011, that the armed forces decided to side with the public and decided that Mubarak’s actions would hurt the military’s legitimacy (Barany, 2011, 32).

The key difference between the Tunisian and Egyptian armed forces is “the unregulated patronage” (Arafat, 2017, 55) that the Egyptian forces enjoyed over the years. The Egyptian army was supported by its control over “a vast economic empire” (Arafat, 2017, 55) with access to goods and services and positions in business and government; therefore, it was much closer to the regime compared to

the Tunisian army. According to Arafat, Nasser's regime was "the beginning of the militarization of Egyptian politics" (Arafat, 2017, 56), and an unwritten agreement between the military and the civilian administration was made. Accordingly, the civilian administration would support the military's benefits in return for its loyalty to the regime. According to Hanssen (2014, 9), during the Nasser regime, the degree of military professionalization reached its peak, mostly due to the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel, and the officers' interest in politics gradually decreased. Sadat's policies over the military continued with controlling the military but through depoliticization and professionalization (Arafat, 2017, 56). Similar to Nasser, Anwar Sadat used the armed forces as a base for legitimacy; however, their leadership style was different (Harb, 2003, 282). While Nasser controlled any case of a challenge to his rule within the armed forces by rewarding them, Sadat sought a policy of sidelining or dismissing the officers or turning them against each other (Harb, 2003, 282). Therefore, the military increasingly became subordinate to the civilian regime while the level of professionalization of the military increased. When Mubarak came to power, the regime's policies over civil-military relations again focused on depoliticization and economic autonomy of the armed forces. Under Mubarak, the armed forces would support the regime and the armed forces would receive economic benefits and "private benefits for the senior officers in the form of special compensation and perquisites" (Brooks, 2015, 16) while "remaining outside the jurisdiction of monitoring bodies" (Arafat, 2017, 51). In addition to economic benefits, the military also benefited from the growth of "military-controlled enterprises aimed at the civilian market" (Brooks, 2015, 16) that ranged from agricultural production to manufacturing. However, it was the economic autonomy that broke the relationship between the regime and the military during the Arab Uprisings (Arafat, 2017, 51).

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed control and persuaded Mubarak to resign two weeks after the beginning of the protests. Although linked to the regime through crony capitalist links, the military elites' decision to persuade Mubarak to resign was a case of a "desire for self-preservation and a fear of weakened influence and power" (Arafat, 2017, 52), as well as conflict of interests over economic privileges that were increasingly given to police and security apparatuses (Barany, 2011, 32), rather than an ethical responsibility for the public. In

addition, Gamal Mubarak's ties to the National Democratic Party's younger elites and private sector growth in the country were perceived as a threat to the military's economic interests (Anderson, 2011, 4). Therefore, Arab Uprisings gave the military the opportunity to restore its central position (Arafat, 2017, 54). In Tunisia's case, on the other hand, the military did not take over the control of the country, but Prime Minister Ghannouchi took the role of the president and formed a caretaker government while Tunisia went through the process of general elections.

To conclude, during the Arab Uprisings, the Tunisian and Egyptian armed forces sided with the public. However, the civil-military relations of the two countries explain the reasons behind their motives. Although both armed forces are highly professionalized and institutionalized, the Egyptian army's privileged position within the country defined the process of decision-making during the uprisings. While the Tunisian army was sidelined from politics and deprived of the privileged economic benefits, the Egyptian army's economic interests were linked to the regime. However, as the economic autonomy of the Egyptian military increased and due to the strong links between the military and the society, the once-built agreement between the regime and the military broke. Following the Arab Uprisings, the Egyptian military assumed the role of an agent that restores continuity in the country "by blocking democratic transition" (Arafat, 2017, 57), whereas the Tunisian military backed a democratic transition process while not participating in it (Anderson, 2011, 3).

2.2.4. Political Islam: Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood

The position of the Islamist movements in Egypt and Tunisia was one of the factors that defined the post-Arab Uprisings period in both countries. Although the conflict between the Islamists and other secular opposition figures is not new in the region (Alvi, 2019, 154), distrust between the secular opposition and Islamist movements and contradicting trajectories of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda Party became an important determinant for the future of Tunisia and Egypt.

Before examining the paths followed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda Party, it is important to define Islamism and secularism in the region. According to

Affan, in the Arab-Islamic context, secularism should not be defined “as a call for separation between the state and the church, a call for privatisation of religion, or a social division of labour produced by modernity” (Affan, 2022, 36) but instead, it should be interpreted as “a process of re-making religion to be more compatible with modernity” (Affan, 2022, 36). Therefore, it is a political ideology that offers a modernized version of Islam. In terms of Islamism, Affan argues that Islamism should not be directly equated to Islam but rather, it is “a socio-political manifestation of Islam in the modern era that – to a great extent – has been shaped by the conditions of modernity” (Affan, 2022, 36). Therefore, the post-Arab Uprisings period should be interpreted within the context of whether the cooperation of two different sets of ideas of Islamists and secularists in terms of different versions of modernized Islam is being realized or not.

Secularism has been an inherent feature of Tunisian politics since its independence from France (Alvi, 2019, 153). In the postcolonial era of the country, Bourguiba followed a definite path of secularism, modernization and Westernization. On the other hand, Bourguiba’s marginalization of religious groups (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 4) did not mean that religious groups and activities were obsolete in the country but rather “moved from the public to the private arena” (Wolf, 2017, 27). Alvi underlines that “Tunisian society’s religious groups, organizations, and citizens found other means to preserve their belief system and practices, but it was not always easy” (Alvi, 2019, 154). The late 1960s and 1970s witnessed the increasingly authoritarian measures taken by Bourguiba. During the period, Bourguiba focused more on the far-left movement in the country, “and he even sought to keep it in check by tolerating the religious activists, who fiercely denounced ‘godless Marxism’” (Wolf, 2017, 39) and “between 1968 and 1974 alone, hundreds of leftists were tortured and imprisoned, often in solitary confinement” (Wolf, 2017, 39). Therefore, “as the country became increasingly Westernised and autocratic, pious Tunisians soon looked for alternative ways to defy their leader, including through organised Islamic activism” (Wolf, 2017, 31) in a period that Bourguiba created a space for the growth of Islamic groups.

The emergence of one of the religious groups coincides with this period. *Al Jamaa al Islamia*, which would be later known as the Ennahda Party, founded in the late 1960s

by Rachid Ghannouchi, Hmida Ennaifer, and Abdelfattah Mourou, came out as new religious activism (Wolf, 2017, 32), focusing on religious studies and reacting to the top-down modernization of Bourguiba. Affected by the ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Wolf, 2017, 40), for the group, Islamism “was an attempt to construct an alternative Arab identity with an Islamic lexicon in order to counter the European conception of modernity adopted by the first generations of post-colonial leaders” (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 4). In the 1970s, *Al Jamaa al Islamia* became the *Mouvement de la tendance islamique (MTI)*. According to Ben Lazreg (2021, 4), during that period, Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou acknowledged that they were influenced by the thinkers in Egypt and Syria, including Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, in the next decade, the MTI became “committed the movement to the democratic process, free elections, political pluralism, and the peaceful alternation of power” (Pickard, 2014, 7, as cited in Ben Lazreg, 2021, 5). For that reason, according to Ben Lazreg (2021, 5), the movement was ahead of other religious groups in the region.

In the early years of Ben Ali’s rule, the MTI was moderately tolerated. A few months after coming to power, Ben Ali released all the MTI prisoners (Wolf, 2017, 67). Changing its name to Ennahda, the movement participated in the 1989 elections with independent candidates (Wolf, 2017, 71), and Ennahda-supported candidates achieved 14.5 per cent of the votes, which in return, alarmed the regime, and Ben Ali referred to the Islamist as a critical threat to the country (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 5). While Ghannouchi and other leaders fled the country, many of the Ennahda members were imprisoned and tortured (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 5), and party activities were curtailed in the 1990s. In the meantime, secular opposition parties tried to put pressure on the regime while some called for the Ennahda’s legal recognition (Wolf, 2017, 72). “The MDS, the Popular Unity Movement (MUP), the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT), and the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party (PCOT) met regularly to formulate a set of common demands. However, their cooperation had little impact” (Wolf, 2017, 72). Most of its members in exile, Ennahda’s organizational attempts had been a challenge throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Wolf, 2017, 88). On the other hand, as the regime cracked down on the Islamists, it reoriented its attention to the secular opposition parties and tried to neutralize them, including “MDS [Movement of Social Democrats], LTDH [Tunisian League of Human Rights], and UGTT” (Wolf,

2017, 98). In an increasingly oppressive environment, “in May 1991 Mzali, Ahmed Ben Salah, and other dissenters published a statement together with Ennahda leaders in which they denounced the regime’s violence and called for a national alliance against Ben Ali” (Wolf, 2017, 100), which in return further brought closer the opposition.

In 2005, Ennahda participated in the opposition coalition, “also known as the 18 October Collective for Rights and Freedoms” (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 5). The coalition presented a democratic vision for the future of Tunisia and coalition members agreed on “women’s rights, freedom of political organization, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, the release of and amnesty for political prisoners, and an affirmation of the place of Islam in Tunisian society and culture” (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 5). Although the coalition broke in 2009, according to Ben Lazreg (2021, 5), Ennahda embraced many of these demands in the 2011 electoral process. Therefore, it can be said that the pact built an agreement between Islamist and secular opposition forces. Although, at that time, the pact had a limited impact, “Ennahda’s insistence on ‘moderation’, ‘reconciliation’, and ‘compromise’” (Wolf, 2017, 105) and, to counter the regime’s discourse on Ennahda as the foreign import of the Muslim Brotherhood, casting the organization as a part of “the nationalist reform movement” (Wolf, 2017, 105) made the movement increase its impact in the country and affected the political nature of the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.

Distrust between the Islamist movements and the secular opposition had been given as a reason for the failure of the democratization in the region in the first chapter of this thesis. It is not to deny that Ennahda and the secular opposition had conflicts. Karakoç gives an example from the pre-Arab Uprisings period. Accordingly, when a film named *Persepolis* was shown on television, “the film was regarded by Islamists as offensive to Islam. Thousands of people marched and attacked the television station” (Karakoç, 2015, 177). This singlehandedly shows the struggle between the two sides. However, Ennahda’s moderate position and both sides’ cooperation for the future of Tunisia become one of the factors that make the democratization process possible after the Arab-Uprisings period. On the other hand, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s experience with the secular opposition, as well as its evolution throughout the years, posits a different case from Tunisia.

The Muslim Brotherhood's political path in Egypt carries similar factors to Ennahda. The Brotherhood was founded for "spreading Islamic morals, establishing an Islamic state through Islamization from below, and implementing sharia law" (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6) in 1928, and throughout the years, it spread through regional countries and conflicted with the regimes. As the movement was accused of plotting to assassinate Nasser after the 1952 Revolution, it was crushed by the regime with several imprisonments and executions (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6). Milton-Edwards underlines that Nasser's actions of leaving little space for the Muslim Brotherhood to exist drove the movement underground, radicalized it and embedded "hostility to secularism and nationalism which would affect the movement for many decades to come" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 23).

Following Nasser, Anwar Sadat followed a relatively easing relationship with the movement since he became "dependent on the legitimating symbols of Islam to secure his power" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 27) and strengthened the Islamists as "he battled political foes among the powerful leftist secularist factions" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 28). Therefore, Sadat sought the Muslim Brotherhood's support "in the 1970s by freeing its members and allowing them to operate with relative freedom" (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6), although the movement remained illegal. In addition, during the decade, it became evident that within the movement, "there were ongoing tensions between those in the organization who gravitated towards [Said] Qutb's message of jihadism and radicalism and those that preferred the gradualist *dawa* approach" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 28). This tension would continue in the following decades, and it became an integral part of the internal characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 28).

According to Ben Lazreg, during the 1980s, the movement adopted "a nonviolent and moderate path" (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6) and increased its political efforts while resisting radicalism. Similar to Ben Ali's experience with Ennahda, Mubarak tolerated the Muslim Brotherhood as a political and social entity. Therefore, over the years, the Brotherhood increased its influence over Egyptian society through "social and welfare support work, activities, and links to student movements on university campuses" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 29).

In the 1987 elections, the Brotherhood “formed a tripartite alliance with the Liberal and the Socialist Labour parties and elaborated an electoral platform that called for economic reform, more democracy, and the application of sharia law” (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6), and the alliance won 78 seats. However, similar to Ennahda, the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success became a matter of concern for the Mubarak regime. In the 1990s, “the regime started targeting the movement’s cadres” (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6) and several members of the movement were prosecuted. In addition, Milton-Edwards points out that, over the years, the Brotherhood has “always had to contend with the perception by ruling regimes and other actors that it is a menacing, all-encompassing, and inherently violent threat” (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 30). In the meantime, the Islamizing agenda of the movement turned it into a multinational phenomenon while inspiring “militant and violent offshoots or jihadist organizations which promoted jihad through terrorism” (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 30).

According to Ben Lazreg, in the following years, the movement embraced a path that consisted of inconsistencies, since while embracing a democratic agenda, it also carried religious and illiberal concepts from the past (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 6). Therefore, the young reformists within the Brotherhood had split while the “old guard” (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 8) pursued a limited liberalization and a bottom-up approach in Egyptian society. With this approach, until 2011, the Brotherhood had already increased its effect in the political arena. However, the movement’s argument on overcoming secularism in order to build an Islamic state endured the conflict between the secular opposition and the Brotherhood (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 30).

During the Arab Uprisings, the Brotherhood represented its participation in the protests along with the secular opposition activists as a “patriotic duty to the nation and the Egyptian people and not simply as a crude power grab” (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 40). When the Supreme Court of the Armed Forces took control of the government, they claimed the same. According to Milton-Edwards (2016, 40), this attempt to speak on the behalf of the public would lead them to confront in the following years. “The Brotherhood believed that the powerful political dynamic unleashed by the Arab Spring in Egypt was its opportunity to emerge as a dominant political force in the new political order” (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 41), so that the

Islamist project would be realized (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 41). Following the Uprisings, the Brotherhood was included in the transition process by the SCAF (Wickham, 2015, 170) and was permitted to register as a political party in order to compete in the elections. The Brotherhood established its new political party, Freedom and Justice Party and emphasized the movement's role "in a civic rather than Islamic dispensation" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 42) and tried to assure the opposition that the movement would not be seeking "to monopolize power in the new political order" (Wickham, 2015, 170). However, it was soon clear that the Brotherhood "hoped to use the FJP as the vehicle to obtain political power while retaining the wider organizational structure of the Brotherhood as separate and distinct from the new institutions of the FJP" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 42); therefore, prioritized the movement over the party (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 42). Prior to the November 2011 – January 2012 elections, the party became a part of the Democratic Alliance; however, tensions arose around the role of Islam within the context of the constitutional framework (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 43). Although the party had earlier indicated that it would not seek for domination, the Brotherhood "fielded candidates in many more than the 50 per cent of the constituencies that it had promised" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 43). As the Brotherhood triumphed the elections, the movement "used its proportional weight within the Democratic Alliance ... and secure key positions within this state institution [the parliament]" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 44). Soon, the Parliament was dominated by the Islamists. Following the parliamentary elections, the movement's presidential candidate, Mohammad Morsi won the presidential elections.

Wickham underlines that since the Arab Uprisings, the Brotherhood leaders "continued to advocate the application of Shari'a" (Wickham, 2015, 187). For example, one of the prominent members of the Brotherhood, Subhi Salih, noted that "Terms like 'civil' or 'secular' state are misleading. Islamic Shari'a is the best system for Muslims and non-Muslims" (Hassan, 2015, as cited in Wickham, 2015, 187). In addition, "Mahmoud Ghuzlan, the Brotherhood's official press spokesman, confirmed in July that the FJP called for the application of Shari'a" (Wickham, 2015, 187). After the elections, "with self-imposed powers, Morsi and the Brotherhood soon pushed through the constitution and, in doing so, alienated those who sought to keep Islamization and the shari'a out of politics" (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 46).

Therefore, the Brotherhood was accused of promoting its ideology rather than constructing a democratic transition process and rebuilding the country's economy (Milton-Edwards, 2016, 47).

Unlike Ennahda's case, a year after the elections, Morsi was deposed by the military and the Muslim Brotherhood was denounced in Egypt (Ben Lazreg, 2021, 7). Although Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood shared a similar background and a similar interaction pattern with Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, the two movements, as Ben Lazreg defines it, followed "contradictory trajectories" (Ben Lazreg, 2021) in defining their discourse and identity starting from the late 1990s. Ennahda embarked on a democratic vision for the future of Tunisia with cooperation with other opposition groups.

To conclude, actors of political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt affected the post-Arab Uprisings period of both countries. Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with secular opposition, the regime, the society, and their ideological differences around the role of democratic institutions and liberal values became determinants for the future of Tunisia and Egypt. Although both actors shared a similar political path, Ennahda's moderate position and cooperation with other political actors affected the path of Tunisia. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood's domination of political opposition and continuing Islamization agenda of the political party, along with the intervention of the Egyptian military forces, created a different future for Egypt.

The second chapter of the thesis has focused on pre-Arab Uprisings period of Tunisia and Egypt. The first part of the chapter laid down a brief socio-political history of both countries until the 1980s. The latter parts have been divided under three categories: Political economy, class structure, civil society; civil-military relations; and political Islam. These categories covered the period from the 1980s until the Arab Uprisings. For the socio-political history, Tunisia and Egypt share similar state-building processes. Both of them once ruled by the Ottoman Empire and later became a European protectorate. The military played an important role in the state formation prior to the independence, the unequal distribution of land and wealth was persistent. In the independence period, one of the factors that differed Tunisia from the rest of the region, including Egypt, was that the military did not play a functional

role for the regime. In Egypt, on the other hand, the military is one of the most influential institutions prior and after the independence. Both countries witnessed the birth of unions and the workers movement. However, while the UGTT had been able to act as a challenge to the Tunisian regime and act as an independent organization, the Egyptian workers movement, particularly the ETUF, could not separate itself from the regime. After the 1980s, in Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, both countries started to experience an authoritarian repression. Although both of them implemented economic reforms and structural adjustment policies in order to ease the economic crisis, the promised political reforms were not met. In terms of the civil society, Tunisian state has developed a civil society and tried to advance it from the beginning of the independence. What differed in Tunisia compared to Egypt was the presence of a civic culture. Lastly, in terms of the effect of the political Islam, Ennahda posits a different case from the Muslim Brotherhood due to its moderate position and cooperation with other political actors.

The third chapter of this thesis will be focusing on the post-Arab Uprisings period in Tunisia and Egypt. In the first part of the last chapter, factors that led to the Arab Uprisings will be briefly explained. After the first part, the similar categorization with the second chapter will be used in order to explain the different coup d'états of Tunisia and Egypt with references to the explanations for the failure of democratization and the persistence of authoritarianism.

2.3. Post-Arab Uprisings: Two Different Paths for Tunisia and Egypt

The first chapter of the thesis covered the theoretical framework of authoritarianism and the democratization process. Explanations for the authoritarianism and explanations for the failure of democratization in the region were explained with scholarly theories. In addition, these explanations were applied to Tunisia and Egypt. The second chapter covered the pre-Arab Uprisings authoritarianism of Tunisia and Egypt, primarily after the 1980s with the beginning of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak's regimes. The chapter laid down the foundations for the differences in Tunisia and Egypt's socio-political history, political economy, civil society, and civil-military

relations. Lastly, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood were presented as two different actors that affected the future of the two countries after the Arab Uprisings.

The last chapter of this thesis will focus on the post-Arab Uprisings period in Tunisia and Egypt. The period will compare the 2011 coup d'état in Egypt and the 2021 political crisis and coup d'état in Tunisia. In the first part, factors that led to the Arab Uprisings will be explained. In the following parts, Tunisia and Egypt's election processes, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, political economies and civil-military relations will be examined. This examination will further present how the explanations for authoritarianism and the explanations for the failure of democratization processes apply to Tunisia and Egypt and how the different factors in the two countries led to different paths for Tunisia and Egypt.

2.3.1. The Arab Uprisings

In December 2010, Mohammad Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia sparked a wave of massive protests across the Middle East. Ben Ali's deposal from the presidency was followed by the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, after a month (Lynch, 2014, 1). By February 2011, every country in the Arab world witnessed demonstrations in that people demanded political change (Lynch, 2014, 1).

Tunisia and Egypt were the first two countries in the region that was beset by the demonstrations. The question of what led to the Uprisings in the two countries has common answers. According to Gelvin (2015, 40), both countries have been affected by the neoliberal economic reforms of their governments. Although these policies had been witnessed by all countries in the region, Egypt and Tunisia posit different cases. Egypt, being the first country that the reforms implemented, and Tunisia, being the "best student in the region (Gelvin, 2015, 40)", were both exposed to increasing inequality between the rich and poor that created tensions (Gelvin, 2015, 40). According to Beinin, in Tunisia,

"The poverty level was 32.4 percent in 2000 (eight times what the independent evaluation stated), 23.3 percent in 2005, and 15.5 percent in 2010. These figures do not include the "near poor" living just above the poverty line. By another calculation, in 2014, 24.7 percent of Tunisians were living on less than \$2 a day (purchasing power parity), about the same as in Egypt (Beinin, 2016, 57)".

In Egypt, on the other hand, 44 percent of the population was counted “as poor or extremely poor, with some 2.6m people so destitute that their entire income cannot cover basic food needs, let alone other expenses” in 2008 (The Economist, as cited in Gelvin, 2015, 40). Therefore, as the gap between the rich and poor increased in both Tunisia and Egypt, the public’s increasing demand for political change was reflected in the form of demonstrations. Beinlin underlines that, with the rise in the unemployment rate over the years, the lack of economic opportunity “is the long-term grievance undergirding the outbreak of the uprising” (Beinlin, 2016, 56).

Saidin (2018, 71) underlines that economic crisis and political legitimacy were among the most important reasons that was behind the Arab Uprisings. Accordingly, the Tunisian regime “was able to provide economic and social gains to large sentiments of the population and secure its legitimacy and political stability in return” (Saidin, 2018, 71). However, the rising income equality and the unemployment rate broke the bargain between the population and the regime (Saidin, 2018, 71). As the unemployment crisis affected the young generation for several years and coupled with the young generation’s view that “very often jobs are not assigned in a transparent manner, and that corruption and favoritism are the determining factors in obtaining work” (Saidin, 2018, 71), the Uprisings became inevitable. In Egypt’s case, although prior to the Uprisings, the Egyptian economy grew, the gap between the rich and poor led to an “imbalanced development” (Saidin, 2018, 76), that was benefited by “certain classes and regions in the country especially the regime’s family members” (Saidin, 2018, 76). In addition, similar to Tunisia, youth unemployment became a driving force for the demonstrations. “The total number of the unemployed, on the eve of the uprising was about 2.5 million, mainly youth aged 20-24” (Saidin, 2018, 76). Therefore, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the economic crisis that created a gap between classes and increased the unemployment rate, in addition to the growing corruption, was an important force for the Uprisings.

In the case of corruption, according to Gelvin, in both countries, “privatization of government-owned assets fed the corruption; those who had connections with, for example, the ruling party, or more important the president’s family, were most successful in acquiring public enterprises, usually at bargain-basement rates”

(Gelvin, 2015, 45). The corruption that evolved around the privatization was also evident in both of the presidents' families. In Tunisia, it involved Ben Ali's wife, Leila Trabelsi and the Trabelsi clan, while in Egypt, it was mostly around President Mubarak's son, Gamal Mubarak (Gelvin, 2015, 45). Ultimately, the level of corruption in both countries reached a point that became one of the most important reasons for the protests.

The last reason for the Arab Uprisings in this part of the thesis that will be discussed is the political legitimacy of Tunisian and Egyptian regimes. As mentioned in the earlier chapters of the thesis, prior to the Uprisings, both Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes began to lose their legitimacy due to the increasing level of authoritarianism and political suppression. For Saidin (2018, 72), the Tunisian public reached a point that, as their political system became unresponsive to their demands due to violation of human rights, corruption and lack of political freedom, the demonstrations became inevitable. The same can be said about Egypt as well. Thirty years of Mubarak rule came to an end due to human rights abuses, corruption, expanded power of the police force, continuous political repression towards the opposition and electoral manipulation (Saidin, 2018, 76).

Of course, there are multiple other reasons for the Arab Uprisings that can be examined in a detailed manner. However, the point of this part was to show the commonalities in Tunisia and Egypt's road to the Uprisings and lay down the ground causes as economic crisis, political legitimacy and corruption. The following parts will be focusing on Tunisia and Egypt's post-Arab Uprisings period and factors that led to two different coup d'états in the two countries. Tunisia and Egypt's governance, political parties, elections, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, political economies and civil-military relations will be explained in order to present how the different factors in the two countries led to different paths for Tunisia and Egypt and how the explanations for authoritarianism and the failure of democratization apply to Tunisia and Egypt.

2.3.2. Governance: Political Parties, Elections, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood

The post-uprisings period led to two different paths for Tunisia and Egypt. Although two countries faced with a coup d'état with a 10-year gap, they constitute different trajectories. After the Uprisings, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party assumed victory in the 2011 elections in Tunisia and Egypt. Following the overthrow of Ben Ali, Prime Minister Ghannouchi took power and became the acting president until the elections. Following an economic crisis and political instability for ten years, Tunisian President Kais Saied suspended the parliament and dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi in July 2021. On the other hand, in Egypt, after the overthrow of Mubarak, instead of the Prime Minister, the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces took the lead until the national elections. Two years after the Arab Uprisings, in July 2013, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi removed Mohamed Morsi from power and suspended the constitution. The second part of the third chapter, therefore, will focus on the political parties and electoral period of the two countries following the Uprisings.

To start with Tunisia, Masri (2017) defines the period between 2011 Ben Ali's departure and the 2014 elections as a "vigorous political coming-of-age" and a "remarkable transition" (Masri, 2017, 52). Following the Uprisings, Mohamed Ghannouchi took over the presidency for one day and handed it to the Chamber of Deputies Fouad Mebezaa, while Ghannouchi reassumed the role as the prime minister. Mebezaa was accepted as an "interim president" (Masri, 2017, 52), and during the transition period, Tunisia witnessed "turbulent divisions and coalitions, protests and protestations, triumphs and disappointments, and the consequential political awareness of civil society actors and ordinary citizens" (Masri, 2017, 52). What caused the divisions and protests were the newly formed governments and the public's unmet expectations. For example, in Ghannouchi's first formed government after the Uprisings, there were "many holdovers from the old regime" (Erdoğan, 2018, 64). Therefore, the young population, union members and civil society organizations refused to accept this newly formed government since it was no different from the prior ones and activists gathered in protests (Perkins, 2014, 230). The protests later became known as the Kasbah protests, referring to the place they occurred, and were taken over by the leftist opposition groups that formed "the January 14 Front – providing leadership and demanding the removal of RCD members from the government" (Masri, 2017, 53).

Although the government was dissolved by Ghannouchi, the movement called for the abolishment of the party and the establishment of a national constituent assembly. The importance of the January 14 Front was that it “had morphed into *the Conseil national pour la protection de la révolution* and which Ettakatol and Ennahda also joined, provided political cover for the protests” (Masri, 2017, 53) and was supported by the UGTT. Therefore, as the second round of protests took place and Beji Caid Essebsi was assigned as the prime minister following Ghannouchi’s resignation on February 27 (Perkins, 2014, 231).

Under such circumstances, the RCD was dissolved and Essebsi’s government organized and supervised the elections (Perkins, 2014, 236). According to Storm (2013, 270), the fragmented nature of the Tunisian party system did not prevent the vast majority of the political parties from contesting in the first post-uprisings elections. In addition, elections were competitive, largely free, and fair (Storm, 2013, 274). While the RCD had been dominating politics for decades with 3.8 million members in 2009 (Masri, 2007, 55), after the revolution, “eighty-one parties put forward candidate lists and 27 parties won at least one seat” (Erdoğan, 2018, 67). Although the opposition had different ideas about the Tunisian and Arab identity and modernity and conservatism, “parties that fared best among Tunisians were those that had had no ties with Ben Ali and could actually claim a history of principled resistance to his authoritarian regime (Masri, 2017, 57)”. Among the opposition, Ennahda achieved a great break and won “41.0 percent of the seats and a vote share of 37.0 percent” (Storm, 2013, 273). What differed Ennahda from other Islamist parties in the region was that under the leadership of Ghannouchi, Ennahda embraced a moderate position in Tunisian politics. According to Masri,

“Ghannouchi understood the relationship between electoral support and the socioeconomic structure of Tunisia. The backing for the party after the revolution was strongest in poor urban areas on the coast and in younger districts where unemployment was high, particularly in the south of the country” (Masri, 2017, 58).

Therefore, what appealed the Tunisian population was not solely on the ground that Ennahda was Islamist, but it was “an honest party and an antidote to the corrupt practices of the former regime” (Masri, 2017, 58). Following the elections, Ennahda formed a coalition that was referred as Troika, with the secular revolutionary party CPR (The Congrès pour la République) that came second in the elections and was founded by the human rights activist Moncef Marzouki and with the secular social

Ettakatol that came fourth in the elections. (Storm, 2013, 273). Following the coalition, Marzouki was named the president, while Ennahda's former secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, was named the prime minister and the leader of Ettakatol, Mustapha Ben Jaafar became the speaker of the Constituent Assembly (Perkins, 2014, 252).

The Troika coalition was seen as a “demand for moderate politics” (Alexander, 2016, 90 as cited in Erdoğan, 2018, 68), particularly because of Ennahda officials' efforts to cooperate with secular parties in order to support democracy. However, once in power, Ennahda was accused of Islamizing Tunisia and dominating politics by controlling “all key ministerial positions” (Wolf, 2017, 134). In April 2012, the party was protested over the handling of the problems “including judicial reforms and socioeconomic programs” (Masri, 2017, 59). It was no surprise that the protests took place after the formation of the coalition. Storm underlines that the fragmented nature of the Tunisian party system paved the way for a “highly unstable political system and therefore also a very fragile new democracy” (Storm, 2013, 276). This fragmented nature of the system was not due to the number of parties but the effectiveness of them. Most of the parties in Tunisia were “either (1) had existed as clandestine parties during Ben Ali's reign; (2) had been coopted/neutralized by the previous regime; or (3) were somehow linked to a party in either group (1) or (2) and, therefore, internally created parties” (Storm, 2013, 276). Therefore, although two of the necessities of a democratic regime, electoral process and political parties, were fulfilled, the democratic transition process was fragile. However, according to Storm (2013, 277), the fragile nature of the transition was not necessarily a negative but rather, a positive sign since the Tunisian people did not settle for a replacement of the Ben Ali regime but demanded a change in politics. In addition, protests taught the public that “peaceful popular protests can indeed make a difference” (Storm, 2013, 277).

In terms of Ennahda, much of the party's actions or proposals were benign compared to other regional Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Masri, 2017, 59). That was mostly because of Tunisia's sociopolitical environment compared to other regional countries. Islamists in Egypt, for example, had already changed Egypt's secular trend by the time Mubarak had resigned, while the country

had already been Islamized from civil society to politics while, on the other hand, “by the time Ben Ali left office, Tunisia had been largely secularized and transformed to such a degree that it stood in very sharp contrast to the rest of the Arab world” (Masri, 2017, 59).

The secularization of the public and Ennahda’s moderate position in the government differed the post-uprisings period of Tunisia from the rest of the region. Following the protests in 2012, the process for the adoption of a new constitution created new tensions between secularists and Islamists largely over the position of the Shari’a in Tunisia and the criminalization of the blasphemy and the defamation of religion. However, over these issues, Ennahda eventually had to compromise, and Tunisia was at the time defined as “a free, independent, sovereign state; Islam is its religion; Arabic is its language; and the Republic is its form of government” (Erdoğan, 2018, 69). The new constitution that was ratified in January 2014 and defined Tunisia “unequivocally as a civil state, granting equal rights for men and women, freedom of speech and conscience, an independent judiciary, citizens’ rights to health care, and progressive resource redistribution” (Masri, 2017, 62).

Throughout the process of the approval of the new constitution, confrontations between Islamists and secularists continued. In February 2013, the secular opposition leader Chokri Belaid was murdered (McDowall, 2020). As four months later, in July 2013, another opposition leader, Mohamed Brahmi was assassinated, the opposition parties withdrew from the Constituent Assembly and refused to cooperate with the government (Erdoğan, 2018, 75-76). Demonstrations began in late July 2013 and the country came into the verge of a crisis, the UGTT stepped in and became a mediator between Ennahda and the society since the organization “was singularly qualified to organize a round of talks among civil society organizations to deal with accusations against Ennahda and discuss a path forward” (Masri, 2017, 66). The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, led by the UGTT, produced a timeline for the resignation of the government and the selection of a new government. Following the Quartet’s attempts, in December 2013, Ennahda ceded power (McDowall, 2020) and a technocratic caretaker government was given a one-year term by President Marzouki until the next parliamentary and presidential elections in the late 2013 (Storm, 2013,

281) According to Masri, “Ennahda’s ‘willingness’ to relinquish its power marked a first for an Islamist party” (Masri, 2017, 66).

As the crisis had seemed to be avoided, in January 2014, the parliament approved the new Tunisian constitution that guaranteed “personal freedoms and rights for minorities and splitting power between the president and prime minister” (McDowall, 2020). The constitution was followed by the parliamentary and the presidential elections in October and December 2014. The first legislative elections since 2011, the 2014 elections were marked by a 69 percent voter turnout while more than a hundred political parties participated (Erdoğan, 2018, 79). Masri claimed that “Nidaa Tounes, the party assembled by Beji Caid Essebsi as a potpourri of secular oppositionists, achieved plurality in the parliamentary elections with 86 of the 217 parliamentary seats; Ennahda won 69” (Masri, 2017, 70). Two months after the parliamentary elections, in December 2014, Essebsi “was elected as the first president of the second republic of Tunisia with 55.6 per cent of the votes” (Erdoğan, 2018, 81).

Following the ten years since the Arab Uprisings, Tunisia’s long praised democratic transition process has faced with a coup in July 2021. Although some scholars tended to compare this coup led by the President Kais Saied with 2013 Egyptian coup d’état, the two process posit different trajectories in terms of the governance, political parties, political economy and civil society, and the civil-military relations.

In terms of the governance, for the next ten years following the Uprisings, Tunisia had been ruled by nine successive governments that failed to fix the economic problems that country had faced over the last ten years (Lall, 2021). In January 2021, because of the economic difficulties and the hardships in the health system due to the COVID-19, major protests broke out against the Ennahda-led government (Marzouki, 2022, 5). On 25 July 2021, “President Kais Saied announced that he was dismissing Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, suspending parliament, rescinding the legal immunity of legislators, and presiding over their public prosecution” (Marzouki, 2022, 5). While President Saied claimed that “he was taking these measures in the name of the 2014 Constitution, which prohibits such an unchecked concentration of powers” (Marzouki, 2022, 5), “crowds on the streets of the capital Tunis cheered in July when Saied suspended Tunisia’s parliament, fired the prime

minister and seized power” (Lall, 2022). What made the crowds to cheer for seizing power of the President Saied was that “the democratically elected leaders failed to right the former regime’s wrongs or achieve economic progress, leaving Tunisia with greater corruption, higher unemployment, widening poverty and deeper debt a decade after the revolution” (Yee, 2022).

On September 22, President Saied extended the exceptional measures for an indefinite period and “issued a presidential decree affirming the suspension of parliamentarians’ immunity, stating that legislation will be made in the form of decree law promulgated by the president” (Marzouki, 2022, 5). For Marzouki, “the de facto dissolution of parliament, the abandonment of the constitution, and the arrests of political opponents and journalists are clear signs that Tunisia is no longer a democracy” (Marzouki, 2022, 5). For this failure of democratization process, Marzouki offers three reasons: “1) the failure to accompany political reform with socioeconomic gains for citizens; 2) the subsequent rise of populism; and 3) the mistakes of the Islamic party” (Marzouki, 2022, 5).

In terms of “the failure to accompany political reform with socioeconomic gains for citizens” and “the subsequent rise of populism”, the country has faced with “a constant drum of instability that throttled progress” (Yee, 2022), while the successive governments had focused on creating a new political system instead of taking an action “on socioeconomic inequality and high unemployment, especially among young people who made up nearly a third of the population” (Yee, 2022). In terms of the political reforms, after 2011, Tunisians enjoyed “an unprecedented level of political freedom” (Marzouki, 2022, 6) and three years later after the Uprisings, the country adopted its first democratic constitution. While the demands of the middle class were met, the lower classes, mostly the poor and the unemployed were deprived from economic gains. Although the lower classes also benefited from the political reforms, “for some among the poorest, the revolution has made an already precarious situation even grimmer” (Marzouki, 2022, 6). As mentioned before, the corruption was one of the primary causes of the economic crisis faced by Tunisia. Marzouki underlines that the anticorruption policy that was implemented after the Uprisings, “made the condition of society’s poorest members worse” (Marzouki, 2022, 6). According to Marzouki,

“...when the state took back more than three-hundred corrupt businesses and agricultural enterprises, this threw thousands of people out of work overnight. In order to soften the economic blow of “draining the swamp,” the government needed a massive influx of aid or cash. Tunisia did not have access to such resources. Therefore, the anticorruption measures that the country’s economic system badly needed ended up further worsening the immediate economic situation of those who were already the most heavily burdened by the past regime’s cronyism (Marzouki, 2022, 6).

As the economic conditions did not improve in the long term, political instability worsened. For example, the National Reconciliation Law, which granted amnesty for corrupt businesspersons that passed in 2017, “contributed to strengthening corruption” (Marzouki, 2022, 7). In addition to the political instability, successive coalition governments resulted in the failure to take necessary political and economic measures. Tunisia’s new electoral system after 2014 “limited any party’s ability to claim a majority even after winning an election” (Yee, 2022). For the short term, the coalition governments proposed a system that the voice of the public is most heard. However, in the successive coalitions, neither camp was “willing to make unpopular economic or political changes that could threaten the consensus” (Yee, 2022). Years of political instability and economic crisis made the public lose their faith in democracy and elections. “Tunisians blamed the poor economy on the political parties and the political system” (Yee, 2022) which resulted in the election of Kais Saied as the president of the country in 2019 who is an “austere constitutional law professor with a reputation for championing the poor and underrepresented” (Yee, 2022). Depoliticization of the Tunisian public from the democracy and elections gave rise to the Kais Saied’s rise and the rise of populism in Tunisia.

President Saied was elected with a large majority of votes in 2019. His voters perceived him as “a new, clean, and straightforward personality” (Marzouki, 2022, 7) and “saw him as clean by virtue of his lack of political experience” (Marzouki, 2022, 7). Therefore, three years after his election, in 2022, many people supported the coup conducted by the President. In the meantime, the public oriented their anger toward Islamists-led government in 2021 protests. According to Marzouki, the public’s anger toward Islamists was not ideological but rather “they blame Islamists for betraying their promise to deliver clean and efficient governance, for prioritizing a politics of petty agreements and backdoor deals with parties from the former regime, and for catastrophically mismanaging deadly health and economic crises” (Marzouki, 2022, 9). In terms of the mistakes of the Islamic party, what Ennahda

failed to grasp during this crisis was that, as the party agreed to bargain with the former regime politicians and businesspersons, this action “alienated Ennahda from the forces of the revolution and the disenfranchised youth who initially found Ennahda’s promise of a clean politics so appealing” (Marzouki, 2022, 9).

Following the July 2021 coup, in October 2021, the President Kais Saied appointed Najla Bouden as the prime minister while the President extended “the suspension of parliament and moved to rule by decree, suspending parts of the country’s post-revolution constitution” (Agence France-Presse, 2021). In July 2022, the country held a constitutional referendum with a 30.5% voter turnout (Amara, 2022) which gave the president far more power “allowing the Head of the State to no longer share executive power with the head of government, to no longer be held accountable before parliament, to name the judges in high-level positions, and by extension select the members of the future Constitutional Court” (Boussen & Lakhel, 2022). Lastly, on 17 December 2022, parliamentary elections were held in Tunisia with 8.8% voter turnout since most of the political parties boycotted the elections. With the announcement of the voter turnout, “major parties, among them the National Salvation Front, which includes the Muslim democrat Ennahda party, and the secular Free Constitutional Party, said Saied had no legitimacy and should step down, calling for mass protests” (Al Jazeera, 2022).

For the period between 2011 and 2014, Tunisia’s electoral process posited a positive example for the democratic transition. In addition, cooperation between the political figures, namely the Islamist and secularist political parties raised a greater hope for a democratic transition process and the elimination of the failure of democratization. However, after 2021, following a coup d’état, Tunisian democracy seems to be stumbled. On the other hand, although Tunisia and Egypt carry similarities in their sociopolitical histories and political economies, differences in the structure and actions of the civil society, the civil-military relations, and differences between Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood makes the two countries different cases after the Arab Uprisings.

Egypt’s post-Arab Uprisings period differed from Tunisia’s following the Uprisings. After the 2011 national elections and the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt

faced a coup d'état in 2013 and led to the “the installation of an overtly military-controlled government” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 133) in 2014.

Ottoway and Ottoway (2019, 133) define the three-year period as a “triumph of the state over citizens”. The reason for that definition is that the January 2011 uprising led to “the rise of the most repressive military regime since the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 133) and for the al-Sisi regime, democracy was “a luxury Egypt cannot afford” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 133). Moreover, the importance was put on the state, rather than the citizens; therefore, the regime had “no intention of satisfying the calls for freedom” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 133).

Following the fall of Mubarak in January 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power and led the country to the national elections (Szmolka, 2017, 359). Ottoway and Ottoway present three actors that shaped the post-uprisings period of Egypt:

“the military and security apparatus, which quickly re-established its grip over the country even before the crowds left Tahrir Square; the old secular political elite that controlled the courts, state bureaucracy and political parties; and the Muslim Brotherhood, which, with other smaller Islamist parties as junior partners, rushed to fill the political space created by the uprising” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 134).

Szmolka (2017, 358) underlines that holding elections and approving a new constitution do not necessarily mean that a democratic transition process takes place, and Egypt was an example for that. For the question of why democratic transition failed in Egypt, Szmolka gives three reasons: “a lack of understanding between polarised political forces (secular and Islamist); the exclusionary politics implemented by the Islamists; and the interference of a non-accountable actor – the army – in political affairs” (Szmolka, 2017, 359). In addition to these three reasons, according to Szmolka (2017, 359), the 2013 military coup implied a turn to the authoritarianism similar to the Mubarak era.

The 2012 parliamentary elections unfolded the first step toward the counter-revolution and the failure of the democratization process in Egypt. Prior to the elections, several new parties were created while the National Democratic Party (NDP), that had been dominating the Egyptian political scene for decades, was dissolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Szmolka, 2017, 359). In the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, Freedom and Justice Party “won 47.18

percent of seats in the Egyptian parliament” (Egypt Independent, 2012) while securing “127 seats on party lists and its candidates won another 108” (Egypt's Brotherhood wins 47% of Parliament seats, 2012). Five months after the parliamentary elections, in June 2012, Mohammed Morsi, the head of the FJP was elected as the first Islamist president in Egypt’s first democratic presidential election with a voter turnout of 46.4 percent in the first round and 51.8 in the second (Szmolka, 2017, 360). Therefore, according to Szmolka (Szmolka, 2017, 360), the first phase of the transition process was pluralist and politically competitive. However, the problem was the conflict between the secular and Islamist parties and the military’s active role in politics.

In the same month, the Supreme Constitutional Court ordered the parliament to be dissolved, arguing that it had been unconstitutional “on the ground that one third of the seats elected through individual candidacy were invalid” (Egypt court orders dissolving of parliament, 2012). However, this act was mostly due to the fact that the Islamists had both dominated the political scene; therefore, for the secular opposition, the courts became “merciless in challenging the newly elected parliament, which immediately became the target of several lawsuits seeking its dissolution” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 137) and the judiciary was thus “both willing and able to side with the anti-Islamist opposition to dissolve the democratically elected parliament” (Grewal, 2015). In the meantime, the courts had tried to block the forming of a committee that Islamists would be overrepresented in the writing of a new constitution. However, Morsi ignored the opposition and called a constitutional referendum in December 2012 (Szmolka, 2017, 363). The constitution that was produced by the Constituent Assembly that “mostly by its Brotherhood members” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 137), was confirmed with the 63.8 percent of the votes, “although only 32.9 per cent of the electorate participated” (Szmolka, 2017, 363) and came into force on 25 December 2012.

The constant conflict between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular opposition was a setback for the democratization of Egypt in the post-uprisings period. Until July 2013, Egyptian politics saw a great amount of interference of the military in order to hinder the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood with the support of the

secularists. The period between December 2012 and July 2013 can be defined as the following:

“Morsi found himself blocked from taking decisive action again and again. The SCAF controlled the power to legislate, while the judiciary, state bureaucracy and media remained in the hands of secularists. The Muslim Brotherhood had no control over the military or security services” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 138).

Although the military and the secularists were openly against the new Brotherhood regime, the Brotherhood also made the transition process unworkable. Morsi and the Brotherhood had no attempt to compromise with the secular opposition while Morsi’s administration “was doubtless totally inexperienced and often incompetent” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 138). Morsi’s unilateral decree on obtaining greater power for himself (The Associated Press, 2018) and pronouncing himself above the courts with the cancellation of previous SCAF decrees did not help the transition process; in addition, Morsi announced that he “wouldn’t give up on any of the powers given to the president” (Erdoğan, 2018, 162). Under these circumstances, a new constitution was produced in December 2012 consolidating “the Islamic nature of the state” (Szmolka, 2017, 364), confirming “the use of shariah as the main source of legislation” (Szmolka, 2017, 364) and conferring “significant powers on the army” in order to sustain the loyalty of the military (Szmolka, 2017, 364).

In March 2013, as the Morsi administration refused to accept “an offer of a \$750 million rescue loan from the International Monetary Fund” (The Associated Press, 2018). With the refusal, “fuel and electricity shortages stoke discontent” (The Associated Press, 2018). In the meantime, a youth organization called Tamarrod launched a campaign and gathered signatures for the removal of Morsi and the new presidential elections (The Associated Press, 2018). The organization was supported by the security services and in June 2013, demonstrations that were called by Tamarrod broke all over the country (Kingsley, 2013). In three days, Morsi was deposed and imprisoned by the military led by General al-Sisi (The Associated Press, 2018). Following the removal of Morsi, al-Sisi called for new elections. However, al-Sisi’s actions did not reflect a new-transitional period attempts but rather, al-Sisi “sought to make himself the center of all power and decision-making to the detriment of politics and parliament. He saw himself not as the head of a transient ‘regime’ but as the living embodiment of the permanent state” (Ottoway & Ottoway,

2019, 140). Almost one year after the removal of Morsi, in May 2014, al-Sisi was elected as the president.

According to Ottoway & Ottoway (2019, 140), all authoritarian leaders try to increase their power and justify their actions in nationalistic terms and claiming that their actions are beneficial for the entire country and al-Sisi posits no exception. On the other hand, what differed al-Sisi was that he put on an emphasis on the state as an entity that is “above and independent of all other institutions and the entire population” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 140) and “the state was to be controlled by the military” (Ottoway & Ottoway, 2019, 141). This is why “triumph of the state over the citizens” sets a good definition for Egypt in the post-uprisings period.

According to Cavatorta (2016, 137), in Egypt, “the intention to genuinely democratize was never present at the core of the regime – the military”. The absence of the intention of a democratic change fall within the scope of the explanations for the failure of democratization. In addition, as mentioned before, although Egypt held elections following the Uprisings, that did not necessarily mean that a successful democratic transition process took place. In Egypt, exclusionary politics between parties, and interference of the military hindered a democratic transition process.

2.3.3. Political Economy and Civil Society

Problems in the political economies of Tunisia and Egypt were one of the important factors that led to the Uprisings. According to Ajl, Haddad and Abul-Magd the regional discontent was “mostly due to the neoliberalism” (Ajl, Haddad and Abul-Magd, 2021, 65) since prior to the Uprisings, “commodity subsidies declined, wages stagnated, and poverty rates increased region-wide” (Ajl, Haddad and Abul-Magd, 2021, 65). After 2011, while Tunisia continued its commitment to neoliberalism and further integrated into the global market (Ajl, Haddad and Abul-Magd, 2021, 66) and Egypt’s transitional governments fell short to the economic instability and al-Sisi’s military government replaced military entrepreneurs as the “leading force in the government and the market” (Ajl, Haddad and Abul-Magd, 2021, 66).

Following the 2011 uprisings, it was expected that both the Jasmine Revolution and the January 25 Revolution would lead to growth in the economy. However, the Tunisian economy has not been growing “as fast as people expected” (Alvi, 2019, 121). The period after the Uprisings also did not bring what the Egyptian people expected in the economy. According to Khan and Miller, in the Arab countries that went through transition, including Egypt, the economies worsened after the Uprisings (Khan & Miller, 2016, 1).

After the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia’s economic problems were still caused by youth unemployment and income inequality (Alvi, 2019, 139). According to the World Bank (2022), Tunisian unemployment with advanced education rate was 29 percent in 2011 and 30 percent in 2014 while the overall unemployment rate was 18.3 percent in 2011. On the other hand, the overall unemployment rate fell to 15.1 percent in 2014, while in 2021, the overall unemployment rate increased to 16.8 percent (The World Bank, 2022). According to Yerkes and Yahmed, the disparity between the unemployment with advanced education rate and the overall unemployment rate was because “the relatively low number of qualified job openings” (Yerkes & Yahmed, 2018, as cited in Alvi, 2019, 139). Therefore, until 2014, although the government increased the number of job openings in the public sector and lowered the rate of overall unemployment, the unemployment rate with advanced education remained high (Alvi, 2019, 139).

In addition to unemployment, although poverty is consistent in some parts of Tunisia, the poverty rate that was 32 percent in March 2011 fell to 15 percent in May 2016 (Alvi, 2019, 140). Poverty and income inequality continued to be a problem in the post-uprisings period. Alvi underlines that “despite codifying intra-regional economic parity into the 2014 constitution, the disparities remain stark and grim, as the central region continues to suffer from poverty rates as high as four times more than the coastal areas” (Alvi, 2019, 131).

On the other hand, Tunisia’s overall socioeconomic progress differed from the other countries in the region within the first years after the Uprisings (Alvi, 2019, 140). Tunisia outreached to European countries “for job training, employment opportunities, and innovations in foreign direct investment (FDI) and job creation” (Alvi, 2019, 140). Since 2011, “Tunisia has taken significant steps to try to alleviate

the crisis of unemployment among the educated youth. Along with numerous workshops on entrepreneurship, innovation, job creation, and employment strategies” (Alvi, 2019, 120). In addition, in 2014, Tunisia was assisted by the IMF for the economic reforms that amounted to 500 million dollars out of the total 1.5 billion dollars loan (Alvi, 2019, 136). For the first years, Tunisia’s economy “has shown resilience” (Alvi, 2019, 142). However, as of 2022, Tunisian economy seemed to face serious problems (Lall, 2022). According to Lall,

“Since 2011, the Tunisian dinar’s value has halved; unemployment currently hovers around the 18% mark nationally but has been as high as 32% in some parts of the country and corruption is considered endemic by Tunisians. Public debt has more than doubled from 39% of GDP in 2010, and with the government forced to shell out large sums to service its debt, there is some concern that Tunisia will go the way of Lebanon and default” (Lall, 2022).

Following the next ten years after the Uprisings, Tunisia’s elected leaders have failed to achieve economic success while leaving the country with “higher unemployment and widening poverty” (Yee, 2022). The coronavirus pandemic, on the other hand, exacerbated the scale of the years of “economic stagnation and political infighting” (Stanicek, 2022, 1). For example, the government’s debt rose to 82.6% in 2022 compared to 39.3% in 2010 (Stanicek, 2022, 1). Although the people of Tunisia still supported the revolution (Yee, 2022), what the public demonstrated against the government in 2021 were due to the demand for “better economic opportunities and economic security” (Cherif, 2022, 4). According to a poll conducted in August-September 2021, “the majority of Tunisians backed Saied, considering his actions necessary to remove a corrupt and unpopular political elite after years of economic stagnation” (Stanicek, 2022, 1) while “71% of Tunisians are deeply dissatisfied with their lives and believe their situation was better before 2010 revolution” (Stanicek, 2022, 1). As the successive governments have failed to address socio-economic problems, “expectations for a better economic future have plummeted. In 2019, only a third of Tunisians believed that the situation would improve in the coming years, compared to 78 per cent in 2011” (Colombo, 2021, 13). According to Cherif, although the country had seemed to take positive steps within the next three years after the Uprisings, successive governments

“...continued to follow the dictator’s economic policies and proved unable to bring innovative solutions to the nation’s mounting problems. These successive governments kept seeking foreign loans from multiple partners, mostly international

financial institutions, the US, the EU (especially Germany, France and Italy), Japan, and the regional players of the GCC and Turkey” (Cherif, 2022, 4).

Therefore, while the foreign loans were beneficial to cover basic needs of the country, in the long term, increased debt made the economy unstable. In an unstable economic system, investors also avoided to invest (Cherif, 2022, 5). In addition, Cherif underlines that, by 2021, “the tourism industry was broke after years of terrorism, a devastating pandemic, and political turbulence” (Cherif, 2022, 5).

According to Yee (2022), after the Uprisings, most of the leaders of Tunisia barely realized that they needed an economic plan which proved to be a mistake. Post-uprisings leaders’ solution for unemployment was “hiring hundreds of thousands of civil servants, raising government salaries and borrowing from abroad to pay for it all” (Yee, 2022). However, at the end, this resulted in a national debt and inflation. In the meantime, Tunisians blame the political system and political parties for the economic conditions (Yee, 2022). Under such circumstances, Kais Saied “used the hate a big part of the population has against the political class... to say ‘I am the savior’” (Yee, 2022) which eventually resulted in the dissolution of the parliament and dismissal of the government in 2021.

Prior to the 2011 uprisings, similar to Tunisia, Egypt’s economic problems were related to the high unemployment rate, “crony capitalism, inadequate infrastructure, a large and inefficient bureaucracy, and widening income and wealth inequalities” (Khan & Miller, 2016, 2). Following the Uprisings, the World Bank (2022) data shows that Egypt’s overall unemployment rate was 11.9 percent in 2011 and 13.1 percent in 2014 while by 2015 the youth unemployment rate reached 35 percent (Khan & Miller, 2016, 2).

The Egyptian economy “worsened significantly” (Khan & Miller, 2016, 2) after 2011. The Morsi government’s inexperience in running the economy and Morsi’s decision to put the economy in second place due to political problems turned out to be a major policy mistake (Khan & Miller, 2016, 3). The absence of a meaningful economic plan exacerbated the ongoing economic problems. In order to appease the public, the government applied populist measures including “increasing subsidies and government employment and wages” (Khan & Miller, 2016, 3) which resulted in a rise of the fiscal deficit and an increase in inflation (Khan & Miller, 2016, 3). The

collapse of the Egyptian economy was expected but averted “only by the financial support from Egypt’s friends in the Middle East and not as a result of any policy action” (Khan & Miller, 2016, 3). By 2014, Egypt had witnessed “a widening budget deficit, and an increasing internal and external debt” (Paciello, 2013, 1-2). According to Paciello (2013, 2), although the political uncertainty following the Uprisings hindered the Egyptian economy, the responses by the Egyptian governments were not adequate in dealing with the economic problems. After the Uprisings, all transitional authorities “have hesitated to break with the old power system and have continued to manage the decision processes in the most obscure ways and without any dialogue with the country’s social forces” (Paciello, 2013, 2-3).

Similar to Tunisian experience, Egypt’s transitional authorities tried to protect the purchasing power of public employees. For example, in October 2011, %25 pay raise and “an increase of the minimum wage to 700 Egyptian pounds a month” (Paciello, 2013, 4) was approved by the transitional government. In addition, after the Morsi government, under the interim government “a new proposal has surfaced to set a minimum income (rather than wage) of 1,200 Egyptian pounds a month, starting in 2014” (Paciello, 2013, 4). However, these actions not only increased the budget deficit, but also did not affect the purchasing power of the employees outside of the public sector (Paciello, 2013, 4).

For the political economy, what differentiates Egypt from Tunisia is that “the key economic challenge for Egypt is in fact a political one” (Harding, 2016). The conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood, the military and the secular opposition affected the process of policymaking for the economy. In the meantime, as Khan and Miller (2016, 3) underline, transitional governments applied to several populist measures to appease the Egyptian public in the transition period.

The role of the civil society organizations had been an important factor for the Uprisings. Prior and after the Uprisings, civil society groups played a major role “in directing, sustaining and potentially impacting the faith of the movements” (Khneisser, 2019, 12). According to Khneisser, “different forms of organized movements and daily non-movements have preceded and paved the way for the eruption of the Uprisings in 2011” (Khneisser, 2019, 12). While Tunisia and Egypt “both share the dimensions of colonial legacy, economic structural adjustment and

liberalization, top-down corporatism, regime-affiliated trade unionism and relatively strong workers' movement" (Khneisser, 2019, 12), the influence of the two civil societies following the Uprisings have been different in the two countries (Khneisser, 2019, 13).

To start with Tunisia, the country has a "tradition of organized labour and unionized action" (Khneisser, 2019, 12). This tradition affected the influence of the civil society on the transitional period so that the organizations could guide a more "progressive constitutional framework and democratic governance" (Khneisser, 2019, 13). On the other hand, Tunisia's transitional government also "enacted laws to encourage greater civic participation" (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 113). For example,

"The Higher Authority for the Realization of Revolutionary Objectives, Political Reform and the Democratic Transitions, established in February 2011 as part of the transitional government, codified protections for CSOs and NGOs, enabling them also to testify, comment on, and influence pending government policy and legislation" (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 113).

As mentioned before, two left-wing opposition political leaders were assassinated in the transitional period. In light of the secular opposition protests for the resignation of the government, a group of civil society organizations led a dialogue between the government and the opposition parties (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 114). Led by the UGTT, three other institutions, "the Tunisian League of Human Rights, the Bar Association and UTICA" (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 114) joined forces in order to "drive the settlement process" (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 114). What is called as the National Dialogue Quartet, the group was able to prevent the situation from turning into a conflict. In return, in 2015, the Quartet was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 114). Therefore, for the transitional period, it can be said that "Tunisia's history of associational life and political organizing created a pathway to a peaceful uprising and a democratic transition" (Mako & Moghadam, 2021, 111). On the other hand, following the transitional period, economic problems and political crisis of Tunisia led to a conflict between the civil society and the government. For example, although the UGTT had been an important actor in the democratic transition process that led to a dialogue between the government and the opposition parties, political crisis of 2021 led the UGTT to react. In January 2022, the UGTT has "criticised President Kais Saied's road map out of

political crisis” (Al Jazeera, 2022). Although this might be seemed as a disagreement rather than a conflict, it is important to mention the speech of the head of the UGTT in December 2022. In a news conference, Nouredine Taboubi, announced that the UGTT would hold “mass protests and occupy the streets soon to show its rejection of next year’s austerity budget” (Amara, 2022). The budget expects to reduce “the fiscal deficit to 5.2% next year from a forecast 7.7% this year, driven by unpopular reforms that could pave the way for a final deal with the International Monetary Fund on a rescue package” (Amara, 2022). Therefore, for this part, although Tunisia continues to have a tradition of organized labour and unionized action, their role as a mediator in the democratic transition process has vanished.

Following the Uprisings and the fall of Mubarak, it was expected that a democratic transition would occur in Egypt (Khneisser, 2019, 22). Similar to Tunisia, Egypt’s NGOs “quickly took advantage of the political opening” (Herrold, 2016, 189) and “initiated projects related to constitutional reform, judicial reform, and transitional justice, and ramped up their ongoing human rights campaigns” (Herrold, 2016, 189). In the meantime, the number of NGOs had increased and “maintained close dialogue with authorities around legislation that would respect human rights and public freedoms” (Khneisser, 2019, 22-23) while taking part “in the Consultative Council’s debate around the new NGO law” (Khneisser, 2019, 22-23). However, under the rising “political polarization” and “economic deterioration” (Khneisser, 2019, 23), recommendations of the civil society organizations were mostly ignored (Khneisser, 2019, 23). In the case of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, Beinin underlines that although “the movement of Egyptian workers was the largest single component of the culture of protest that crystallized in the 2000s, unlike in Tunisia, they had no institutional mechanism to compel ETUF to join the popular movement against Mubarak” (Beinin, 2016, 107) and different from the UGTT, the ETUF stood with the Mubarak regime (Beinin, 2016, 109).

What differed in Egypt compared to Tunisia in terms of the NGO participation in the Uprisings was that Egyptian NGOs did not widely participate in the January 25 Revolution (Herrold, 2016, 190). In addition, following Mubarak’s departure, NGO’s “democracy promotion efforts were short-lived” (Herrold, 2016, 190). After 2011, according to Herrold,

“The regimes that governed Egypt after Mubarak’s fall from power cracked down on the NGO sector through smear campaigns and new policy regulations, and by the summer of 2014 NGOs and foundations had become demoralized and were predicting the looming ‘death of civil society’ in Egypt (Confidential Interview, July 9, 2014)” (Herrold, 2016, 190).

Therefore, although Egyptian NGOs collaborated and conducted several activities following the January 25 Revolution (Herrold, 2016, 198-199), the transitional governments’ defamation and containment policies towards NGOs (Herrold, 2016, 193) and cracking down on the NGOs by the elements of the old regime within the transitional governments (Herrold, 2016, 202) prevented the contribution of the civil society to the democratic transition process in Egypt.

To conclude, Tunisia’s long-lasting tradition of civil society participation, organization and unionized action differed from Egypt’s political trajectories. Prior to the Uprisings, both Tunisia and Egypt’s several civil society organizations were repressed by authoritarian regimes. However, the existence of unionized action under the UGTT, compared to pro-regime ETUF, and transitional governments’ actions towards NGOs, together with the NGOs ability and capacity, differs in Tunisia and Egypt.

Another important factor that affected the post-Arab Uprisings period in the two countries was the civil-military relations and the position of the military. During the Uprisings, both Tunisian and Egyptian armed forces were sided with the public. However, their relationship with the public, as well as with the government were different. Therefore, the following part will focus on the civil-military relations in Tunisia and Egypt.

2.3.4. Civil-Military Relations

In her 2004 article “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”, Eva Bellin refers to the robust coercive apparatus as the factor that leads to a failed democratization process. Therefore, for this part, Bellin’s argument will be used to discuss the civil-military relations in Tunisia and Egypt.

To start with Tunisia, as mentioned in the second section of the thesis, starting from the independence, the military was intentionally left depoliticized (Lutterbeck, 2013, 34) and “underfunded, underequipped, and sidelined from political and economic power under former presidents Habib Bourguiba and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali” (Grewal, 2016). Ranked “among the Arab world’s most professional forces” (Barany, 2011, 31), the Tunisian army supported the pre-reform movements during the Arab Uprisings since it did neither supported by or linked to the Ben Ali regime nor there was any good reason to support the regime. To the contrary, it was to the military’s interest to support the revolution based upon “corporate interests and political restraints” (Taylor, 2014, 57).

According to Grewal (2016), Tunisian civil-military relations have changed significantly following the Uprisings. Sidelined under Bourguiba and especially Ben Ali’s rule, the military began to balance the police force in the country (Grewal, 2016). For example, the military funding “has dramatically increased” (Bonhomme, 2018) following the Uprisings. Accordingly, as of 2015, “Tunisia’s military expenses amounted to \$1.1 billion dollars compared to \$528 million in 2010, the year preceding the Arab Spring” (Bonhomme, 2018). During his reign, Ben Ali had marginalized the military while increasing his control over it and creating a personalized rule (Grewal, 2016). For example, the top army officers were appointed by Ben Ali through his personal connections. However, in the first years after the Uprisings, the military’s role in politics changed. Once appointed by Ben Ali, the chief of staff of the armed forces, Rachid Ammar, was hailed during the revolution since the military sided with the public. Following the Uprisings, Rachid Ammar reassumed his role as the chief of staff of the armed forces and “sought to elevate the relative political position of the military” (Grewal, 2016). For example,

“In February 2011, Army Brigadier General Ahmed Chabir was appointed the director general of national security in the Ministry of the Interior, while Colonel Moncef Helali assumed command of the National Guard. Major Colonel Mohamed Abdennaceur Belhaj was later appointed the director general of customs, which had been civilian-led throughout the 2000s. The military thus assumed command of the nation’s top security posts” (Grewal, 2016).

However, Ammar’s increasing control over the military “was challenged by Tunisia’s first democratically elected government” (Grewal, 2016). What differed in the transitional government compared to the Ben Ali’s rule was that the president

now had to share its control with the prime minister according to the constitution (Grewal, 2016). While the president was responsible for appointing the top military positions, he would have done so by consulting the prime minister (Grewal, 2016). This change in the management of the army not only helped the army to be freer from the personal rule of the president, but also prevented the army from becoming a more personalized entity. Therefore, “from 2012, the Tunisian military became more decentralized, meaning that parliament, the president and the prime minister could weigh in on decisions” (Bonhomme, 2018).

Although the power-sharing over the military caused a tension between then-president Marzouki and prime minister Jebali, their move to appoint “military advisers and advisory councils to help them manage the military” (Grewal, 2016) resulted in a more institutionalized armed force. In addition, as Ammar’s control over the military increased Marzouki and Jebali’s distrust over him, Marzouki and Jebali created alternative positions for the military. For example, in September 2012, Marzouki created a position for a military adviser (Grewal, 2016), and Jebali created a security council. Therefore, since 2012, “management of the military has become more decentralized, with the president, prime minister, minister of defence, parliament, military adviser, NSC, and Security Council all offering their input” (Grewal, 2016). As the influence of each institution varied, according to Grewal the crucial point is that “management of the military has become a shared responsibility between multiple actors” (Grewal, 2016), therefore; the armed forces became an institutional-ruled entity.

As the input of the senior officers increased with the new management system, disagreements between officers prompted Marzouki’s fear of a potential coup (Grewal, 2016). While Tunisian politics had been shaking with terrorist attacks, military operations and political assassinations, Egyptian military coup exacerbated the fear. Ammar’s resignation and appointment of officers outside of Ben Ali and Ammar’s personal networks “marked an important point” (Grewal, 2016) for the military. In order to prevent an Egyptian scenario for Tunisia, the government did not fill the role of chief of staff left by Ammar. In addition, the government applied policy changes in military, “took a stronger stance on terrorism” and “established military zones along Tunisia’s southern borders with Libya and Algeria, placing

local police and customs officers under the military's command" (Grewal, 2016). These changes further professionalized the Tunisian army and the budget of the Ministry of Defence "has grown more quickly than any other ministry, increasing by an average of 21 percent each year" (Grewal, 2016).

Although the military has a professionalized and institutionalized position in Tunisia, it was surprising that the military seemed to get closer to President Kais Saied's regime in 2021. As mentioned before, for decades, Tunisian army has been known for its professionalization and being away from politics. However, following the 2021 political crisis that President Saied froze the parliament and dissolved the government, the army controlled the exit and entry of the parliament (Schaer & Guizani, 2021) which caused concerns since it "was the first time in Tunisia's recent history that the military became involved in political matters" (Schaer & Guizani, 2021). On July 25, the soldiers "accompanied by military tanks implemented Saied's order to close Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi's office and all of parliament, preventing its elected members from entering and conducting the people's business" (Masmoudi, 2021) and violated the Article 18 of the constitution of 2014 "which states that the army is 'required to remain completely impartial' and to support 'the civil authorities in accordance with the provisions set out in law'" (Masmoudi, 2021).

In addition to this incident, Schaer and Guizani underline that one of the most "worrying aspects of increased army involvement is also the potential use of military courts to prosecute political opponents" (Schaer & Guizani, 2021). According to Amnesty International, "military courts in Tunisia are increasingly targeting civilians, in some cases for publicly criticising President Kais Saied since he claimed sweeping new powers on 25 July" (Amnesty International, 2021). For example, within the last three months of 2021 alone, "the military justice system has investigated or prosecuted at least ten civilians for a range of offenses" (Amnesty International, 2021). Four civilians among the ten, on the other hand, have been brought before the military courts for criticizing the President Saied (Amnesty International, 2021). Therefore, the increase in the use of military courts in Tunisia is also becoming a matter of concern.

To sum up, for the case of the Tunisia, marginalized position of the military had changed following the Uprisings. Although a personalized ruled was to be set just after the revolution, the Tunisian army remained as a professionalized and institutionalized entity for the following years after the Uprisings. While the military was kept under control in order to prevent any possible case of a coup, with an increased budget and importance to national security, the position of the military in Tunisia changed. However, following the actions taken by the military in the 2021 political crisis and the increasing use of the military courts in the country, the future of the military in Tunisia is ambiguous.

Egypt posits a different case compared to Tunisia in terms of the military. As explained in the early parts of this thesis, the military has always been an important factor in Egyptian politics. After the Uprisings, it was expected that a civilian government would be created. However, with the 2013 coup d'état, the military reassumed its role in government.

Similar to Tunisia, the Egyptian military aligned with the public in the Arab Uprisings, therefore; gained the respect of the Egyptian people (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 660). However, after a two-year rule of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated president Mohammad Morsi, the Supreme Court of the Armed Forces assumed power in Egypt. Following Mubarak's removal from the power, instead of handing the control to an interim government, the SCAF assumed control in Egypt. According to Erdoğan (2018, 212), although the SCAF announced that it would hand the power in six months, the Council "extended this period to eighteen months" (Erdoğan, 2018, 212). Even after handing the power, the Council "attempted the rule the country behind the curtain" (Erdoğan, 2018, 212) by controlling the political process in order to secure its power within the newly structured political system. For example, after the appointment of the interim government, the SCAF backed interim government proceed "to issue a constitutional declaration in which it appointed the military leadership as the ultimate decision maker and the final authority in shaping the transition process" (Erdoğan, 2018, 213). This constitutional declaration "granted the SCAF the right to have a final say over the constitutional process even after a new parliament was elected" and "suggested that the military budget should escape civilian oversight and the SCAF should be solely responsible for all matters

concerning the armed forces” (Erdoğan, 2018, 213). When Morsi came to power, he “took steps to curb military’s political clout” (Erdoğan, 2018, 215). For example, Morsi annulled the constitutional declaration “issued by the SCAF before presidential election which targeted diminishing the president’s presidential and legislative powers” (Erdoğan, 2018, 215). In order to increase the power of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi appointed the Brotherhood members to key ministerial positions. Therefore, Morsi and the Supreme Court of the Armed Forces openly confronted with each other.

The conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood, the secular opposition and the military caused a setback for a democratic transition process, and the military was an important part of it. However, according to Uzun and Elerian, “the military coup of 2013 represents a new trend in the Egyptian politics” (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 663) since 1953 coup d’état. As the military became responsible for the transitional period following the Uprisings, its direct involvement in politics increased (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 663). There are several reasons behind the decision of the military to stage a coup, but the conflict of interests between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood is an important one.

With the economic and political interests at stake, the military assumed control and “the post-coup period witnessed exaggerated consolidation of military power, not even on the expense of opposition, but also on the expense of allied groups like General Intelligence and the businessmen” (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 664). Following the coup, the military’s dominance at the constitutional level, executive level and legislative level increased (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 664). At the constitutional level, the president’s authority over the Minister of Defence decreased since the constitution “guarantees the Minister of Defence, who is usually served in the higher positions in the military, to stay in office for two successive terms as a tool of immunity from dismissal” (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 665). In addition, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces began to be directed by the Minister of Defence, not the president, therefore; became immune to presidential influence. At the executive level, the ex-military officers “were empowered in the executive apparatus. The majority of governors’ positions were regained by the military, in contrary to the period of Morsi which marked decrease in the numbers of ex-militaries in the

governors comparing to the period of Mubarak” (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 665). At the legislative level, al-Sisi used his authority to issue “large number of decrees” (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 667), while at the same time, designed the election law in favour of the favoured political parties and groups, including economic activities of the military (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 668), and sidelined the opposition. Therefore, the parliament became “a tool for full support of the regime and punishment of the oppositions” (Uzun & Elerian, 2019, 668).

Egypt’s increasing authoritarianism after the Uprisings differs from Tunisia. According to Bellin, the military constitutes the most important factor in countries’ divergent trajectories (Bellin, 2018, 448). As mentioned before, although there were attempts to limit its presence, the military had always played an important role in Egypt since 1952 coup. Providing the regime, a coercive power, “delivering on large infrastructural and development projects” (Bellin, 2018, 449) and perceiving itself as the “guardian of the nation” (Bellin, 2018, 449), the military was trusted by the public and created “a general distrust for democracy” (Bellin, 2018, 449). Therefore, although the military had a distrust over the popular movements, its economic and political interests, in addition to their dissatisfaction of the Mubarak regime, paved the way for the support of the Uprisings. However, the military’s authoritarian measures increased over the first three years after the Uprisings which became evident after the election of al-Sisi as the president. According to Bellin, “within four years of the uprising, Egypt had witnessed a return to ‘electoral authoritarianism’ that was in many ways more illiberal than what it had known before the uprising” (Bellin, 2018, 451).

In terms of the scope of personnel and resources, institutional culture and the self-conception, the Egyptian and Tunisian military contradicts. The Egyptian military, compared to Tunisia’s, is enormous in terms of both personnel and resources (Bellin, 2018, 451). On the institutional level, according to Bellin, the Tunisian army respected the civilian rule and embraced the role of the defender of the country from external threats but did not embrace “a grandiose mission to reshape the country according to its own vision” (Bellin, 2018, 452). Therefore, following the Uprisings, in the time of a political crisis in both countries, the Tunisian army decided not to intervene while the Egyptian army staged a coup d’état, which in the end, failing the

democratic transition process. However, recent incidents related to political crisis of 2021 and the relationship between the military and the President Saied creates a dispute over the role of the military in the future of Tunisia.

To conclude, the military has been an important factor for the failure of the democratization process. Compared to Tunisia, which its military was long excluded from politics and constructed as an institutionalized and professionalized entity for a long time, the Egyptian military has always been involved in Egyptian politics indirectly or directly. Although the two armies have been professionalized, the institutionalization level of the Tunisian army differed from the Egyptian military. While the Egyptian army is way ahead in terms of the scope of the personnel and resources, the Tunisian army remained small compared to Egypt's. Following the Uprisings, the Tunisian military's marginalization no longer existed with an increasing budget and importance that was put on national security. On the other hand, the Egyptian army assumed control over the country with a coup d'état.

The last chapter of the thesis has focused on the post-Arab Uprisings period in Tunisia and Egypt. In the first part of the last chapter, factors that led to the Arab Uprisings in two countries have been briefly explained. These factors consisted of economic crisis, income inequality, political legitimacy and corruption. The second part covered the governance of Tunisia and Egypt after the Uprisings. This part laid down the different paths for Tunisia and Egypt in terms of political parties and elections. What differed Tunisia from Egypt in the democratization process following the Uprisings was that the secularization of the public, Ennahda's moderate position in the government, efforts for a functioning electoral system and non-interference of the military. In Egypt, on the other hand, the conflict between the secular and Islamist parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and the military's active role in politics hindered the democratic transition process. While Tunisia faced with a coup d'état in 2021 by President Saied, Tunisia and Egypt's route to coup d'états were the results of two different trajectories. The third part of the last chapter covered the political economy and the civil society of the two countries. It has been concluded that, both Tunisia and Egypt shared similar difficulties in the political economy following the Uprisings. Tunisia's overall economic progress, due to the determination on staying in the course of economic liberalization, differed from the

region in the first years of the post-Uprisings period. However, Tunisian governments' failure to define a well-structured economic plan after a decade from the Uprisings resulted in mass protests which eventually led to the dismissal of the government and suspension of the parliament in 2021. Egypt differs from Tunisia in terms of the political economy since Egypt's problems were mostly due to political challenges following the Uprisings. In addition, civil society's contribution to the post-Arab Uprisings period in Tunisia also differed from Egypt. Tunisia's tradition of civil society participation helped the country in the democratic transition process within the first years after 2011. Recent conflicts between the civil society and the President Saied, on the other hand, creates an ambiguous environment for the democratic transition. The last part of the last chapter of the thesis focused on civil-military relations in Tunisia and Egypt. Following the Uprisings, marginalized position of the military changed in Tunisia. However, the army remained as a professional and institutionalized entity with an increase in its fiscal health. The Egyptian military's role in politics differs from Tunisia. While the scope of personnel and resources of the Egyptian military is enormous, the army actively engaged in politics and governance. At the end, Egyptian army assumed control over the country in 2013 while Tunisia faced with a civilian coup d'état in 2021. These two processes bore out from different trajectories and bore different results for the future of the two countries.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION

In the beginning of 2011, the Arab Uprisings were perceived as a collective action of people that demanded political change and would lead to the fall of authoritarian regimes and a democratization process in the Middle East. The authoritarian regimes fell in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt while Tunisia went through a brief democratization process following the Uprisings. However, Tunisia's parliament was suspended, and the government is dissolved in 2021 by the president Kais Saied which was called a "civilian coup d'état". This thesis focuses on the similar and different factors that Tunisia and Egypt have experienced after the Arab Uprisings and how two coup d'états differ from each other throughout the process.

Tunisia and Egypt share similar factors in their socio-political history, the state building processes, societies and the environment in the pre-Uprisings period. For this reason, it was expected that Tunisia and Egypt would be following the same path after the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes. This thesis focused on the similar and different factors in Tunisia and Egypt and how these factors affected the different trajectories. While Tunisia and Egypt both have similar factors in terms of their socio-political history and the state building processes and the factors that led to the Uprisings, in terms of the election processes, the civil society, the civil-military relations and the economic policies, the two countries bear differences. Tunisia, having a strong civil society and a more educated population differs from Egypt that has a strong military structure, a weak civil society and having a more strategically important geographical position. These factors explain the different trajectories of the two countries and explains the two different authoritarianisms of Tunisia and Egypt. While Egypt is considered to be a military authoritarian regime, Tunisia's authoritarianism is civilian. Therefore, similar and different factors in Tunisia and Egypt also leads to different authoritarianisms for two countries.

For this study, the thesis first conceptualized the explanations for authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the literature and underlined the reasons for why these theories can or cannot be applied to explain the persistent authoritarianism in the region and the differences in Tunisia and Egypt's democratization processes.

The first explanation for the authoritarianism in the Middle East is the institutional inheritance of the regional countries. Studies on the institutional inheritance explain the state-formation in the region as a disrupted process. Prior to the European rule, countries in the region were ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, while the Ottoman Empire had a strong bureaucratic structure under the rule of the Sultan, with the weakening of the empire by the eighteenth century due to several economic and political reasons, in addition to the inadequate modernization process that disrupted the state formation in the region. With an uncompleted bureaucratic development process, regional countries began to be ruled by European powers. For the case of Tunisia and Egypt, British and French rules caused a discontinuity in the state formation process since each rule destroyed the prior's bureaucracy-building. Although national bureaucracies began to be constructed following the independence of the countries, the regional countries did not have a solid background. In order to ensure the welfare of the regional countries, single actors and regimes came to power and presented as the single solution. Explanation on institutional inheritance underlines that this process of formation led to authoritarianism in the region. This thesis suggests that Tunisia and Egypt share a similar state formation and bureaucratic development process until the independence periods, and the explanation on institutional inheritance of the countries fits the authoritarian nature of the countries. On the other hand, explanations on Islamic history and Arab culture fell short for explaining the authoritarianism in the region. Arguments on Islam and Arab culture suggest that Islam does not coincide with the Western concepts of liberalism, individualism and liberty and Islam is in essence undemocratic since according to Islam, the legitimate rule comes from God. Therefore, the region is prone to the authoritarian rule. However, counter arguments suggest that Islam and Arab culture does not explain the authoritarianism in the region but rather it is the top-down introduction of modernization and the relationship between the regional powerholders and the Western states that results in the authoritarian rule.

The second explanation for the authoritarianism in the region is the argument on the Western democracy promotion. According to the argument, democratic reforms that have been advocated by the Western countries in the Middle East did not help the region but increased the scale of the authoritarianism since the reforms did not pose any actual threat to the authoritarian leaders. Supporters of the Western democracy promotion argue that democratic principles can be applied worldwide, regardless of regional characteristics. However, as not every scholar shares this point of view, some scholars, for example Dalacoura (2010, 64) argue that Western democracy promotion is used as a tool for political and economic domination in the region. In addition, the United States' and European countries' unthreatening but rather friendly relations with autocratic regimes supported the persistence of authoritarianism in the region. Moreover, introduction of the elections in the region as a step for democracy promotion not only gave legitimacy to these regimes, but also the regimes found themselves a way to suppress the opposition. Therefore, it can be concluded that counter arguments on Western democracy promotion fit the overall structure of the authoritarian persistence in the region.

The last two approaches for the explanation of the authoritarianism in the region are the modernization theory and the rentier state theory. The modernization theory suggests that less developed countries can be brought to the same level as more developed countries as long as they follow the same path; therefore, emphasizes the importance of industrial and urban development in preventing authoritarianism. However, as explained in the first chapter of this thesis, the modernization theory falls short to explain economically developed but authoritarian countries, especially the existence of oil-rich countries. At this point, the rentier state theory tries to explain the endurance of authoritarian and rich states. The rentier state theory is both used to explain the authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the region as a part of structure-led explanations. According to the theory, if a state raises its wealth not through taxes or production but with rents, the work-reward relationship between the society and the state brakes since no apparatus for the society to bargain with the state would exist. Therefore, as the state becomes unaccountable and citizens become dependent on the state, it would be easier for the regime to become authoritarian and hinder any possible democratic transition process. As an explanation for both authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the

Middle East, the theory explains the nature of the relationship between the oil-rich states and the society. However, the theory cannot be applied to the whole region as an overall explanation.

Theories for the explanation of the failure of democratization consist of four parts. The first part for these theories consists of structure-led explanations which are international factors and political culture in the region. Scholars that attribute the failure of democratization to international factors argue that it is beneficial for Western states to have an undemocratic Middle East since an undemocratic Middle East gives these states a right to intervene in any case of conflict of interests. In addition, the support for the authoritarian regimes would be beneficial since these regimes can suppress the Islamist opposition. Although this argument might be considered as a cause for the failure of democratization, it cannot be considered an overall explanation for the failure of democratization in the region since it bypasses domestic and regional politics. For this part, political culture becomes an important point. Arguments on the political culture evolve around tribalism and the relationship between Islam and democracy. While the relationship between Islam and democracy have been explained as a reason for the authoritarianism in the region, arguments on tribalism suggest that the leader of a country surrounds himself with a clan or tribe and provides resources to that particular clan or tribe so that he ensures the security of the regime. Accordingly, ruling elites have learnt to use this clan culture for their own advantage. Although it would undermine the importance of explaining democratization, tribalism posits an important point in explaining today's state-tribal relations and security of the regime.

On the other hand, agency-led explanations lay the reasons for the failure of democratization in the region as the position of the ruling elites and distrust between regional actors. As it has been a subject of debate in democratization studies, some scholars such as Cavatorta (2012, 86). argued that the ruling elites of the region had no intention for a democratic transition process in the region; therefore, the process was doomed to fail. While introducing political and economic reforms were about gaining international and domestic legitimacy, these reforms produced no meaningful change. The position of the ruling elite in a transition process is an important factor. However, as it can be seen in the case of Arab Uprisings, newly

introduced liberal reforms can cause unexpected consequences for the ruling elite. In addition to the position of the ruling elites, distrust between regional actors is also an important factor in shaping the process of democratization. Distrust between regional actors were both present in Tunisia and Egypt in the democratization process. However, what differed in these countries was the moderate position of Islamist parties. Therefore, distrust between regional actors can be used as an explanation for the failure of democratization on the condition that paying attention to the motives and behaviours of political actors is necessary.

The third part for the explanations of the failure of democratization in the region is related to the domestic politics of the regional countries, especially inefficiency of political parties, elections and civil society. Arguments suggest that introduction of multiparty elections gave the necessary legitimacy to authoritarian regimes; therefore, hindered the democratization process. As the opposition political parties became a part of multiparty system, the authoritarian regimes gave little opportunity to these parties and civil society to operate. Under these circumstances, the public became depoliticized and disruption of the process of democratization. In addition to the regime-driven ineffectiveness of political parties and civil society, another argument suggests that absence of institutionalism and unpreparedness of political parties and civil society organizations cause the failure of democratization in the region. Arguments on political parties and civil society might fit well for explaining democratization process in Tunisia and Egypt since these two actors were important in shaping post-Arab Uprisings period in the two countries. Cooperation of the political parties and civil society organizations affected the democratization process positively in Tunisia following the Uprisings while in Egypt, conflict between these actors, in addition to the ineffectiveness, became one of the factors that hindered the democratization process.

Robustness of coercive apparatus is argued as both an explanation for the authoritarianism and the failure of democratization in the region. Argued by Bellin in 2004, the analysis suggest that the coercive apparatus' will and capacity to repress or support popular upheavals affect the fall or rebirth of the authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, if the coercive apparatus decides to intervene on the side of the regime, authoritarian rule persists, and democratization process fails. On the other hand, if

the coercive apparatus sides with the public authoritarian rule falls. For the fall of the authoritarian regimes, it was the case for Tunisia and Egypt. The second and the third chapters of the thesis explain the conditions and features that differed in Tunisia and Egypt so that different results have arisen.

The second chapter of the thesis focuses on the pre-Arab Uprisings period of Tunisia and Egypt. First, the similarities and differences between Tunisia and Egypt's socio-political histories prior to the 1980s were presented. The reason for analyzing the similar and different factors in Tunisia and Egypt's histories is that, before the Arab Uprisings, both countries were ruled by autocratic leaders that promised democratic rules and neoliberal reforms. Coming to power of Ben Ali and Mubarak was affected by the socio-political histories of these countries. Therefore, it is essential to understand the historical background of the two countries.

Tunisia and Egypt share several similar factors in their socio-political histories. To begin with, both of the countries were ruled by the Ottoman Empire prior to the European rule. Both countries were able to conduct independent political and commercial relations with other countries. French and British rules in Tunisia and Egypt disrupted the state formation process in both countries. Each European country reconstructed the society and the state structure. On the other hand, although both Tunisian and Egyptian economy developed under the European rule, Tunisian and Egyptian people became poorer. Both countries demanded independence at the beginning of the twentieth century with their nationalist parties Wafd, Destour and Neo-Destour. However, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that both of the countries became fully independent. It should be also noted that, the workers' movements and the unions in both countries supported the nationalist parties' struggle for the independence.

In terms of the differences, although both countries experienced inequality between the peasantry and the land-owning elite, Tunisian peasantry allied itself with the land-owning elite against the nomads and tribes. This alliance created a commonality between the settled population. However, the patron-client relationship in both countries remained as a constant in political and societal relations of both countries. The independence period of Tunisia and Egypt also differed from each other. While Bourguiba's and Nasser's socialisms remained only similar in terms of their names,

the military regime in Egypt gave emphasis on urban and rural standards and carried out agrarian reforms unlike Tunisia. Although both countries began to use authoritarian measures within the first decade of the independence, Tunisia defined itself as a pro-Western and liberal country whereas Nasser defined the regime's ideology as Arab Socialism. After Nasser, Anwar Sadat's policy of *infitah* changed the economic and political policies of Nasser and opened a new way for an era of crony-capitalism and corruption with the exacerbation of patron-client relations. Mubarak's coming to power did not change the prior policies applied by Sadat; although, Mubarak resisted the US-IMF pressure on liberalization of the economy. On the other hand, in the early 1980s, Tunisia experienced a smoother transition period to neoliberalist policies compared to Egypt due to the power of the UGTT and familial-business networks' influence on the direct state control on the economy.

The second chapter also underlined the similar and different factors in political economy, class structure and civil society in Tunisia and Egypt after the 1980s until the Arab Uprisings. This period coincides with the Ben Ali's and Mubarak's rule in Tunisia and Egypt. In terms of the political economy, Tunisia and Egypt went through similar transition processes. Both countries adopted structural reforms under the Washington Consensus in the Ben Ali and Mubarak periods. Similar in both of the countries, the regime neglected the middle class and prioritized the lower classes. However, the lower classes were also affected by the downsides of the economic reforms while the gap between the rich and the poor widened throughout the years. What differed in both countries was that while Egypt partially implemented the reforms of the Consensus, Tunisia fully adopted the reforms. While this full implementation squeezed the middle class, it helped the middle class to integrate with the working-class movement. Therefore, Tunisia's transition process was not a rapid but a resisted one. Since the beginning of Ben Ali and Mubarak's rules, authoritarian measures, corruption and cliental relations increased. The implementation of the structural adjustment programmes was faced with resistance in both countries, which in return, brought political repression. The difference between Tunisia and Egypt was the civil society. Although Tunisian civil society exposed to harsher repression in the last decade of Ben Ali's rule, the civil culture of Tunisia allowed the civil society organizations to challenge the regime compared to Egypt.

The third and the fourth parts of the second chapter focused on civil-military relations and the political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt until the Arab Uprisings. The third part laid down the differences between the civil-military relations of both countries. Although both countries had highly professionalized and institutionalized armed forces, their motives differed prior to the Arab Uprisings. Tunisian armed forces had been clearly distinct from the regime in power mostly due to the Bourguiba's policies to separate the military from the politics. However, the relationship between the Egyptian military and the regime differed from Tunisia. The military was not linked to the regime through bloodline or ethnicity but linked through the crony capitalist links. While the economy of the Egyptian military was directly supported by the regime, the military enjoyed its patronage over an economic empire. Therefore, Egyptian military's privileged position affected the decision-making process during the uprisings. Both Tunisian and Egyptian armed forces sided with the public in the Arab Uprisings. However, Egyptian armed forces' motive to side with the public was due to the armed forces' economic autonomy from the regime. As the armed forces conflicted with the regime over their economic interests and became economically autonomous from the regime, in addition to the strong links between the armed forces and the society, the armed forces decided to side with the regime. The uprisings gave Egyptian armed forces an opportunity to restore its central position within the country. Therefore, following the uprisings, the Egyptian military reassumed its role as an agent that restores the continuity in the country whereas the Tunisian military backed a democratic transition process in the country.

The fourth part and the final part of the second chapter examined the position of Islamist movements and the conflict between the secularist and Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt. Actors of political Islam affected the post-Arab Uprisings period in both countries. In terms of their position, these actors differ in Tunisia and Egypt. While both actors shared a similar political path since their foundation, their position differed. In the case of Ennahda, the movement showed a moderate position in the case of its relationship with the secular opposition. From the beginning of the 2000s, Ennahda participated in the opposition coalition and shared a common vision for the future of Tunisia. Both sides' cooperation with each other was one of the important factors that made a democratic transition process possible following the uprisings.

On the other hand, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood's continuous Islamization agenda, as well as its domination over the political opposition posited a different path for Egypt's future after 2011. Therefore, the position of Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood was presented as one of the factors that differed and affected the post-Arab Uprisings period in Tunisia and Egypt.

The last chapter of this thesis focused on the post-Arab Uprisings period of Tunisia and Egypt. The first part of the last chapter explained the factors that led the Arab Uprisings. Accordingly, it has been concluded that the commonalities that led to the Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were several. The ground causes for the Uprisings were explained as economic crisis, political legitimacy and corruption. Of course there are multiple other reasons for the occurrence of the Uprisings. However, these reasons are beyond the scope of this thesis. The latter parts of the last chapter consist of Tunisia and Egypt's governance, political parties, elections, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, political economies and civil-military relations. These parts were explained in order to show the differences in both countries' trajectories.

In terms of the electoral process, governance, political parties, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, Tunisia posits a positive example for the democratic transition between the years of 2011 and 2014. The secularization of the public, Ennahda's moderate position in the government, efforts for a functioning governmental system and the non-interference of the military helped Tunisia to went through a democratic transition process following the Uprisings compared to Egypt. However, after 2014, following almost a decade of political instability and economic crisis, in 2021, President Kais Saied suspended the parliament and dismissed the prime minister following a series of protests. In Egypt, on the other hand, constant interference of the military to the politics, the Muslim Brotherhood's conflict with the SCAF and the secular opposition hindered the democratic transition process from the very beginning.

Political economies of the two countries shares similar difficulties prior to the Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. In this period of time, Egypt's problems were mostly due to the conflicts between political actors. Therefore, Tunisia's economic development in the first three years following the Uprisings differed from Egypt, which helped to country to stay in the course of a democratic transition process.

Although Tunisia continued to be dedicated to stay in the course of neoliberalism, by 2022, Tunisia's elected leaders have failed to achieve economic success since they could not bring any innovative solutions to Tunisia's economic problems over a decade and Tunisian economy worsened. On the other hand, in terms of the civil society contribution during and after the Arab Uprisings, Tunisia and Egypt differed from each other. Tunisia's tradition of civil society participation, especially the role of the UGTT helped the country following the Uprisings. As of 2022, on the other hand, the UGTT's conflict with the President Saied due to 2021 political crisis makes the role of the UGTT as the mediator ambiguous.

The last chapter of the thesis focused on the civil-military relations in Tunisia and Egypt following the Uprisings. Tunisian and Egyptian military forces were both professionalized and institutionalized entities. What differs in the two military forces is the relationship between the regime and the army in the two countries. For the most of its history, Tunisian military was intentionally marginalized from the politics and the regime. On the other hand, the Egyptian military constantly took an active part in politics and retained a close relationship with the regime according to its interests. In terms of the scope of personnel and resources, Egyptian army also differs from Tunisian army. On the constitutional level, Tunisian army respected the rule of the civil governance while Egyptian army constantly tried to secure its position in the politics in accordance with its economic interests. However, following the actions taken by the military in the 2021 political crisis and the increasing use of the military courts in the country, Tunisian military's position in the country creates a dispute.

This thesis concludes that Tunisia and Egypt share similar factors in their socio-political history and the state building processes. The factors that led to the Arab Uprisings in both countries also shares commonalities. However, in terms of the election processes following the Uprisings, the importance of the civil society, the civil-military relations and the economic policies there are differences. After the Uprisings, Tunisia faced with a civilian coup d'état in 2021 while Egypt experienced a military coup in 2013 through two different trajectories after 2011. The thesis does not focus on the several other factors that might affect the different trajectories for Tunisia and Egypt. For example, constitutional processes and presidential elections,

the role of the elite, the youth movements and the effect of the labor movement in the Arab Uprisings were not examined in a detailed matter. However, the thesis presents an overall picture for the similar and different factors in the two countries and lays down the ground reasons for the divergence between Tunisia and Egypt. To conclude, this thesis presents a comparative analysis between two countries in terms of the democratic transition processes and authoritarianisms. In the light of this research, detailed research concerning the democratic transition processes in the Middle East and a comparative analysis between other countries in the region can be conducted. The thesis also reveals the importance of the civil society, the civil-military relations and the political economies of the countries in a democratic transition process. Therefore, the thesis offers to propose a roadmap for future research on the subject.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

2010 yılının son ayında Muhammed Buazizi'nin kendini yakması Tunus'ta bir protesto dalgasını ateşledi. Halkın protestolarının ardından Tunus Devlet Başkanı Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali görevden alınırken bir ay sonra Mısır Devlet Başkanı Hüsnü Mübarek görevden alınmıştır. Daha sonra literatürde “Arap Ayaklanması” veya “Arap Baharı” olarak adlandırılan bu protestolar tüm bölgeyi sarmıştır. Şubat 2011'in sonunda ise Arap dünyasındaki hemen hemen her ülke, temel siyasi değişim talep eden gösterilerle kuşatılmıştı. Tunus ve Mısır'ın ardından Libya, Cezayir, Fas, Sudan, Lübnan, Suriye, Irak, Ürdün, Kuveyt, Bahreyn, Suudi Arabistan, Umman ve Yemen'de protestolar düzenlendi. Tunus, Mısır, Libya ve Yemen liderliğinin değiştiği ülkeler oldu. 2011'den bu yana birçok çalışma, Arap Ayaklanmalarının nedenlerine odaklandı. 2011 yılının başında Arap Ayaklanmaları, Orta Doğu'da otoriter rejimlerin yıkılmasına ve demokratikleşme sürecine yol açacak, siyasi değişim talep eden toplu bir halk eylemi olarak algılanmaktaydı. Tunus, Libya ve Mısır'da otoriter rejimler Arap Ayaklanmaları ile birlikte düştü. Ayaklanmalar sonrasında sadece Tunus'un demokratikleşme sürecine girdiği gözlemlendi. Ancak 2021'de Tunus parlamentosu askıya alındı ve hükümet Cumhurbaşkanı Kais Saied tarafından feshedildi.

Tunus ve Mısır, Ayaklanmalar öncesi dönemde sosyo-politik tarihlerinde, devlet inşa süreçlerinde, toplumlarında ve çevrelerinde benzer faktörleri paylaşmaktaydı. Bu nedenle Bin Ali ve Mübarek rejimlerinin devrilmesinden sonra Tunus ve Mısır'ın da aynı yolu izlemesi bekleniyordu. Bu tez Tunus ve Mısır'daki benzer ve farklı faktörlere ve bu faktörlerin farklı yörüngeleri nasıl etkilediğine odaklanmıştır. Bu çalışma için, tezde ilk olarak literatürdeki otoriterlik ve demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığına ilişkin açıklamaları kavramsallaştırıldı ve bu teorilerin bölgedeki kalıcı otoriterliği ve Tunus ile Mısır'ın demokratikleşme süreçlerindeki farklılıkları açıklamak için neden uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını nedenlerinin altı çizilmiştir.

Ortadoğu'daki otoriterliğin ilk açıklaması, bölge ülkelerinin kurumsal mirasıdır. Kurumsal miras üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, bölgede devlet oluşumunu kesintiye uğramış bir süreç olarak açıklamaktadır. Avrupa hakimiyetinden önce bölge ülkeleri Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından yönetiliyordu. Buna göre Osmanlı Devleti, bir padişah yönetimi altında güçlü bir bürokratik yapıya sahipken, 18. yüzyıla gelindiğinde imparatorluğun çeşitli ekonomik ve siyasi nedenlerle zayıflamasının yanı sıra Osmanlı Devleti'nde devlet oluşumunu sekteye uğratan yetersiz modernleşme sürecine girilmiştir. Bürokratik gelişme süreci tamamlanmadan bölge ülkeleri Avrupalı güçler tarafından yönetilmeye başlandı. Tunus ve Mısır örneğinde, İngiliz ve Fransız yönetimleri, her yönetim bir öncekinin bürokrasi inşasını yıktığı için devlet oluşum sürecinde bir süreksizliğe neden oldu. Ülkelerin bağımsızlığını kazanmasından sonra ulusal bürokrasiler inşa edilmeye başlansa da bölge ülkeleri sağlam bir altyapıya sahip değildi. Bölge ülkelerinin refahını sağlamak için bireysel aktörler ve rejimler iktidara geldi ve tek çözüm olarak sunuldu. Kurumsal mirasa ilişkin açıklama, bu oluşum sürecinin bölgede otoriterleşmeye yol açtığının altını çizmektedir. Bu tez, Tunus ve Mısır'ın bağımsızlık dönemlerine kadar benzer bir devlet oluşumu ve bürokratik gelişim sürecini paylaştığını ve ülkelerin kurumsal mirasına ilişkin açıklamanın ülkelerin otoriter doğasına uyduğunu göstermektedir. Öte yandan İslami tarih ve Arap kültürü ile ilgili açıklamalar bölgedeki otoriterliği açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Örnek vermek gerekirse, İslam ve Arap kültürü üzerine tartışmalar, İslam'ın Batılı liberalizm, bireycilik ve özgürlük kavramlarıyla örtüşmediğini ve İslam'a göre meşru yönetimin Tanrı'dan geldiği için İslam'ın özünde demokratik olmadığını öne sürmektedir ve bu nedenle bölge otoriter yönetime eğilimlidir. Bununla birlikte, karşı argümanlar, İslam dininin ve Arap kültürünün bölgedeki otoriterliği açıklamadığını öne sürmektedir.

Bölgedeki otoriterliğin ikinci açıklaması, Batı demokrasisinin teşviki argümanıdır. Batı demokrasisinin teşviki argümanına göre, Orta Doğu'da Batılı ülkeler tarafından savunulan demokratik reformlar, otoriter liderler için gerçek bir tehdit oluşturmadığı için bölgeye fayda sağlamamış, aksine otoriterliğin ölçeğini artırmıştır. Batı demokrasisini destekleyenler, bölgesel özelliklerden bağımsız olarak demokratik ilkelerin dünya çapında uygulanabileceğini savunmaktadırlar. Ancak, her akademisyen bu görüşü paylaşmadığı gibi Batı demokrasisinin teşvik edilmesinin

bölgede siyasi ve ekonomik hakimiyet için bir araç olarak kullanıldığını iddia etmektedir. Ayrıca ABD ve Avrupa ülkelerinin otokratik rejimlerle tehditkar olmayan ancak oldukça dostane ilişkileri, bölgede otoriterliğin devam etmesini desteklemiştir. Ayrıca bölgede demokrasinin gelişmesi için bir adım olarak seçimlerin başlatılması bu rejimlere meşruiyet kazandırdığı gibi, rejimler de kendilerine muhalefeti bastırmanın bir yolunu bulmuştur. Dolayısıyla, Batı demokrasisinin teşvikine yönelik karşı argümanların, bölgedeki otoriterliğin genel yapısına uyduğu sonucuna varılabilir.

Bölgedeki otoriter rejimi açıklamaya yönelik son iki yaklaşım, modernleşme teorisi ve rantçı devlet teorisidir. Modernleşme teorisi, az gelişmiş ülkelerin aynı yolu izlemeleri halinde daha gelişmiş ülkelerle aynı düzeye getirilebileceğini öne sürer; bu nedenle otoriterleşmenin önlenmesinde endüstriyel ve kentsel gelişimin önemini vurgulamaktadır. Ancak, bu tezin birinci bölümünde de açıklandığı gibi, modernleşme teorisi ekonomik olarak gelişmiş ancak otoriter ülkeleri, özellikle de petrol zengini ülkelerin varlığını açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu noktada rantçı devlet teorisi, otoriter ve zengin devletlerin dayanıklılığını açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Rantçı devlet teorisi, yapı odaklı açıklamaların bir parçası olarak hem otoriterliği hem de bölgedeki demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığını açıklamak için kullanılır. Teoriye göre, eğer bir devlet zenginliğini vergiler veya üretim yoluyla değil, kiralara artırırsa, toplumun devletle pazarlık yapabileceği bir aygıt olmayacağından toplum ile devlet arasındaki çalışma-ödül ilişkisi durur. Bu nedenle, devlet sorumsuzlaştıkça ve vatandaşlar devlete bağımlı hale geldikçe, rejimin otoriterleşmesi kolaylaşacak ve olası herhangi bir demokratik geçiş sürecini engelleyebilecektir. Orta Doğu'da hem otoriterliğin hem de demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığının bir açıklaması olarak teori, petrol zengini devletler ile toplum arasındaki ilişkinin doğasını açıklamaktadır ancak teori, genel bir açıklama olarak tüm bölgeye uygulanamamaktadır.

Demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığını açıklamaya yönelik teoriler dört bölümden oluşmaktadır. Bu teorilerin ilk bölümü, uluslararası faktörler ve bölgedeki siyasi kültür olan yapı odaklı açıklamalardan oluşmaktadır. Demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığını uluslararası faktörlere bağlayan akademisyenler, Batılı devletlerin demokratik olmayan bir Orta Doğu'ya sahip olmasının faydalı olduğunu, çünkü

demokratik olmayan bir Orta Doğu'nun bu devletlere herhangi bir çıkar çatışması durumunda müdahale etme hakkı verdiğini savunuyorlar. Ayrıca otoriter rejimlerin desteklenmesi, İslamcı muhalefeti bastırabilecekleri için faydalı olacaktır. Bu argüman demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığının bir nedeni olarak görülebilse de, iç ve bölgesel siyaseti baypas ettiği için bölgedeki demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığının genel bir açıklaması olarak kabul edilemez. Bu kısım için siyasi kültür önemli bir nokta haline gelmektedir. Siyasal kültüre ilişkin tartışmalar, kabilecilik ve İslam ile demokrasi arasındaki ilişki etrafında gelişmektedir. Bölgedeki otoriterleşmenin nedeni olarak İslam ve demokrasi arasındaki ilişki açıklanırken, aşiretçilik konusundaki tartışmalar, bir ülkenin liderinin kendisini bir aşiret veya aşiretle kuşattığını ve o aşiret veya aşiretlere kaynak ve güvenlik sağlayarak geçimini sağladığını önermektedir. Buna göre, yönetici seçkinler bu klan kültürünü kendi çıkarları için kullanmayı öğrenmişlerdir. Aşiretçilik, demokratikleşmeyi açıklamanın önemini tam olarak vurgulayamayacak olsa da günümüz devlet-aşiret ilişkilerini ve rejimin güvenliğini açıklamada önemli bir nokta teşkil etmektedir.

Öte yandan, vasıta öncülüğündeki açıklamalar, bölgede demokratikleşmenin başarısız olmasının nedenlerini, yönetici elitlerin konumu ve bölgesel aktörler arasındaki güvensizlik olarak göstermektedir. Demokratikleşme çalışmalarında tartışma konusu olduğu için bazı akademisyenler, bölgenin yönetici elitlerinin bölgede demokratik bir geçiş sürecine yönelik bir niyetleri olmadığını savunmuş; bu nedenle sürecin başarısızlığa mahkum olduğunun altını çizmiştir. Siyasi ve ekonomik reformlar uluslararası ve yerel meşruiyet kazanmakla ilgiliyken, bu reformlar anlamlı bir değişiklik yaratmamıştır. Yönetici seçkinlerin geçiş sürecindeki konumu önemli bir faktördür ancak, Arap Ayaklanmaları örneğinde de görülebileceği gibi, yeni uygulamaya konulan liberal reformlar, yönetici seçkinler için beklenmedik sonuçlara yol açabilmektedir. Yönetici seçkinlerin konumuna ek olarak, bölgesel aktörler arasındaki güvensizlik de demokratikleşme sürecini şekillendirmede önemli bir faktördür. Bölgesel aktörler arasındaki güvensizlik, demokratikleşme sürecinde hem Tunus'ta hem de Mısır'da mevcuttu. Ancak bu ülkelerde farklı olan, İslamcı partilerin ılımlı konumuydu. Bu nedenle, bölgesel aktörler arasındaki güvensizlik, siyasi aktörlerin güdü ve davranışlarına dikkat edilmesi şartıyla, demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığının bir açıklaması olarak kullanılabilir.

Bölgedeki demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığına ilişkin açıklamaların yer aldığı üçüncü bölüm, bölge ülkelerinin iç siyaseti, özellikle siyasi partilerin, seçimlerin ve sivil toplumun verimsizliği ile ilgilidir. İlgili Argümanlar, çok partili seçimlerin getirilmesinin otoriter rejimlere gerekli meşruiyeti verdiğini öne sürmekte; bu nedenle demokratikleşme sürecini engellediğini belirtmektedir. Muhalif siyasi partilerin çok partili sisteme geçmesiyle birlikte otoriter rejimler bu partilere ve sivil topluma çok az faaliyet olanağı tanımıştır. Bu koşullar altında halk depolitize olmuş ve demokratikleşme süreci sekteye uğramıştır. Siyasi partilerin ve sivil toplumun rejim kaynaklı etkisizliğine ek olarak, bir başka argüman da siyasi partilerin ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının kurumsallaşmaması ve hazırlıksızlığının bölgede demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığına neden olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Siyasi partiler ve sivil toplum tartışmaları, Tunus ve Mısır'daki demokratikleşme sürecini açıklamak için uygun olabilir çünkü bu iki aktör, iki ülkedeki Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrası dönemin şekillenmesinde önemlidir. Tunus'ta siyasi partiler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının iş birliği demokratikleşme sürecini olumlu etkilerken, Mısır'da bu aktörler arasındaki etkisizliğin yanı sıra çatışmalar da demokratikleşme sürecini engelleyen unsurlardan biri olmuştur.

Baskı aygıtının kuvveti, bölgedeki hem otoriterliğin hem de demokratikleşmenin başarısızlığının bir açıklaması olarak tartışılmaktadır. Analiz, baskı aygıtının halk ayaklanmalarını bastırma veya destekleme iradesi ve kapasitesinin otoriter rejimlerin düşüşünü veya yeniden doğuşunu etkilediğini öne sürmektedir. Buna göre, baskı aygıtı rejim tarafında müdahale etmeye karar verirse, otoriter yönetim devam eder ve demokratikleşme süreci başarısız olur. Öte yandan, baskı aygıtı halkın yanında yer alırsa, otoriter yönetim düşer. Otoriter rejimlerin devrilmesi Tunus ve Mısır için geçerli olarak görülebilir. Ancak demokratik geçiş süreci için Tunus ve Mısır farklı yollardan geçmiştir. Tezin ikinci ve üçüncü bölümleri, Tunus ve Mısır'da farklı sonuçların ortaya çıkmasına neden olacak şekilde farklılık gösteren koşulları ve özellikleri açıklamaktadır.

Tezin ikinci bölümü Arap Ayaklanmaları öncesi Tunus ve Mısır dönemine odaklanmaktadır. İlk olarak, Tunus ve Mısır'ın 1980ler öncesi sosyo-politik tarihleri

arasındaki benzerlikler ve farklılıklar sunulmuştur. Tunus ve Mısır tarihlerindeki benzer ve farklı unsurların incelenmesinin önemli bir nedeni, Arap Ayaklanmaları öncesinde her iki ülkenin de demokratik kurallar ve neoliberal reformlar vaat eden otokratik liderler tarafından yönetilmiş olmasıdır. Bin Ali ve Mübarek'in iktidara gelmesi, bu ülkelerin sosyo-politik tarihlerinden etkilenmiştir. Bu nedenle, iki ülkenin tarihsel arka planını anlamak önemlidir.

Tunus ve Mısır, sosyo-politik geçmişlerinde birçok benzer faktörü paylaşmaktadır. Başlangıç olarak, her iki ülke de Avrupa yönetiminden önce Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından yönetiliyordu. Her iki ülke de diğer ülkelerle bağımsız siyasi ve ticari ilişkiler yürütebildi ve her iki ülke de İmparatorluğa ekonomik avantajlar getirdi. Bunun yanında her iki ülkede de mali sistem, sadece Tunus'un sahip olduğu tımar sistemi dışında aynı vergilendirme sistemlerine dayanıyordu. Ayrıca ordu, Tunus ve Mısır'ın devlet kurma sürecinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Fransız ve İngiliz yönetiminden önce her iki ülkenin de orduları vardı ve düzenli ordular kurulduktan sonra nüfus ve hanedanlar arasındaki ilişki, devlet ve tebaası arasındaki ilişkiye dönüştü. Tunus ve Mısır'daki Fransız ve İngiliz hakimiyeti her iki ülkede de devlet oluşum sürecini sekteye uğrattı. Her Avrupa ülkesi toplumu ve devlet yapısını yeniden inşa etti. Öte yandan, Avrupa egemenliği altında hem Tunus hem de Mısır ekonomisi gelişmesine rağmen, Tunus ve Mısır halkı daha da fakirleşti. Her iki ülke de 20. yüzyılın başında milliyetçi partileri Vefd, Düstur ve Yeni-Düstur ile bağımsızlık talep ettiler. Ancak, yirminci yüzyılın ortalarına kadar her iki ülkenin de tamamen bağımsız hale gelmesi mümkün değildi. Bu noktada her iki ülkedeki işçi hareketleri ve sendikaların da milliyetçi partilerin bağımsızlık mücadelesine destek verdiğini belirtmek gerekmektedir.

Farklılıklar açısından bakıldığında, Osmanlı Devleti'nin egemenliği altında, beylik sistemi Tunus'ta siyasi ve sosyal yapıyı şekillendirmiştir. Beylik sistemi altında mahalleler, kitlelerin kalıcı hareketliliğine izin verdi ve monarşik bir yapı haline geldi. Bu mahalle sistemi olası marjinal aktörleri içine aldı ve ülkede birlik yarattı. Bu nedenle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminde Tunus'un devlet oluşumu bölgeden farklılık göstermiştir. Tunus ile Mısır arasındaki bir başka fark da her iki ülkede de köylülük ile toprak sahibi seçkinler arasında eşitsizlik yaşamalarına rağmen, Tunus

köylülerinin göçebelere ve aşiretlere karşı toprak sahibi seçkinlerle ittifak kurmasıydı. Bu ittifak, yerleşik nüfus arasında bir ortaklık yarattı. Ancak her iki ülkedeki hami-müvekkil ilişkisi, her iki ülkenin siyasi ve toplumsal ilişkilerinde sabit olarak kalmıştır. Tunus ve Mısır'ın bağımsızlık dönemi de birbirinden farklıydı. Burgiba ve Nasır sosyalizmleri sadece isim olarak benzer kalırken, Mısır'daki askeri rejim Tunus'tan farklı olarak kentsel ve kırsal standartlara önem vermiş ve tarım reformları gerçekleştirmiştir. Bağımsızlığın ilk on yılında her iki ülke de otoriter önlemler almaya başlasa da Tunus kendisini Batı yanlısı ve liberal bir ülke olarak tanımlarken, Nasır rejimin ideolojisini Arap Sosyalizmi olarak tanımladı. Nasır'dan sonra Enver Sedat'ın infitah politikası, Nasır'ın ekonomik ve siyasi politikalarını değiştirmiş ve patron-müvekkil ilişkilerinin şiddetlenmesiyle ahabap-çavuş kapitalizmi ve yolsuzluk çağına yeni bir yol açmıştır. Mübarek'in iktidara gelmesi, Sedat'ın daha önce uyguladığı politikaları değiştirmede; buna rağmen Mübarek, ABD-IMF'nin ekonominin serbestleştirilmesi yönündeki baskısına direndi. Öte yandan, 1980'lerin başında Tunus, UGTT'nin gücü ve aile-işletme ağlarının ekonomi ve devlet kontrolü üzerindeki etkisi nedeniyle Mısır'a kıyasla neoliberalist politikalara daha yumuşak bir geçiş süreci yaşadı.

İkinci bölümde ayrıca 1980lerden Arap Ayaklanmalarına kadar Tunus ve Mısır'da ekonomi politiğin, sınıfsal yapının ve sivil toplumun benzer ve farklı faktörlerinin altı çizilmiştir. Bu dönem, Bin Ali ve Mübarek'in Tunus ve Mısır'daki iktidarlarına denk gelmektedir. Politik ekonomi açısından Tunus ve Mısır benzer geçiş süreçlerinden geçmiştir. Her iki ülke de Bin Ali ve Mübarek dönemlerinde Washington Mutabakatı kapsamında yapısal reformları benimsemiştir. Her iki ülkede de benzer şekilde rejim orta sınıfı ihmal etmiş ve alt sınıflara öncelik vermiştir. Bununla birlikte, ekonomik reformların olumsuz yönlerinden alt sınıflar da etkilenirken, zengin ve fakir arasındaki uçurum yıllar içinde genişlemiştir. Her iki ülkede de farklılık, Mısır, Mutabakat reformlarını kısmen uygularken, Tunus'un reformları tamamen benimsemesiydi. Bu tam uygulama orta sınıfı sıkıştırırken, orta sınıfın işçi sınıfı hareketiyle bütünleşmesine yardımcı olmuştur. Dolayısıyla Tunus'un geçiş süreci hızlı değil, dirençli bir geçiş süreci oldu. Bin Ali ve Mübarek'in kurallarının başlangıcından bu yana otoriter önlemler, yolsuzluk ve yandaş ilişkileri artmıştır. Yapısal uyum programlarının uygulanması her iki ülkede

de direnişle karşı karşıya kalmış, bu da siyasi baskıyı beraberinde getirmiştir. Tunus ve Mısır arasındaki fark sivil toplumdur. Tunus sivil toplumu Bin Ali iktidarının son on yılında daha sert baskılara maruz kalsa da Mısır'a kıyasla Tunus'un sivil kültürü sivil toplum örgütlerinin rejime meydan okumasına izin vermiştir.

İkinci bölümün diğer kısımları, Arap Ayaklanmalarına kadar Tunus ve Mısır'daki sivil-asker ilişkileri ve siyasal İslam'a odaklanmıştır. Her iki ülke de son derece profesyonelleşmiş ve kurumsallaşmış silahlı kuvvetlere sahip olsa da amaçları Arap Ayaklanmaları öncesinde farklıdır. Tunus silahlı kuvvetleri, çoğunlukla Burgiba'nın orduyu siyasetten ayırma politikaları nedeniyle iktidardaki rejimden açıkça ayrı olarak konumlanmaktaydı. Ancak Mısır ordusu ile rejim arasındaki ilişki Tunus'tan farklıydı. Ordu, rejime kan bağı veya etnik köken üzerinden değil, ahabap-çavuş kapitalist bağları üzerinden bağlanmıştı. Mısır ordusunun ekonomisi doğrudan rejim tarafından desteklenirken, ordu ekonomik bir imparatorluğun himayesinden yararlanıyordu. Bu nedenle Mısır ordusunun ayrıcalıklı konumu, ayaklanmalar sırasında karar alma sürecini etkiledi. Arap Ayaklanmalarında hem Tunus hem de Mısır silahlı kuvvetleri halkın yanında yer aldı. Ancak Mısır silahlı kuvvetlerinin halkın yanında yer almasının nedeni, silahlı kuvvetlerin rejimden ekonomik olarak bağımsız olmasıydı. Silahlı kuvvetler, rejimle ekonomik çıkarları üzerinden çatıştığından ve ekonomik olarak rejimden özerk hale geldiğinden, silahlı kuvvetler ve toplum arasındaki güçlü bağlara ek olarak, silahlı kuvvetler rejimin yanında yer alma kararı aldı. Ayaklanmalar, Mısır silahlı kuvvetlerine ülke içindeki merkezi konumunu yeniden kurma fırsatı verdi. Bu nedenle, ayaklanmaların ardından Mısır ordusu ülkedeki devamlılığını yeniden sağlayan ajan rolünü üstlenirken, Tunus ordusu ülkede demokratik bir geçiş sürecini destekledi.

İkinci bölümün son kısmı, İslamcı hareketlerin konumunu ve Tunus ve Mısır'daki seküler ve İslamcı partiler arasındaki çatışmayı incelemiştir. Siyasal İslam'ın aktörleri, Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrası dönemi her iki ülkede de etkilemiştir. Bu aktörler konumları itibariyle Tunus ve Mısır'da farklılık göstermektedir. Her iki aktör de kuruluşundan bu yana benzer bir siyasi yolu paylaşırken, konumları farklıdır. Nahda örneğinde hareket, seküler muhalefetle olan ilişkisinde ılımlı bir konum gösterdi. 2000li yılların başından itibaren Nahda Hareketi, muhalefet koalisyonunda yer aldı ve Tunus'un geleceği için ortak bir vizyonu paylaştı. Ayaklanmaların

ardından demokratik bir geiş sürecini mmkn kılan nemli etkenlerden biri de her iki tarafın birbiriyle iřbirlięi yapmasıydı. te yandan, Mısır'ın Mslman Kardeřler'in srekli İslamlařtırma gndemi ve siyasi muhalefet zerindeki hakimiyeti, Mısır'ın 2011 sonrası geleceęi iin farklı bir rota iziyordu. Tunus ve Mısır'daki Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrası dnemi etkiledi.

Bu tezin son blm Tunus ve Mısır'ın Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrası dnemine odaklanmıřtır. Son blmn ilk kısmı Arap Ayaklanmalarına yol aan faktrleri aıklamıřtır. Buna gre, Tunus ve Mısır'daki Ayaklanmalara yol aan ortak noktaların birka olduęu sonucuna varılmıřtır. Ayaklanmaların temel nedenleri ekonomik kriz, siyasi meřruiyet ve yolsuzluk olarak aıklanmıřtır. Tabii ki, Ayaklanmaların ortaya ıkmasının birok bařka nedeni bulunmaktadır. Ancak bu nedenler bu tezin kapsamı dıřındadır. Son blmn dięer blmleri, Tunus ve Mısır'ın ynetimi, siyasi partiler, seimler, Nahda Hareketi ve Mslman Kardeřler, siyasi ekonomi ve sivil-asker iliřkilerinden oluřmaktadır. Bu kısımlar, iki lkedeki farklı faktrlerin Tunus ve Mısır iin nasıl farklı yrngelere yol atıęını gstermek iin aıklanmıřtır.

Tunus; seim sreci, ynetim, siyasi partiler, Nahda ve Mslman Kardeřler aısından 2011-2014 yılları arasındaki demokratik geiş iin olumlu bir rnek teřkil etmektedir. İřleyen bir hkmet sistemi ve ordunun mdahale etmemesi, Mısır'a kıyasla Tunus'un Ayaklanmaların ardından demokratik bir geiş sürecinden gemesine yardımcı olmuřtur. Ancak 2014'ten sonra, neredeyse on yıllık siyasi istikrarsızlık ve ekonomik krizin ardından, 2021'de Cumhurbaşkanı Kais Saied, bir dizi protestonun ardından parlamentoyu askıya aldı ve bařbakanı grevden aldı. Mısır'da ise ordunun srekli siyasete mdahalesi, Mslman Kardeřler'in Mısır Silahlı Kuvvetleri Yksek Konseyi ve muhalefet ile atıřması demokratik geiş sürecini engellemiřtir.

İki lkenin politik ekonomisi, Tunus ve Mısır'daki Ayaklanmalar ncesinde benzer zorlukları paylařmaktadır. Ancak, Ayaklanmalar sonrasında Tunus'un ekonomik ve siyasi liberalleřme yolunda kalma kararlılıęı blge lkelerinden farklıydı. Bu dnemde Mısır'ın sorunları daha ok siyasi aktrler arasındaki atıřmalardan

kaynaklanmıştır. Bu nedenle, Tunus'un Ayaklanmaları takip eden ilk üç yıldaki ekonomik gelişimi Mısır'dan farklıydı ve bu, ülkenin demokratik bir geçiş sürecinde kalmasına yardımcı olmuştur. Tunus, neoliberalizmin seyrinde kalmaya kararlı olmaya devam etse de, 2022 yılına kadar Tunus'un seçilmiş liderleri, on yıl boyunca Tunus'un ekonomik sorunlarına yenilikçi çözümler getiremedikleri ve Tunus ekonomisi kötüleştiği için ekonomik başarı elde edememişlerdir. Öte yandan, Arap Ayaklanmaları sırasında ve sonrasında sivil toplum katkısı açısından Tunus ve Mısır birbirinden farklılık göstermiştir. Tunus'un sivil toplum katılımı geleneği, özellikle UGTT'nin rolü, Ayaklanmaların ardından ülkeye yardımcı olmuştur. 2022 itibariyle ise UGTT'nin 2021 siyasi krizi nedeniyle Cumhurbaşkanı Saied ile çatışması, UGTT'nin arabulucu rolünü belirsiz kılmaktadır.

Tezin son bölümünün son kısmında ise Tunus ve Mısır'da Ayaklanmalar sonrasında yaşanan sivil-asker ilişkileri üzerinde durulmuştur. Tunus ve Mısır askeri güçleri hem profesyonelleşmiş hem de kurumsallaşmış birimlerdi. İki askeri gücü birbirinden ayıran şey, iki ülkedeki rejim ve ordu arasındaki ilişkidir. Tunus ordusu, tarihinin büyük bir bölümünde kasıtlı olarak siyasetten ve rejimden dışlandı. Öte yandan Mısır ordusu siyasette sürekli aktif rol aldı ve çıkarları doğrultusunda rejimle yakın ilişkiler sürdürdü. Personel ve kaynak kapsamı açısından Mısır ordusu da Tunus ordusundan farklıdır. Anayasal düzeyde Tunus ordusu sivil yönetimin üstünlüğüne saygı gösterirken, Mısır ordusu sürekli olarak ekonomik çıkarları doğrultusunda siyasetteki yerini korumaya çalıştı. Ancak 2021 siyasi krizinde ordunun göstermiş olduğu eylemler ve ülkede askeri mahkemelerin artan kullanımı sonrasında Tunus ordusunun ülkedeki konumu tartışma yaratmaktadır.

Bu tez, Tunus ve Mısır'ın sosyo-politik tarihlerinde ve devlet inşa süreçlerinde benzer faktörleri paylaştığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Her iki ülkede de Arap Ayaklanmalarına yol açan faktörlerin ortak noktaları bulunmaktadır. Ancak, Ayaklanmalar sonrasındaki seçim süreçleri, sivil toplumun önemi, sivil-asker ilişkileri ve ekonomi politikaları açısından farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Ayaklanmaların ardından iki ülke iki farklı süreç içerisinden geçerek 2021'de Tunus sivil bir darbe ile karşı karşıya kalırken, Mısır 2011'den sonra askeri bir darbeye maruz kaldı. Tez, Tunus ve Mısır için farklı yörüngeleri etkileyebilecek diğer bazı

faktörlere odaklanmamaktadır. Örneğin Arap Ayaklanmalarında anayasal süreçler ve cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri, seçkinlerin rolü, gençlik hareketleri ve işçi hareketinin etkisi detaylı bir şekilde incelenmemiştir. Ancak tez, iki ülkedeki benzer ve farklı faktörlerin genel bir resmini sunmakta ve Tunus ile Mısır arasındaki ayrışmanın temel nedenlerini ortaya koymaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez iki ülke arasında demokratik geçiş süreçleri ve otoriter rejimler açısından karşılaştırmalı bir analiz sunmaktadır. Bu araştırma ışığında Orta Doğu'daki demokratik geçiş süreçlerine ilişkin detaylı araştırmalar ve bölge ülkeleri ile karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yapılabilir. Tez, demokratik geçiş sürecinde ülkelerin sivil toplumunun, sivil-asker ilişkilerinin ve politik ekonomilerinin önemini de ortaya koymaktadır. Bu nedenle bu tez, konuyla ilgili gelecekteki araştırmalar için bir yol haritası sunmayı önermektedir.

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TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): The Arab Uprisings and the Divergence Between Tunisia and Egypt: A Comparative Analysis

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